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Introduction 
  
Political events usually have a noticeable impact on financial markets. For instance, the victory 
of the Turkish conservative government on 1 November 2015 induced both stock market prices 
and the value of the Lira to increase significantly.1 Such behaviour of investors has also been 
frequently noted in political and historical literature (Leblang and Mukherjee 2005; Bechtel 
2009; Turner and Zhan 2012). Likewise, firms-specific events like mergers (Moeller et al. 2005) 
or earnings announcements (Garfinkel and Sokobin 2006) result in large share price reactions. 
The notion that share prices reflect relevant information is condensed under the efficient market 
hypothesis by Eugene Fama (1970) which, in its semi-strong form, states that financial markets 
incorporate all available information instantly. In other words, a price is determined, in addition 
to its behaviour in the past, by publicly-known political and economic events.2 
This thesis considers one specific historical market in most parts: the Berlin Stock Exchange. 
This stock exchange is considered to have been largely information efficient since as early as 
the late 19th century, both in the low  (Baltzer 2006; Gehrig and Fohlin 2006; Gelman and 
Burhop 2008),3 and the semi-strong form (Burhop 2011, Lehmann-Hasemeyer et al. 2014, 
etc.).4 Given a largely efficient market and, moreover, rational and profit-maximising market 
participants, one can in turn infer from their investment behaviour. Such an approach is the 
basis of the studies presented here. The investor’s reaction to various political news allows, by 
implication, for a precise assessment of that information – therefore, this thesis aims to add to 
the commonly-known historical or theoretical economic view by adding the view of (well-
informed) contemporaries. Two broad research questions are addressed: First, in how far did 
firms benefit from a political connection? And second, did historical financial markets react to 
various political events?5 
                                                 
1 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2 November 2015. 
2 In the weak form, only historical data is relevant for price formation. A strongly information-efficient market 
incorporates even non-public (insider) information. For an overview of the vast literature, see Malkiel (2003). 
3 Gelman and Burhop (2008) find returns at the Berlin stock exchange prior to World War I to be largely 
autocorrelated. The extent of price predictability matches that of modern stock markets. Gehrig and Fohlin (2006) 
detect a strikingly low spread of returns. Baltzer (2006) discovers a low price differential between Vienna and 
Berlin considering Austrian-based companies. In fact, the Berlin stock exchange was decisive for price formation. 
Its general importance for German economic development is further emphasised by Lehmann (2014).     
4 The underpricing of IPOs was induced mainly by the information available to underwriters in the form of 
incorporators’ rights (Burhop 2011). Lehmann-Hasemeyer et al. (2014) perform an event study with regard to a 
change in electoral law. According to their study, the prices of affected firms react quite sensitively to political or 
economic information. 
5 While the former question is quite straightforward, the latter needs to be applied to a more specific setting. See 
the third chapter. 
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As illustrated by the above examples, markets can be affected at both the micro and the macro 
level. The former situation is utilised in the first two chapters. There, for a single firm, the 
possible benefits arising from a link to politics are considered. These comprise many aspects, 
ranging from mere signalling effects and preferential access to information to actual political 
corruption like the placing of government contacts. Such deceptive practices made massive 
waves in the considered period. Some huge scandals in interwar Germany relate directly to the 
advantages arising from close ties between businessmen and high-ranking officials.6 The 
protagonists involved some illustrious personalities of that time like the former chancellor, 
Gustav Bauer (Malinowski 1996; Geyer 2014).7  
Connections between business and politics are also the subject of contemporary public debates. 
One of the most notable is probably Richard Cheney’s move to the private sector. As the former 
US Secretary of Defence and an influential politician for many years he turned out to be highly 
valuable for his new employer (Fisman et al. 2012). In the German context, former Chancellor, 
Gerhard Schröder, comes to mind. When he became the chairman of the supervisory board of 
a Russo-German pipeline operator, the event was extensively discussed in the media.8 Empirical 
literature on the issue finds a connection to be highly beneficial in terms of market performance. 
To which extent a firm can benefit depends largely on the political environment of a market, 
such as the quality of legal institutions, the level of corruption or possible restrictions on 
investment (Pantzalis et al. 2000; Faccio 2006). Accordingly, many authors have focussed on 
developing countries in Asia such as Indonesia, Thailand or Malaysia (Fisman 2001; 
Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang 2009; Chen et al. 2013). Also, connections to the 
Communist Party of China provide excellent opportunity to test their effectiveness (Li et al. 
2006, 2008; Feng et al. 2015).9 There are a substantial number of studies on the United States 
as well. There, personal affiliations to central political figures have proven highly valuable 
(Fisman et al. 2012; Acemoglu et al. 2013). Ferguson and Voth (2008) explore early 
connections to the National Socialist Party. This most extreme setting offers an ideal occasion 
to exploit links to the ruling party – accordingly, the advantages for connected firms were huge. 
In Britain, Braggion and Moore (2013) find gains from a link to politics as early as Victorian 
times. Still, the German historical context is largely unexplored in that regard. The first study 
                                                 
6 These scandals have become generally known under the names of Sklarz, Barmat and Sklarek, respectively.  
7 Newspapers have speculated about an involvement of further well-known figures like President Friedrich Ebert 
or Chancellor Philipp Scheidemann. Regardless of the veracity of such reporting, these cases won exceptional 
notoriety. All the ingredients for a substantial scandal were at hand: excessive luxury, wild festivities and an 
expansive lifestyle of the involved persons. 
8 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 12 December 2005 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 3 April 2006. 
9 Its many provinces offer large variation in explanatory factors to exploit. 
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aims at closing that gap by giving an overall picture of political connections in the pre- and 
interwar period. This particular survey period allows us to make a clear statement on the 
effectiveness of a connection under monarchy, democracy and dictatorship, respectively. In 
contrast to cross-country studies, this panel-like approach considers the political environment 
in one and the same country, keeping the economic and social conditions mostly constant. In 
fact, a sizeable share of firms in the sample remains the same. The dataset is most 
comprehensive, as it covers all companies listed on the Berlin Exchange in each period. In 
contrast to, for example, Faccio (2000) or Ferguson and Voth (2008), a connection is defined 
in a very straightforward manner: a firm is considered connected if one of its supervisory board 
members is a current or former member of parliament.10 The data sources further allow us to 
take account of the quality of a connection: economic and political heavyweights are expected 
to have different impacts. Likewise, the affiliated party can play a decisive role for firm 
performance (Santa-Clara and Valkanov 2003): performance should improve to a special 
degree if the connected party is part of the current government. However, an actual 
parliamentary government existed only in the Weimar Republic. The Imperial parliament was 
relatively weak, whereas the power of the ruling National Socialist party was the most far-
reaching: again, the various regime types are crucially important for stock market 
performance.11 The same applies for general firm characteristics (Boubakri et al. 2008). Several 
of these are controlled for in the analysis, which comprises an ordinary least squares regression 
setup as well as further robustness checks. In addition, a survival analysis of firm failure reveals 
how a political connection can increase the chances of remaining in the market. A close 
affiliation to politics appears to be particularly beneficial in that regard. Such an affiliation is 
often accompanied by preferential access to credit via state-controlled banks and other 
governmental institutions (Li et al. 2008; Chan et al. 2012). Moreover, the chance of receiving 
a bailout by the government in case of financial problems is largely increased (Faccio et al. 
2006; Blau et al. 2013; Grossman and Woll 2014). 
 
While the first paper is descriptive in large parts, the second tries to establish a causal link 
between firm performance and political connections. The overall setting resembles the all-
regime case, however, only the democratic Weimar period is considered. This appears 
particularly suited for several reasons: First, for the first time in its history Germany was an 
                                                 
10 The mentioned authors also incorporate financial donations or other personal links. Given the size of the sample, 
as well as the variety of political parties, such an approach seems virtually impossible.  
11 In addition, accounting performance in terms of the returns on assets is considered.  
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actual parliamentary democracy which included a wide landscape of political parties. 
Furthermore, large anecdotal evidence suggests the effectiveness of links to politics. Finally, 
the young republic underwent severe economic crises. In these, the firms’ need for capital was 
exceedingly high and political support promised to be of great assistance in reducing investment 
risk in times of instability.12 Therefore, such a period provides an ideal occasion to test the 
actual impact of a connection. In particular, the years 1922 to 1924 are considered in a 
difference-in-differences-like setting, where the hyperinflation in 1923 serves as an exogenous 
shock to the economy. A sample of the 30 largest firms – taken from the blue-chip index of 
Ronge (2002) – is evaluated with regard to firm performance during and in the aftermath of the 
crisis. 
 
The third study of this thesis concerns the overall market effects of political events. It uses 
Imperial Russia as a setting, specifically the period around the Revolution of 1905. This period 
was quite troubled in many aspects: it involved far-reaching political upheaval as well as a 
military engagement, in which Russia suffered an unexpected defeat. The Revolution of 1905 
constitutes some remarkable changes in the country’s political history, including the 
establishment of a parliament and the granting of extensive civil rights. However, these were 
revoked shortly afterwards. The surprise character of most happenings allows to effectively 
apply event study methodology. An assessment of the immediate market reaction to political 
and war-related events has various implications: First, it reveals the investor’s attitude towards 
democratic change in general. Literature on this issue finds their view to be rather negative 
(Turner and Zhan 2012; Lehmann-Hasemeyer et al. 2014). In theory on the other hand, a 
positive effect can arise from the easing of political pressure by the masses. The revolutionary 
character of various events allows to particularly address this threat of revolution hypothesis 
brought forward by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).  
Regarding the state of democratisation in Imperial Russia, the view of historians is inconsistent 
(Walkin 1964, Fröhlich 1981 or Bradley 2002). The result of this study can help to answer the 
question of whether the country could possibly have followed other western European states 
and gradually adopted democratic rights. After all, in the view of involved protagonists like 
Sergey Witte, the revolution resulted from the Tsar’s ‘…wavering and not from Russia’s desire 
for revolution’ (Frankel 2007, p. 57).  
                                                 
12 See the above-mentioned literature on firm survival.  
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The second set of events, relating to the Russo-Japanese War – yet unutilised in this context – 
is evaluated referring to the existing studies on the economic impact of wars. The literature 
comprises basically two conflicts, the American Civil War (Willard et al. 1996; Brown and 
Burdekin 2000) and World War II (Frey and Kucher 2000; Oosterlinck 2003). All authors find 
financial markets to be largely affected, however, not always in line with historical narrative.   
Finally, since the paper considers two government bonds traded on both the Berlin and the Saint 
Petersburg Stock Exchange, these two markets can be compared. The former has been found to 
be largely efficient, as can be seen from the above literature. The efficiency of the latter, on the 
other hand – though the major financial market in Russia – has been questioned (Papp 2001; 
Borodkin et al. 2006). However, it is as yet largely unexplored. A comparison of the respective 
price movement allows a statement to be made about the efficiency of the Saint Petersburg 
Stock Exchange at the turn of the century. 
The main findings of all three studies are outlined in the conclusion at the end of this thesis.  
 
 
  
 
6 
 
References 
 
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2000). Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, 
inequality, and growth in historical perspective. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1167–1199. 
 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Kermani, A., Kwak, J., & Mitton, T. (2013). The Value of 
Connections in Turbulent Times: Evidence from the United States. NBER Working Paper. 
 
Baltzer, M. (2006). Cross-listed stocks as an information vehicle of speculation: Evidence from 
European cross-listings in the early 1870s. European Review of Economic History, 10(3), 301–
327. 
 
Bechtel, M. M. (2009). The political sources of systematic investment risk: Lessons from a 
consensus democracy. The Journal of Politics, 71(02), 661–677. 
 
Blau, B. M., Brough, T. J., & Thomas, D. W. (2013). Corporate lobbying, political connections, 
and the bailout of banks. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(8), 3007–3017. 
 
Borodkin, L., Konovalova, A., & Perelman, G. (2006). St. Petersburg Stock Exchange in the 
Time of Economic Depression, War and Revolution: Does Instability Matter? In: XIV 
International Economic History Congress, Helsinki. 
 
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J. C., & Saffar, W. (2008). Political connections of newly privatized 
firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(5), 654–673. 
 
Bradley, J. (2002). Subjects into Citizens: Societies, Civil Society, and Autocracy in Tsarist 
Russia. The American Historical Review, 107(4), 1094–1123. 
 
Braggion, F. and Moore, L. (2013). The Economic Benefits of Political Connections in Late 
Victorian Britain. The Journal of Economic History, 73(1), 142–176. 
 
Brown, W. O., & Burdekin, R. C. (2000). Turning points in the US civil war: a British 
perspective. The Journal of Economic History, 60(01), 216–231. 
 
Bunkanwanicha, P. and Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2009). Big Business Owners in Politics 
Review of. Financial. Studies, 22 (6): 2133–2168. 
 
Burhop, C. (2011). The underpricing of initial public offerings at the Berlin Stock Exchange, 
1870–96. German Economic Review, 12(1), 11–32. 
 
Chan, K. S., Dang, V. Q., & Yan, I. K. (2012). Chinese firms’ political connection, 
ownership, and financing constraints. Economics Letters, 115(2), 164–167. 
 
Chen, C. M., Ariff, M., Hassan, T., & Mohamad, S. (2013). Does a firm’s political connection 
to government have economic value? Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 18(3), 477–501. 
 
Faccio, M. (2006). Politically Connected Firms. The American Economic Review, 96 (1), 
369–386. 
 
7 
 
Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., & McConnell, J. (2006). Political connections and corporate 
bailouts. The Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2597–2635. 
 
Fama, E. (1970). Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. Journal 
of Finance, 25(2), 383–417. 
 
Feng, X., Johansson, A. C., & Zhang, T. (2015). Mixing business with politics: Political 
participation by entrepreneurs in China. Journal of Banking & Finance, 59, 220–235. 
 
Ferguson, T., & Voth, H. J. (2008). Betting on Hitler: the value of political connections in Nazi 
Germany. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101–137. 
 
Fisman, R. (2001). Estimating the Value of Political Connections. The American Economic 
Review, 91(4), 1095–1102. 
 
Fisman, D., Fisman, R. J., Galef, J., Khurana, R., & Wang, Y. (2012). Estimating the value of 
connections to Vice-President Cheney. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 12(3). 
 
Frankel, J. (2007). The War and the Fate of Tsarist Autocracy. In: Kowner, R. (Ed.). (2007).The 
Impact of the Russo-Japanese War. Routledge: London. 
 
Frey, B. S., & Kucher, M. (2000). History as reflected in capital markets: the case of World 
War II. The Journal of Economic History, 60(02), 468–496. 
 
Fröhlich, K. (1981). The Emergence of Russian Constitutionalism, 1900-1914. The relation 
between social mobilization and political group formation in pre-revolutionary Russia, Den 
Haag. 
 
Garfinkel, J. A., & Sokobin, J. (2006). Volume, opinion divergence, and returns: A study of 
post–earnings announcement drift. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(1), 85–112. 
 
Gehrig, T., & Fohlin, C. (2006). Trading costs in early securities markets: the case of the Berlin 
Stock Exchange 1880–1910. Review of Finance, 10(4), 587–612. 
 
Gelman, S., & Burhop, C. (2008). Taxation, regulation and the information efficiency of the 
Berlin stock exchange, 1892–1913. European Review of Economic History, 12(1), 39–66. 
 
Geyer, M. H. (2014). Korruptionsdebatten in der Zeit der Revolution 1918/19. 
Demokratiegeschichte als Zäsurgeschichte: Diskurse der frühen Weimarer Republik, 5, 333. 
 
Grossman, E., & Woll, C. (2014). Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts. 
Comparative Political Studies, 47(4), 574–600. 
 
Leblang, D., & Mukherjee, B. (2005). Government partisanship, elections, and the stock 
market: examining American and British stock returns, 1930–2000. American Journal of 
Political Science, 49(4), 780–802. 
 
Li, H., Meng, L., & Zhang, J. (2006). Why do entrepreneurs enter politics? Evidence from 
China. Economic Inquiry, 44(3), 559–578. 
 
8 
 
Li, H. Meng, L. Wang, Q. and Zhou, L. (2008) Political connections, financing and firm 
performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms. Journal of Development Economics, 87(2).  
 
Lehmann, S. H. (2014). Taking firms to the stock market: IPOs and the importance of large 
banks in imperial Germany, 1896–1913. The Economic History Review, 67(1), 92–122. 
 
Lehmann-Hasemeyer, S., Hauber, P., & Opitz, A. (2014). The Political Stock Market in the 
German Kaiserreich—Do Markets Punish the Extension of the Suffrage to the Benefit of the 
Working Class? Evidence from Saxony. The Journal of Economic History, 74(04), 1140–1167. 
 
Malinowski, S. (1996). Politische Skandale als Zerrspiegel der Demokratie. Die Fälle Barmat 
und Sklarek im Kalkül der Weimarer Rechten. Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung, 5, 46–
65. 
 
Malkiel, B. G. (2003). The efficient market hypothesis and its critics. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 17(1), 59–82. 
 
Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P., & Stulz, R. M. (2005). Wealth destruction on a massive 
scale? A study of acquiring‐firm returns in the recent merger wave. The Journal of Finance, 
60(2), 757–782. 
 
Oosterlinck, K. (2003). The bond market and the legitimacy of Vichy France. Explorations in 
Economic History, 40(3), 326–344. 
 
Pantzalis, C., Stangeland, D. A., & Turtle, H. J. (2000). Political elections and the resolution of 
uncertainty: the international evidence. Journal of banking & finance, 24(10), 1575–1604. 
 
Papp, R. G. (2001). The Development of a Domestic Stock Market in St. Petersburg in Late 
Imperial Russia. Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University. 
 
Ronge, U. (2002). Die langfristige Rendite deutscher Standardaktien. Europäische 
Hochschulschriften, 2901. 
 
Santa‐Clara, P., & Valkanov, R. (2003). The presidential puzzle: Political cycles and the stock 
market. The Journal of Finance, 58(5), 1841–1872. 
 
Turner, J. and Zhan, W. (2012). Property rights and competing for the affections of Demos: the 
impact of the 1867 Reform Act on stock prices. Public Choice 150, 609–631. 
 
Walkin, Jacob (1964). The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia: Political and Social 
Institutions under the Last Three Tsars. Science and Society 28(3), 340–342. 
 
Willard, K. L., Guinnane, T. W., & Rosen, H. S. (1996). Turning Points in the Civil War: Views 
from the Greenback Market. The American Economic Review, 1001–1018. 
9 
 
Contemporary newspapers 
  
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 12 December 2005 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 3 April 2006 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2 November 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
11 
 
 
Chapter I 
– 
‘Survival of the knittest’ 
The value of political connections in pre- and interwar Germany13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper finds widespread connections between firms and the parliament in pre- and interwar 
Germany. We also give a comprehensive overview of respective firm and party characteristics. 
Unlike previous work, the sample includes three different periods, representing three distinct 
political systems. We show that regime type mattered a lot, since connections did not add value 
to a firm homogeneously during monarchy, democracy and dictatorship. They proved effective 
in general only under National Socialist rule, consistent with previous literature. In the Weimar 
Republic, only political and economic heavyweights paid off, while in Imperial Germany firms 
could not benefit from a link to the parliament. In addition, we consider the probability of a 
firm to remain on the market and come to another substantial finding: connected firms were 
more likely to survive than their non-connected counterparts, especially in times of crisis. 
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13 This paper is co-authored with Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer (University of Hohenheim). 
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Introduction 
 
Connections between the economic sphere and politics have been repeatedly making the 
headlines in recent decades. Newspapers are usually keen to report whenever a high-ranking 
official gets appointed in private business, with comments ranging from simple discussions on 
the possible advantages for involved sides to the suspicion of actual deceptive practices. A 
recent example is Daniel Bahr, the former German Minister of Health, who was appointed 
executive board member of the private health insurance Allianz in 2014.14 Even less transparent 
was the designation of ex-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder as chairman of the supervisory board 
of the Russo-German pipeline operator Nordstream. There was an extensive debate over 
whether an engagement of such dimensions was inappropriate for a former leader of a country 
and, moreover, whether it provided the company with actual benefits – in the form of 
government credit guarantees granted shortly afterwards.15 Probably one of the most prominent 
cases of lobbying was the decision of Richard Cheney, former US Secretary of Defence and an 
influential politician for many years, to join the private sector. When the oil field service 
company Halliburton nominated him as CEO, the consequences were extensively discussed 
both in public as well as in academia (Fisman et al. 2012).16 
 
However, the presence of a politician in business or vice versa is not a new phenomenon. Gustav 
Stresemann, for instance, later German Chancellor and minister of foreign affairs, started his 
career as a representative of an industrial association. After joining the National Liberal Party 
in late Imperial Germany, his influence on both a political and an economic level proved highly 
effective (Stegmann 1976; Pohl 1995).  
For the involved firm, a link with politics could be highly profitable. A prominent example is 
the Hamburg-based tobacco company Reemtsma. Due to its political ties, it obtained 
information on a planned amendment well before its competitors. Reemtsma was able to adjust 
to the new legal situation early, which resulted in large profits (Klein 2014, pp. 421). Another 
case of interconnection of business and politics caused a large scandal in interwar Germany. 
Companies owned by the brothers Barmat obtained substantial loans by state-controlled banks. 
When these defaulted, the close relations between firm owners and high-ranking politicians 
came to light (Malinowski 1996, pp. 46). 
                                                 
14 See Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 September 2014.  
15 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 12 December 2005 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 3 April 2006. 
16 See The New York Times, 11 August 1995. 
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Hiring an influential politician does not come for free.17 Firms must have clear expectations 
about the resulting advantages.  However, in which way a possible benefit can materialise is 
not always obvious.18 To begin with, a connected politician might influence legislation directly 
on behalf of the firm. Though this way requires the least phantasy, it is also the least plausible 
one.19 A more likely benefit is a preferential treatment in the placing of public contracts. 
However, such practices are limited to certain branches like, for instance, public services or 
transportation. Multiple advantages arise from improved access to political information.20 
Finally, in case of financial problems, firms linked to politics might receive public support more 
easily – for instance, in the form of a bailout. 
 
Prior research found political connections to be highly beneficial for involved firms. The aim 
of this study is to identify political connections in pre- and interwar Germany. In addition, we 
assess whether these proved advantageous for a firm, both with regard to its market 
performance and also its ability to survive over time.21 Unlike most other work on this issue, 
we follow a highly comprehensive approach: First, the dataset includes all joint stock 
companies listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange. Also, we survey these at three different points 
of time, in 1913, 1925 and 1938. Even though the time horizon is relatively short, it includes 
three totally different regime types, which enables us to precisely determine the effectiveness 
of a connection in each of these: Monarchy, democracy and dictatorship. Here, the general 
                                                 
17 The regular salary for board members differed among firms in Germany at that time (Saling 1921, p. 123). 
Excessive compensation of board members was subject to intensive discussions during the first half of the 20th 
century (Lieder 2006, pp. 198). Aside from this, other implicit past or current benefits might have played a role. 
In his profound study of corporate-political interaction, Mark Mizruchi (1992) illustrates, among other things, the 
determinants and effects of campaign contributions in the US.   
18 The literature identifies various channels of transmission. See the next section for an overview. 
19 First, the impact of a single person on the legislative process is likely to be overrated. Furthermore, in most cases 
a law does not affect single firms. Rather, it pertains to the economy or at least parts of it as a whole, which leads 
to a classical free rider problem: Competitors could profit in an equal manner from a connection without facing its 
costs. For that reason, influencing regulation and legislation is mainly left to industry-specific interest groups, as 
suggested by theoretical (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998) as well as historical evidence (DiLorenzo 1985). Attempts 
to directly influence legislation was common practice even in the highest circle of politics, as the case of alleged 
bribery of the German President Hindenburg illustrates. In return for the gift of the manor Neudeck he supposedly 
favoured the benefactors in the allocation of state financial aid (Klein 2014, pp. 450). 
20 For instance, the altering of regulation can greatly affect business. A connected firm is likely to received 
respective information at an early stage. Accordingly, it adjusts more quickly than its competitors. Further indirect 
benefits might arise from signalling: An affiliation to a politician suggests high integrity, which in turn can 
facilitate business and access to capital. 
21 To our knowledge, this is the first application of survival analysis methodology with respect to political 
connections. 
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impact of the political environment with regard to connections is revealed more accurately than 
in previous (cross-country) studies, as our setting remains largely the same.22 
 
Amongst stock companies in pre- and interwar Germany, links to politics were widespread. 
However, they did not pay off equally in all regime types in terms of market performance. We 
only detect an impact on the share prices for the Weimar Republic and the National Socialist 
rule. The size of that effect further depends on the quality of the connection itself. A major 
finding is derived from survival analysis: The probability of a firm to stay in the market is 
significantly increased by the prevalence of a political connection.   
 
The study is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature and hypotheses. Also, 
the three different time periods are briefly depicted along with some stylised features. After the 
dataset has been introduced, the prevalence of political connections in Germany becomes 
manifest in the descriptive section. How these affected actual firm performance is evaluated by 
the following ordinary least square regression including various robustness checks. Further, a 
survival analysis further reveals the higher probability of connected firms to remain on the 
market. A final section outlines the results.  
 
The value of a political connection 
 
Generally, we expect a connection to be beneficial for a firm. Possible channels of transmission 
are well-documented in both literature and by historical examples.23 For instance, political 
information might provide a competitive edge in the market. As mentioned in the introduction, 
such a case is well illustrated by the cigarette producer Reemtsma, which gained a sizable 
advantage by adapting early to a change in tax legislation on tobacco. In 1925 the government 
attempted to alleviate its chronic shortage of money by imposing a tax on the warehousing of 
raw tobacco. If stored inside a company, the tobacco was from then on assessed for taxation. 
Well before the law got enacted, Reemtsma got access to details of the drafting by a political 
side. By then, the company had outsourced its material stock and was able to avoid taxation – 
unlike many of its competitors. Its alleged connection to the government proved valuable once 
                                                 
22 So did the various German stock companies on which the analysis is based.   
23 There is a lot of evidence in the interwar period. In Imperial Germany, explicit cases of taking advantage due to 
a connection to the parliament or a political party are rare, probably as a consequence of their lacking competences. 
However, this does not hold for political corruption in general. For a much-debated example of explicit bribery of 
the public authorities by the steel producer Krupp, see Bösch (2005). 
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more in the following years when the firm was greatly backed in a case of tax fraud (Klein 
2014, pp. 421).  
 
Most of the literature on political connections employs event study methodology. That draws 
on the reaction of companies’ share prices – reflecting the expectations of investors. There 
seems to be a considerable payoff for firms that are linked to politics, returns on their shares 
are much above the average market. The magnitude of such ‘abnormal’ stock returns further 
depends on the degree of political and economic freedom prevalent in the respective market 
(Pantzalis et al. 2000). In less free countries the effect appears to be more pronounced, which 
might be the reason for the large emphasis that has been put on developing countries. Many 
studies have focussed on south-east Asia. Raymond Fisman (2001) draws on firms connected 
to President Suharto in Indonesia, Cailian Chen et al. (2013) follow a similar approach for 
Malaysia. Both of these event studies detect positive abnormal returns for firms linked to the 
government. Pramuan Bunkanwanicha and Yupana Wiwattanakantang (2009) take Thailand as 
the setting of their research and come to the same finding.24  
There is substantial work on China after the period of liberalisation of its economy in the early 
1990s. Its many provinces provide an excellent framework to test for different determinants of 
a connection and, furthermore, which of those turned out to be valuable (Li et al. 2006). An 
affiliation with the communist party – despite the lack of ideological consistency – does indeed 
increase the stock market performance of a firm (Li et al. 2008; Feng et al. 2015). Just as in 
cross-country studies, the institutional environment is highly relevant. Weak legal as well as 
weak regulatory institutions obviously provide an incentive for a firm to establish a connection.  
Of the highly developed countries the most emphasis has been placed on the United States. 
Authors focus mainly on personal affiliations to important politicians. For instance, connections 
to Vice-President Richard Cheney appear quite useful. Any event that widens or just backs up 
his position a rise of corresponding share prices (Fisman et al. 2012).25 Likewise, affiliations to 
the Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, have a positive impact on market performance 
(Acemoglu et al. 2013). US Senator James Jefford embodies another rewarding example for 
such a relation (Jayachandran 2006). Also, if links to a political party as a whole are taken into 
                                                 
24 Unlike the other two studies, Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009) focus only on firms owned by 
influential business families. If one of their members run for an election, the firm performs significantly better in 
the capital market. 
25 The relation also holds vice-versa. Potentially negative events, like Cheney’s two heart attacks, resulted in a 
negative price reaction of corresponding shares. 
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consideration, the effect persists. Stock market investors appreciate the presence of a political 
connection (Goldman et al. 2009; 2013).  
Studies in a historical context are, unfortunately, rather scarce. Fabio Braggion and Lyndon 
Moore (2013) conducted an event study based on connected firms in late Victorian Britain. 
They detected significant positive abnormal returns only for ‘new technology’ firms with links 
to a member of parliament.26 The existence of a connection largely facilitated the raising of new 
capital: both new shares and debt issues could be placed at the London Stock Exchange in 
favourable conditions.  
The work by Thomas Ferguson and Hans-Joachim Voth (2008) is the most famous in a 
historical German context. They conducted an event study based on companies that were linked 
to the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) before Adolf Hitler came to power. 
The market performance of these firms exceeded that of non-connected ones to a great measure 
– after the seizure of power in 1933. An event as extreme as this constitutes a perfect natural 
experiment. It illustrates the impact a connection can have if the corresponding political party 
is able to exercise supreme rule. Our sample also includes the period of National Socialist rule. 
The results of Fergusson and Voth provide an excellent benchmark to compare our results to, 
although the research design differs slightly.27  
 
In order to identify the impact of political connections in pre- and interwar Germany, we first 
investigate their general prevalence. Moreover, the performance of connected firms is assessed 
– regarding both stock market valuation and actual profitability. For this purpose we employ 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-effects panel regression models. Moreover, two 
matching procedures are used to check the robustness of the results. Given the above literature, 
our general expectations with regard to the value of a connection condense to the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Politically connected firms outperform their non-connected counterparts. 
 
That primarily refers to market performance as reflected in share prices. Surprisingly, 
considering the actual accounting performance the picture appears contrary: Mara Faccio 
(2010) finds that connected firms display significantly lower returns on assets than their non-
                                                 
26 New technology firms in the considered period of time are those operating in the chemical industry, electricity 
supply, electricity generation and bicycle as well as motorcar production. 
27 So does the definition of a political connection. See Ferguson and Voth (2008, pp. 108). 
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connected counterparts. Checking across countries, Narjess Boubakri et al. (2008, p. 667) come 
to quite similar results. Marianne Betrand et al. (2006, p. 24) see such a negative correlation 
investigating French stock companies. By reference to Malaysia, Heather Mitchel and Saramma 
Joseph (2010) detect an at best weak positive relationship between links to politics and 
profitability. Joseph Fan et al. (2007) document a poor post-privatisation performance for 
connected firms in China. Accordingly, we expect acounting overall performance in terms of 
the return on assets to be weak at best.  
An additional direct benefit of a connection consists of the preferential treatment in the placing 
of public contracts on grounds of political ties. A remarkable suchlike case concerns the supply 
of the municipality of Berlin with workwear. In the late 1920s lucrative contracts were given 
exclusively to firms owned by three brothers named Sklarek. To close these deals, they utilised 
a widespread network to the municipal government. Again, as in the case of Reemtsma, the 
result was huge profits for the affiliated firm (Klein 2014, p.298). Eitan Goldman et al. (2013) 
evaluate such practise empirically in the US. There, connected firms are much favoured in 
public procurement.28 The above hypothesis can be adjusted accordingly: As certain sectors are 
impacted in particular, their performance is expected to gain most through a connection.29   
Whether a firm seeks the proximity to politics depends not just on the environment but also on 
the firm itself.  Boubakri et al. (2008) discover a set of firm characteristics to be important: Its 
size, the location of the headquarters, the leverage, and the number of employees are apparently 
significant determinants of connectedness. Apart from geographic location the ownership 
structure appears to influence the relation of the political links and the value of a firm (Faccio 
and Parsley 2009). Braggion and Moore (2013) find that the age of a company plays a role. In 
this study we control for firm characteristics with respect to joint stock capital, firm age, 
location of a firm and the sector of business activity, all of which are available in our data 
sources.  
 
A firm’s choice of appointing a politician is likely to depend on his political background. In 
present-day Germany, for instance, liberal parties are interlinked with business far more often 
than their – particularly left-wing – counterparts (Niessen and Ruenzi 2010). However, final 
evidence of the actual market performance has not yet been established. Some work examines 
                                                 
28 More specifically, Goldman et al. (2013) analyse public procurement after elections for both the US House of 
Representatives and Senate. Firms connected to the winning party receive increased access to public contracts and 
vice versa.   
29 In our sample these are public utility and transportation companies. Also, the sole prevalence of connections 
should be exceedingly high in these sectors. 
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elections and other political events and thereby tries to assess the benefits that accompany a 
specific political party. However, the impact of such party effect is inconsistent, at least across 
different countries. In the US, market reactions seem to depend on the specific party affiliation 
(Lobo 1999; Santa‐Clara and Valkanov 2003). Investors in Germany, on the other hand, do not 
differentiate between left-wing and right-wing governments in terms of trading behaviour 
(Döpke and Pierdzioch 2006).30  
We can clearly identify the political party of any connection. For reasons of clarity – a general 
model of party influence is difficult to establish – we distinguish only between two broad 
categories: A connection to any member of parliament (MP) and a connection via a politician 
that is a member of the currently governing party. In general, we expect the latter to improve 
firm performance to a far larger extent. Access to the government and the state bureaucracy can 
extend the scope of influence on legislation, as well as on regulatory issues.  
An actual parliamentary government existed only in the Weimar Republic.31 In Imperial 
Germany, the government was installed by the Emperor alone. The passage of a bill, however, 
still required a majority of votes in the parliament. As a consequence, the continuous search 
and formation of coalitions was a distinct feature of the Imperial period. We consider those 
parties which were usually supportive of the government and as a consequence had an influence 
over a large part of legislation as governmental. Over time, these alliances between government 
and parties varied a lot. A well-k example of the early years was Bismarck’s shift from a liberal 
to a conservative political orientation in 1879. That brought with it a break with the hitherto 
‘governing’ National Liberal Party (Wehler 1994, p.68). In the years prior to World War I, the 
cooperation of the Conservatives and Centre Party – known as the ‘blue-black bloc’ – was the 
basis of most of the legislation (Huber 1969, p. 322). Therefore, these two parties are considered 
as governing ones in the sample year 1913.  
It is straightforward to determine that in 1938 the government was solely composed of members 
of the National Socialist Party. In fact, that was the only legal party at all at that time. Table 6 
provides an overview.  
Apart from party background, it seems hardly realistic that the value added by a political 
connection is homogeneous. Rather, it depends on the involved politician’s position, his 
influence at the party level, the size of his political and business network, and so on. Therefore, 
                                                 
30 The impact of different political parties is examined in greater detail in part II of this thesis: As only in the 
Weimar Republic a larger spectrum of political parties existed, this period provides an ideal setting. The other 
sample periods are less appropriate to analyse. In Imperial times, an actual political party structure was not yet 
developed – except for the Social Democracy. The last period – 1938 – is even less suitable as only one political 
party was existent. 
31 At that time the government consisted of BVP, DDP, DVP and Centre Party, see table 6. 
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a number of key figures are taken into consideration. They represented the core of the economic 
and – whether active or former members of parliament – the political scene in Germany. The 
outstanding position of a few MPs which hold several board seats is also emphasised in 
contemporary newspaper reports. (Morus 1925). Supposedly, these heavyweights possessed by 
far the largest influence among all connections. Accordingly, firms affiliated to such a pivotal 
figure should have benefitted the most.32  
 
The effectiveness of a political connection is dependent on the political party and the position 
of the affiliated person. Members of the governing party and political and economic 
heavyweights are expected to add most to a firm’s value.  
 
The very same protagonists as previously mentioned, the brothers Sklarek, were further 
involved in a notorious lending scandal. It became known to the public that Sklarek-owned 
firms were granted sizeable loans by a state bank – without any substantial collateral (Klein 
2014, pp. 298).33 Such practice is exemplary of one of the most effective channels through 
which a connection can generate value: facilitated access to capital. First, a connection has a 
signalling effect for other market participants – whether at the stock market or bank level: A 
well-known politician on the board of a firm increases its creditworthiness. As just delineated, 
capital can also be raised by means of actual corruption. There is further anecdotal evidence of 
the granting of credit without sufficient coverage, i.e. on the basis of political ties only, during 
the interwar period. Mainly state-owned banks, as well as diverse politicians, were involved in 
these more or less corrupt deals. The alleged misuse of the Ruhrhilfe, for instance, originally 
intended for those who had been afflicted with the French occupation of the Ruhr area, led to 
heated debates in and outside the parliament. Finally, a parliamentary commission concluded 
that governmental credits were to be given in favour of big business only – of course well 
interlinked with high-ranking officials (Klein 2014, pp. 226). Another example of preferential 
access to bank loans is given by the brothers Barmat. They had established close ties to the 
highest ranks of politics, including former Chancellor Gustav Bauer.34 As a result, Barmat-
                                                 
32 We employ two measures for the value of single politicians – the first refers to the economic and the second to 
political value. A detailed description can be found in the data section.  
33 The case of Sklarek won exceptional notoriety as it comprised all the ingredients for a substantial scandal: 
excessive luxury, wild festivities and an expansive and comfortable lifestyle of all persons involved.   
34 Also, newspapers speculated about a connection to President Friedrich Ebert. The whole case was scandalised 
to great extent by the right-wing and anti-democratic camp. First, the involved politicians were Social Democrats. 
Moreover, the Barmats had a Jewish background. Bot factors provided ideal occasion to reveal the alleged 
weakness of the system. 
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owned firms received large credit by state-controlled banks did not check the coverage 
sufficiently (Malinowski 1996, pp. 48).35  
In line with anecdotal evidence, a large part of the literature on political connections emphasizes 
the access to capital as a main benefit. The majority focusses on emerging markets. For 
example, Chinese businessmen with a communist party membership have access to a largely 
enhanced amount of loans given by state-controlled banks and other governmental institutions 
(Li et al. 2008). Kenneth Chan et al. (2012) come to the same result examining Shanghai-listed 
stock companies. As for Pakistan, Asim Khwaja and Atif Mian (2005) find a highly increased 
share of borrowed capital if a firm has a political connection. Moreover, the access to credit via 
government-controlled banks is apparently given independently of any economic factors, but 
simply due to the connection itself.36 An even negative relationship between economic 
performance and connectedness is observed by Christian Leuz and Felix Oberholzer-Gee 
(2006): Indonesian firms affiliated with the regime of President Suharto have much less access 
to foreign capital markets as a consequence of their poor accounting. At the same time, these 
firms are strongly supported by the government and therefore have greatly facilitated access to 
credit via domestic banks. Also, their performance in times of crisis is inferior to their non-
connected counterparts. Mark Bliss and Ferdinand Gul (2012) report the same relation for 
Malaysia: connected firms are characterised by higher leverage and a lower return on assts. 
Also Narjess Boubakri et al. (2008, p. 667) detect a particularly poor accounting performance.37 
In sum, one incentive to link up with politics – not only in times of crises – might be to avoid 
competition with other, more profitable firms. First, a politician can increase the trustworthiness 
of a company simply with his good name. Moreover, he might provide access to large investors. 
Accordingly, politically connected firms exhibit a higher share of institutional investors in their 
ownership structure (Wahab and Rahman 2009, p.153). This in turn increases the probability 
of a firm to survive, particularly in economically difficult times (Filatotchev and Toms 2003, 
pp. 912).38  
                                                 
35 Later on, that loan defaulted. Unlike many other cases of political corruption, this one had severe juridical 
consequences for the involved persons. 
36 The default rates of credit given to connected firms is about 20 percentage points above market average. 
Apparently, decisions by government-controlled banks were often politically driven, whereas profitability was of 
less importance.  
37 The existence of a connection can, in turn, lower the efficiency of a firm. Serdar Dinç (2005) provides evidence 
of an increased lending activity of government-influenced banks during election times. Such behaviour seems to 
fulfil the interests of politicians rather than economic rationality and is likely to result in high costs for the involved 
institutes. However, this relation does not apply to developed economies. 
38 Igor Filatotchev and Steve Toms (2003) investigate the chances of a firm’s survival in the British cotton textile 
industry after World War II. Since that time that was in steady decline, as it failed to face increasing competition 
in both the export and domestic market. Access to institutional investors helped firms to postpone failure in a 
declining industry.  
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A related form of firm support is a bailout by the government in case of financial problems. 
Interlinked firms are more likely to be bailed out in general. The connection therefore works as 
a kind of political insurance against firm failure (Faccio et al. 2006). This applies particularly 
in times of crisis, when state support is often given on a massive scale. During the financial 
crisis of 2008 those institutes that were interlinked with politics were more likely to receive 
government aid via the Troubled Asset Relief Program (Igan et al. 2011; Blau et al. 2013; 
Grossman and Woll 2014). The fact that these studies relate to the United States suggests that 
the effectiveness of a connection is not confined to developing countries. Likewise, Mara 
Faccio et al. (2006, pp. 2611) find country-specific factors to be less decisive with respect to 
the chance of receiving a bailout – as opposed to the other potential advantages of having a 
political connection.39 Unlike the granting of credit or the assignment of public contracts, state 
aid for a financially troubled firm is widely accepted among the people and is rarely considered 
a form of corruption.40  
Both improved access to capital and a higher chance of a bailout should induce connected firms 
to get through troubled times. We test this assumption by examining whether the probability to 
‘survive’ is affected. More precisely, we check whether connected firms have a better chance 
of remaining listed on the stock market.41 Unlike other strategies that have frequently been 
adopted in past research, survival analysis looks at the issue from a new angle. The probability 
to avoid failure and – in addition – to be involved in firm consolidation constitutes a quite 
concrete outcome. This allows for a profound evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
credit/bailout channel. We aim to contribute to the literature by introducing this new approach 
for the assessment of the value of political connections. The corresponding hypothesis reads as 
follows. 
 
Politically connected firms have increased access to capital and a higher chance of receiving 
a bailout. Therefore, they are expected to have a higher chance of surviving, particularly in 
times of crisis.  
 
                                                 
39 As described above, the value of a politically connection in terms of share prices is largely dependent on a 
country’s political and economic environment (Faccio 2006). 
40 In fact, politicians often vociferously orchestrate such kinds of action in order to gain popularity. Most famous 
in recent German history is probably the bailout of the construction company Philipp Holzmann in 1999, which 
was used by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to emphasize his labour market expertise. See Die Welt, 26 November 
1999. 
41 Not just staying in the market, but even entering it is greatly facilitated as well. Qigiu Liu et al. (2013) find that 
new firms with links to politicians have better chances of placing their shares on the stock exchange. 
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To which extent it can take advantage depends, however, on the political environment: links 
between business and politics are more widespread in countries characterised by comparably 
high levels of corruption, by weak legal institutions, by a high political fractionalisation and by 
restricted capital mobility (Faccio 2006; Boubakri et al. 2008).42 Apparently, the political 
environment, and consequently the political system itself, is of large importance. In order to 
take account of that, this study comprises three different periods of time: Late Imperial 
Germany, the Weimar Republic and finally the period of National Socialist rule, each 
representing – in a stylised way – a specific type of government or regime: monarchy, 
democracy and dictatorship.    
The dataset includes all firms listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange at the respective point of 
time. By surveying firms in this regime-spanning manner, we avoid falling victim to firm 
selection bias and are able to give quite a broad picture of the German economy in the particular 
period. The dates are chosen such that they represent the heyday of the respective regime. The 
German Empire was continuously expanding its economic potency. Per capita income, output 
and labour productivity reached its peak in 1913, shortly before the outbreak of World War I 
(Burhop 2011b, pp. 31). The Weimar Republic in contrast was most of the time shaken by 
economic and political crises. From 1925, however, it experienced a few relatively quiet and 
prosperous years. Finally, 1938 represents the third period under review. By then, the rule of 
the National Socialists was well established – both politically (Jessen and Richter 2011, pp. 52) 
and economically43 (Overy 1994, pp. 68): Adolf Hitler was at the height of his peace-time 
popularity and World War II was not yet looming.44  
An analysis as comprehensive as this is advantageous compared to other (cross-country) studies 
of political connections. First, we do not compare hugely different economic settings. In fact, 
many of the actual objects of investigation, i.e. companies, remain in the sample over time.45 
Furthermore, the intervals between survey periods are comparably short. For that reason 
                                                 
42 Unsurprisingly, those countries that restrain the business activities of politicians possess a lower share of 
connected firms. Faccio (2006) analysed a huge sample of firms over 47 countries, representing about 8 percent 
of world market capitalisation. Her definition of a connection is, however, much broader than the one we apply in 
this study. Boubakri et al. (2008) follow a similar approach. However, they employ a much smaller sample of 
firms and focus on the firm rather than on political characteristics as determinants of a connection. 
43 How much of the economic success actually reached the people in terms of material well-being is, however, 
disputed in literature, see Spoerer and Streeb (2013). 
44 Latest in 1939, most parts of the German economy were directly or indirectly involved in the production of 
military goods (Overy 1994, pp. 259). A point of time to close to the war does not give a ‘normal’ picture of the 
National Socialist economy. 
45 Which additionally enables us to conduct a fixed-effects panel estimation. 
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probable differences in the value of a political connection can be attributed mainly to the 
respective political system.46 
 
Monarchy, democracy and dictatorship in Germany 
 
Germany experienced three different forms of government within a considerably short period 
of time. The first all-German constitution was effective until the end of World War I when it 
was replaced by a new, genuinely democratic constitution which lasted until the National 
Socialists assumed power in 1933.  
Imperial Germany was a federal parliamentary monarchy, in which the Emperor kept the 
dominant position. He alone appointed the federal government and was further authorised to 
sign international treaties, including declarations of war.47 The parliament, in contrast, had no 
direct means to control the government and could also be dissolved by the emperor at any 
time.48 Moreover, laws could only be passed with the consent of the federal council. The 
Bundesrat in turn was dominated by Prussian aristocracy and the Emperor.49 There were some 
progressive elements, however: In contrast to the German state parliaments, where often 
undemocratic franchises were in effect,50 the federal Reichstag was elected on the basis of a 
universal and equal suffrage for all men above the age of 25.51 Furthermore, no act could be 
issued without its approval.52 The same applied to the yearly federal budget.53 The parliament’s 
constitutional competences included social, trade, transport and communication policy, as well 
as law and military issues.54  
The actual influence of the parliament and the state of democracy in Imperial Germany is not 
undisputed. There is, however, consent over the fact its importance grew over time. Initially 
                                                 
46 We assume that any country-specific (unobserved) factors were changing only slightly in-between. In this 
regard, our study can be read as a panel analysis as compared to a cross-sectional one. To our knowledge, this is 
the first investigation of such a kind.    
47 §§11–19 of the imperial constitution of 1871. In the following, footnotes refer to this document, which can be 
found in Huber (1961, pp. 384). 
48 That permanent thread of dissolution indeed put severe pressure on the members of parliament to cooperate with 
the government (Berghahn 1994, p.191). 
49 §5 constitution; the exact composition of the Bundesrath is specified in §§6–10 of the constitution. The German 
Emperor was at the same time sovereign in Prussia, which possessed a critical voting weight in the federal council.  
50 The most prominent was certainly the three-class franchise in Prussia that effectively maintained the influence 
of the aristocracy, industry and upper bourgeoisie. Though it usually received a majority of votes, the Social 
Democratic Party – representing the lower and working classes –  was effectively kept out of legislation. For a 
detailed overview of the franchise and its impact on political culture see, for instance, Kühne (1994). 
51 §20 constitution 
52 §5 constitution 
53 §69 constitution 
54 §4 constitution. The other areas of policy were, according to the federal structure of the German Empire, matters 
of the individual states.  
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intended to be a democratic veneer rather than an autonomous constitutional organ, the 
Reichstag became a vital element in the process of legislation. Cooperation at least with the 
weightiest parliamentary groups in the parliament became indispensable for any government in 
power (Wehler 1994, p. 61).55 Alongside growing voter turnout, increased levels of education 
and the advent of modern mass media, the importance of federal elections also grew. That 
development was reflected in expensive electoral campaigns and an advancing mobilisation of 
the masses  (Ullman 1999, p. 25).56 Hans-Ulrich Wehler (1994, pp. 63) distinguishes between 
two broadly defined periods: According to Wehler, Imperial Germany was initially 
characterised by Bonapartist rule with Bismarck in its centre. After those first two decades, the 
Empire became more polycratic, beginning in the early 1890s: however, the political scene was 
still dominated by the old elites – and Germany was far from being a true parliamentary 
democracy. Likewise, Christoph Schönberger (2001) points to the low grade of 
parliamentarisation before World War I: The political system was characterised by a dualism, 
as government and parliament mostly worked against each other – to the disadvantage of the 
latter.57 Manfred Rauh (1973, pp. 243), on the other hand, detects a pronounced emancipatory 
development of the Reichstag around the turn of the century. In contrast to Wehler he considers 
parliamentarism, or at least its basis, to be largely developed after 1909 (Rauh 1973, pp. 351; 
1977, pp. 147). Anyway, it seems to be a fair assumption that the power of the parliament was 
relatively weak prior to World War I compared to the following period. Aristocratic elites, and 
to some extent economic interest groups, acted as the main political players. They had a large 
influence on legislation, the German bureaucracy and the public (Stegmann 1976).58 
Accordingly we expect a connection to the Reichstag to be least effective in 1913.  
 
In the Weimar Republic the situation was contrary. Particularly after the replacement of the 
worker and soldiers councils—which played a pivotal role during the revolutionary years—the 
parliament took a central part in politics. According to the new constitution, the legislative 
period was shortened to four years and the voting age was also reduced. Most important in that 
                                                 
55 The growing self-confidence of the parliament led to increased conflicts with the government especially in the 
late Imperial period, see Huber (1969, pp. 325).  
56 While the turnout in the first election 1871 was only about 51 percent, it reached nearly 85 percent in the last 
election in 1912 (Ritter 1980, pp. 38). The shares of votes of the most important parties are illustrated in the 
appendix. Altogether, the imperial political landscape was highly polarised. A ‘national’ faction on the one side 
was opposed by the Catholic Centre Party and the Social Democratic Party on the other side (Ullmann 1999, p. 7).    
57 At the same time, the general degree of Democratisation in the Imperial society was quite high. The participation 
of large parts of the population was not reflected in the influence of the Reichstag however. According to 
Schönberger (2001, p. 624), ‘parliamentarisation was outpaced by democratisation’. 
58 For an overview of interest groups in pre- and interwar Germany, see Ullmann (1988). 
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respect was surely the altering of the electoral mode towards a proportional representation and 
the introduction of women’s suffrage.  
However, over time the significance of the parliament diminished and its authority was 
undermined: Mainly due to the political fragmentation and the resulting lack of common 
consent, the de facto political power was transferred to the President.59 His person represented 
a large monarchical element which was incorporated into the Weimar constitution.60 The 
President, directly elected by the people, was given far-reaching constitutional competences 
(Huber 1981, pp. 23; pp. 307; pp. 350).61 Still, altogether the position of each single member of 
parliament was greatly strengthened. The same applied to the political parties.62 Moreover, 
recent literature has reconceived the role of the Reichstag in Weimar times. Sibylle Lehmann 
(2010) emphasizes the relative efficiency of this institution – as opposed to the classical view 
which suggests a rather chaotic parliament (Falter et al. 1986).63 Unlike in Imperial times a 
modern party scheme became established across the whole political spectrum (Huber 1981, pp. 
129). The state expanded greatly during Wold War I and maintained its central role in many 
fields. Not only was the parliament equipped with greater competences than before, but also 
the legation itself – including economic policy – was now made within the Reichstag (Ullmann 
1988, pp. 124). Consequently, we expect political connections – and particularly those to the 
government – to be quite effective in this period. The career of Gustav Stresemann appears to 
be consistent with that expectation. He started as a representative for the Bund der Industriellen, 
one of the three large economic interest groups in Imperial Germany. With the new democratic 
regime in place, it appeared more promising to switch to the parliamentary side. Stresemann 
from then on acted as a delegate. Finally, he became the party chairman of the National Liberal 
Party and its successor, the DVP, respectively (Stegmann 1976).64 In line with such prominent 
biography, there is large anecdotal evidence for the effectiveness of political connections in 
Weimar times.65 
                                                 
59 Which resembled quite the situation of Imperial Germany in a strange fashion. Instead of the Emperor, it was 
the President who installed a government.   
60 In order to account for national identity, the new constitution tried to take tradition into account and to maintain 
a certain continuity wherever possible (Huber 1981, pp. 25). 
61 Particularly the right to dissolve the parliament and to rule by means of emergency law provided the President 
with a very a powerful tool.  
62 This holds especially for the considered period. In the late years of the Weimar republic, the parliament was 
effectively circumvented. Presidential cabinets installed by the president were common after 1930. In fact, the 
corresponding constitutional provision did not stabilise the system, but contributed to the failure of the first German 
democracy (Huber 1984, pp. 731). 
63 Legislation worked quite efficient and coherently among parties; Lehmann locates the sources of instability of 
the political system rather outside the parliament.  
64 That position led him to high ranking political positions. Highly respected nationally as well as internationally, 
Stresemann served as foreign minister and even as Chancellor (Thimme 1956). 
65 See the following section. 
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The third period considered in this study – the National Socialist rule – features a completely 
altered political background. The Enabling Act of 24 March 1933 concentrated all legislative 
power in the hands of the government. The Chancellor, in the person of Adolf Hitler, could pass 
legislation without the approval of the parliament. Moreover, the remaining federal structure 
was completely removed (Boldt 1990, pp. 261). By virtue of the law of 14 July 1933, only some 
months after the Enabling Act, all parties but the NSDAP were banned (Thamer 2002, pp. 
142).66 Accordingly it was the only party that was left in the Reichstag. In fact, some important 
politicians even defected to the new holder of power.67 In November 1933 federal elections 
were held once again. After these the composition of the parliament was finalised in favour of 
the new rulers. In the end, only members of the NSDAP were delegated in the highest German 
legislative organ (Boldt 1990, p. 263). Within a short period of time the National Socialists 
established an absolute rule on the fundaments of the Weimar constitution (Neumann 1984, pp. 
68). The parliament as such – though still an official institution – was basically left without any 
authority.68 The political agenda of the National Socialist Party also included the crackdown of 
corruption as an alleged characteristic of the old democratic regime. Indeed, many cases of 
political corruption were taken to the court after 1933. According to the new rulers, there was 
no room for any interconnection of business and politics in National Socialist Germany 
(Ludwig 1998, pp.185). 
Still we expect political connections to be beneficial during National Socialist rule, probably 
even more than before: First, the proceedings against political corruption and the related show 
trials came to an end soon. Once their power was consolidated, the National Socialists aligned 
with the old economic elites. That new government proved to be extremely vulnerable to 
fraudulent practices. The abolishment of most democratic institutions left party bureaucracy 
basically without surveillance. Political and personal abuse of power was widespread among 
the NS party ranks (Bajohr 2001, 137 pp.). Moreover, the parliament as such was not dissolved, 
but still officially represented the law-making body.69 Despite the absence of actual 
parliamentary power, a politician could moreover have wielded much influence more directly. 
The new regime was characterised by a dualism of party and state, since the National Socialist 
party occupied the most important positions (Neumann 1984, pp. 93). Accordingly, direct 
                                                 
66 In fact, many parties vanished from the political scene ‘freely’ by means of self-dissolution. For a detailed 
picture of the disappearance of the democratic political scene see, for instance, Matthias and Morsey (1960). 
67 Sometimes under the odd designation of ‘guest of the NSDAP’ (Hubert 1992, pp. 70). 
68 The de facto power was completely concentred on Adolf Hitler, who ruled basically on the basis of emergency 
regulations. De jure, the old federal institutions were still in effect (Hubert 1992, pp. 214). 
69 Apparently the Reichstag was intended have a relevant role in future times. The counting of parliamentary terms, 
for instance, was started over in March 1933. That was certainly no indication of a gradual expiration of this 
institution (Hubert 1992, p.129). 
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access to the ruling NSDAP promised great opportunities. The party pervaded many parts of 
economic life, firms and labour unions.70 The situation resembles communist China, as 
described by Hongbin Li et al. (2008). There, the positive effect of a connection manifests via 
direct access to the ruling party. A theoretical foundation for the reciprocity of business and 
politics is further given by Jay Choi and Marcel Thum (2009). In their model, a country’s 
political and constitutional setting determines the impact of political networks. These turn out 
to be profitable in autocratic regime types only.  
A highly profitable business, specific for this period, was the expropriation of Jewish assets and 
firms. Usually, these could be acquired far below its actual value, to the benefit of the acquirer. 
In 1936 the National Socialist Party was officially in charge of this procedure and decided who 
was qualified to takeover a Jewish firm or parts of it (von der Malsburg 2015, pp. 284).71 The 
share of Jewish ownership was particularly large in private banking and amounted to nearly 50 
percent of all institutes in 1933. Correspondingly, the banking sector was highly involved in 
the process of Aryanisation (Köhler 2005, p. 89; pp. 201). Relating to this, a political connection 
to the NSDAP should have proven beneficial, especially for banks.  
Also, other sectors could utilize such linkage. The chemical and metal processing company 
Degussa, which benefitted to a huge extent from its proximity to the National Socialist rulers, 
gives us one such outstanding example. During the 1930s nearly all of its executives joined the 
NSDAP, which gave the company an edge in many ways: Takeovers of Jewish capital and firms 
were greatly facilitated. Owing to their ties to the National Socialist leaders, the company was 
further involved in the processing of large amounts of expropriated gold and silver, resulting in 
large profits during the first years of the regime. In wartime, Degussa was a main producer of 
the chemicals used for genocide. Also this involvement originated mainly on the ground of the 
political activity of one of its leading managers, Gerhard Peters (Hayes 2006).72 Another case 
of corruption in that period refers to the consumer goods industry. Once more, the Reemtsma 
tobacco company was involved. It was contributing regular contributor to the NSDAP even 
before its seizure of power. In return, the firm received favourable treatment when it came to 
acquisitions and were government-backed in various legal disputes.73 Being on good terms with 
                                                 
70 For an overview see von Prollius (2003) or Schneider (1999). Furthermore, there is a vast literature on the 
interconnection of economy and party on a regional level, like, for instance, the work of Clemens Vollnhals (2002) 
or Christian Dirninger (2014). 
71 Beforehand, many Jewish enterprises were taken over with the use of private contracts, leaving at least some 
scope for the expropriated. For a detailed picture of the total displacement of Jews from economic life in Germany 
during the National Socialist rule, see (Genschel 1966). Private banking as a particularly affected business is 
investigated extensively by Ingo Köhler (2005). 
72 Furthermore, the Degussa extensively employed forced workers in its production.  
73 Which underlines the impact of weak legal institutions for a connection to be effective. 
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the new rulers helped Reemtsma to maintain their dominant market position (Bajohr 2008).74 
Broader empirical evidence of the high value of a connection to the National Socialist Party is 
given by Ferguson and Voth (2008). 
 
Altogether, we expect the effect of a connection to the Reichstag to be weakest in Imperial 
Germany. During the Weimar Republic, in contrast, the parliament became the central element 
of legislation. The impact of ties there accordingly should be much larger. The expectations for 
the last period are not plain. Admittedly, the parliament as such was basically powerless. On 
the other hand, access to the ruling party promised a huge direct influence on politics.75 
 
Political connections of Berlin-listed stock companies 
 
This study is based on a unique dataset which contains all firms listed on the Berlin Stock 
Exchange in three different periods. The information was hand-collected from the Handbuch 
der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, a stock market manual. Along with the supervisory board 
members, it contains basic firm characteristics, such as joint stock capital, the year of formation 
and the location of the headquarters. That latter measure – conervetred into distance to Berlin 
– is a proxy for asymmetric information. We assume that firms farther away from Berlin may 
use a political connection to reduce information costs. Lampe and Ploeckl (2014), for instance, 
have shown that even a theoretically ‘weightless’ communication like phone calls faced 
substantial distance cost similar to physically transported mail. Further, there is information on 
firms’ core business activity and the stock exchanges on which it was listed. We make use of 
the end-of-year prices in percentage of nominal share value and the return on assets in order to 
get a performance measure.76 Table 1 gives an overview of the three considered periods.77 The 
number of firms listed in Berlin varied a lot over time. It increased by about 25 percent after 
World War I, before dropping by half until the NS dictatorship was fully established in 1938. 
The average joint stock capital was distributed among the various periods in a reverse manner, 
while the distance to the German capital remained approximately constant over time. Within 
the 12 years between the first two periods, the average firm age increased by six years, implying 
                                                 
74 The company had great experience in that practice. As delineated earlier, in Weimar times it had already 
extensively established close ties to politics.  
75 Such an outcome is also in line with the only historical study of political connections in Germany (Ferguson and 
Voth 2008). 
76 In the following simply referred to as ‘price’ or ‘share price’. In the analyses we use the logarithmised form of 
this measure. 
77 For a more details on the distribution of the variables employed, see the appendix.  
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that many newly-founded firms entered the market. By contrast, firm age kept pace with 
calendar time after 1925. The economic and political situation in late Weimar Republic as well 
as under National Socialist rule apparently was not a favourable time for a start-up to enter the 
stock market. The share of firms actually seated in Berlin did not vary much and amounted to 
22.89 percent, 22.65 percent and 24.18 percent, respectively.  
 
Table 1: Average firm characteristics  
  1913 1925 1938 
Number of firms 843 1.064 521 
Firm age in years 27.7 33.6 47.7 
Joint stock capital 11.1 9.2 18.1 
Distance to Berlin in km 246 245 244 
Own calculations; for data, see text. Joint stock capital in million Reichsmark 
 
Firm characteristics differed to a large extent between the various branches of the economy. 
Since the dataset comprises three periods, it reveals the sectoral change over time quite well. 
See tables 2 to 4 for an overview. Though the broad pattern is consistent among the various 
regime types, there are some remarkable differences. The banking sector, for instance, held a 
dominant position in terms of stock capital in Imperial Germany. In 1925, by contrast, banks 
were much less capitalised. A plausible reason might be the financial crises and the 
hyperinflation that shook Germany in its early years of democracy (Ritschl 2013, p. 3). At the 
same time, there was a massive concertation in the banking industry in the wake of World War 
I. After that large Berlin-based banks dominated the market (Abs 1978, pp. 45). This trend 
becomes manifest in the highly reduced average distance to the German capital. The growing 
importance of certain branches like the chemical industry is clearly visible in its average firm 
size.  
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Table 2: Firm characteristics by sector 1913 
Sector Firm age in years 
Joint stock 
capital 
Distance to Berlin in 
km 
Number of 
firms 
Banking 38.1 42.1 259 63 
Insurance 53.2 6.5 201 48 
Mining 33.0 17.7 324 100 
Heavy industy 21.8 5.1 249 168 
Light industry 24.7 3.6 268 118 
Food processing 25.2 2.9 255 86 
Transportation 25.8 13.1 222 68 
Chemical industry 26.4 9.2 252 35 
Public utility 22.3 30.7 196 32 
Others 23.7 7.0 186 125 
All firms 27.7 11.1 246 843 
  
Table 3: Firm characteristics by sector 1925 
Sector Firm age in years 
Joint stock 
capital 
Distance to Berlin in 
km 
Number of 
firms 
Banking 47.0 16.3 186 51 
Insurance 64.9 4.8 221 43 
Mining 39.7 26.8 287 86 
Heavy industy 28.2 5.4 254 245 
Light industry 30.4 4.9 278 200 
Food processing 37.1 4.0 305 77 
Transportation 37.9 13.1 217 67 
Chemical industry 32.0 17.5 244 53 
Public utility 27.6 20.8 214 63 
Others 29.6 3.8 195 179 
All firms 33.6 9 245 1064 
 
Table 4: Firm characteristics by sector 1938 
Sector Firm age in years 
Joint stock 
capital 
Distance to Berlin in 
km 
Number of 
firms 
Banking 58.9 23.9 265 50 
Insurance 72.4 3.8 244 37 
Mining 46.6 58.1 258 37 
Heavy industy 40.1 6.9 286 79 
Light industry 44.1 11.6 225 94 
Food processing 47.7 5.4 294 65 
Transportation 52.3 32.4 238 50 
Chemical industry 43.1 32.9 191 31 
Public utility 40.8 37.1 264 26 
Others 40.0 6.5 153 52 
All firms 47.7 18.1 244 521 
Own calculations; for data, see text. Joint stock capital in million Reichsmark  
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There is a remarkable jump in the stock capital of the mining industry under National Socialist 
rule, possibly reflecting the fostering of the supply of domestic resources. The transportation 
sector underwent a similar development, whereas public utility companies played an important 
role throughout. 
One weakness in the literature is certainly the lack of coherence in the definitions of political 
connections between different studies. For instance, a firm is considered connected if it 
provided financial donations or political support to a party, as in the case of Ferguson and Voth 
(2008). Both of these criteria are difficult to consistently survey, however. Especially for a 
sample like ours, consisting of various smaller parties, such task is virtually impossible.78 Other 
authors like Daron Acemoglu et al. (2013) take the number of business interactions or any 
broadly defined ‘personal links’ to a politician as a proxy. An even vaguer criterion are family 
ties, as employed by Fisman (2001), Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009) or Feng et 
al. (2015). Though they certainly do play an important role, especially in Asian countries, the 
arbitrary character of such a definition remains unsatisfactory.  
In order to avoid these difficulties, we define a political connection in a simple but 
straightforward manner. A firm is considered connected if at least one member of the 
supervisory board is a current or a former member of parliament. Both of these groups are fully 
identifiable in official sources. Technically speaking, we determined connections by matching 
board members of every firm with MPs in the Reichstag. Information on these is listed in the 
Reichstaghandbücher.79 Connections to the government arise simply out of the corresponding 
party affiliation.  
Note that the supervisory board possessed a pivotal position in German stock company law.  
Since a direct monitoring of the management by single shareholders was impracticable, a 
powerful supervisory body was considered vital for an efficient and successful organisation of 
business (Burhop 2006, pp. 4). Most boards were dominated by large capital owners and 
representatives of banks or other companies. Main duties involved the supervision of executives 
and legal representation towards these in case of corporate litigation. However, in practice it 
even intervened in daily business from time to time (Lieder 2006, pp. 189).  The shareholders 
elected the first supervisory board of a company. Afterwards, new board members could be 
designated by the board itself (Bayer and Burhop 2009). The actual amount of compensation 
                                                 
78 Ferguson and Voth (2008) examine connections to the National Socialist Party, on which there is a vast amount 
of historical research.    
79 Along with the personal information of MPs, these parliamentary almanacs comprise the various laws that were 
passed, electoral and party statistics and the like. This matching was tremendously facilitated by the Bayerische 
Staatsbibliothek, which published an online database containing all relevant information. 
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was based on profit and was matter of extensive debate. Though there were differences across 
sectors, a considerable share of profit was spend to reward the board members. Also, the total 
amount increased over time (Burhop 2006, pp. 9).80 The legal basis for board composition 
changed only moderately over time. An essential altering was certainly the new commercial 
code from 1937. The implementation of the Führer principle curtailed the supervisory board’s 
power, also a maximum number of board members was set (Lieder 2006, pp. 331). 
We can further subclassify a political connection, as our data distinguishes between links to 
both current and former members of parliament. Based on this information one can define three 
mutually exclusive categories: first, firms connected only to a politician which serves as MP 
for the first time in the current legislative period. Second, firms with a board member that was 
a former MP and third those, which were connected to a current MP that had been sitting in 
parliament for a longer than one legislative period (continuous MP).81 The respective shares are 
displayed in table 5 and illustrated graphically in figures 2 and 3. The lower part refers to 
connections to the governing party. Note that by definition, the share of such connected firms 
is lower or equal compared against all connections. 
  
Table 5: Share of connected firms in the various periods 
 All connections 1913 1925 1938 
Share of firms connected altogether 11.51 12.31 21.31 
Share of firms connected only to former MP 7.83 6.20 7.87 
Share of firms connected only to current MP 0.83 1.50 1.34 
Share of firms connected to continuous MP 2.85 4.61 12.09 
Connections to the governing party    
Share of firms connected altogether 5.22 10.43 14.20 
Share of firms connected only to former MP 4.03 5.36 0.77 
Share of firms connected only to current MP 0.24 1.41 1.34 
Share of firms connected to continuous MP 0.95 3.67 12.09 
Own calculations; for data see text.     
In order to take into account the importance of a single politician, two measures of his potential 
political influence are built. First, we simply take the number of years a person served as a 
delegate. In many cases, there was a longer period of absence in-between. Therefore, we 
calculate in a second step the ratio of this time spent as an MP and the time since the first 
                                                 
80 As per commercial code of 1987, board compensation could be paid from a company’s profit that exceeded four 
percent of the paid-up capital (Burhop 2006, p. 8). Burhop (2006) investigates the mining and the manufacturing 
sector in Imperial Germany. In the latter, about 10 percent of profit were paid as board compensation.   
81 There is a break in tracing former members of the Reichstag at World War I due to theoretical and practical 
considerations. Politicians during Weimar and NS time which were MP in Imperial times are not taken into 
account. However, their share was quite small. 
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election. This weighting scheme allows for possible times of absence from parliament, in which 
no political influence could have been gained.82 Second, we can identify the connected board 
members by name. That enables us to ascertain the total number of board seats hold by a single 
person in our sample. Figure 3 displays the corresponding histograms. The distribution appears 
highly positively skewed: A vast majority of MPs represented only one firm, however, a few 
maintained a huge network of firm connections.83 In 1913, for instance, Georg Waldemar 
Mueller – at that time however only a former MP – held board seats of no less than 17 
companies listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange. In Weimar times, Hermann Fischer was linked 
to 15 firms in all. The weightiest connection to the National Socialist Party was Emil Georg 
von Stauß who occupied eight board seats in 1938.84 Note that one highly interlinked person 
corresponds to multiple companies. In the case of Waldemar Mueller, for instance, 17 firms 
could take advantage from the network of this ‘heavyweight’.85 The importance of such central 
figures becomes especially salient in the instance of industrialist Albert Vögler, whose rise 
began in late Imperial times as a confidant of steel tycoon Hugo Stinnes.86 He intensified his 
political career in the 1920s, serving as long-term delegate for the DVP. Quite early, Vögler 
established links to the National Socialists, making him one of the weightiest economic leaders 
in the whole of interwar Germany (Rasch 2003).87 Though over time the general distribution of 
board seats held appears very similar, the figure appears somewhat denser in 1938. One reason 
is given by the nature of the data itself. At that time, the total number of firms listed on the 
Berlin Stock Exchange was remarkably smaller. Only half the sample size compared to 1913 
would involve an average drop in total board seats held by a single MP in equal measure.88  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 By definition, this measure of political value is between zero and one. In the following analysis, the variable is 
denoted ‘tenure’. 
83 Note that personal interlocks were widespread among large German companies (Marx and Krenn 2012). 
However, here we consider not just business but also political networks.  
84 His prominence is reflected in the large reporting on his person in contemporary newspapers. See, for instance, 
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 October 1923; Industrie- und Handelszeitung, 6 October 1927 Berliner 
Börsenzeitung, 6 October 1937.  
85 Naturally, the distribution of the firms connected to MPs with multiple connections looks quite different from 
those presented here. 
86 Hugo Stinnes, internationally labelled ‘the octopus of German commerce’ (The Times, 12 July 1920), gained 
notoriety by his business practises during inflation. For a detailed picture of public perception of this outstanding 
figure see, for instance, Feldman (1998). 
87 In our sample Albert Vögler is quite well connected: he possessed board seats of 12 different companies in 1925. 
In the following period Vögler was still linked to 10 firms. 
88 Assuming that boards seats were randomly ‘drawn’ by MPs. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of maximum number of board seats held by connected MPs   
 
 
Own calculations; the upper-left graph refers to 1913, the upper-right to 1925 and the lower-left to 1938. 
 
As previously suggested, an important determinant of political influence is the respective party 
an MP is associated with. The weightiest in terms of political power was certainly the National 
Socialist Party after Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933. In time industry and commerce were 
gradually restructured on behalf of the NSDAP. Thus, the National Socialists were able to 
expand their purview in economy and society in a way that was unmatched by any government 
ever before in Germany (Zumpe 1978, pp. 123).89 Prior to World War I the Social Democratic 
Party showed a reverse image. Although it held a majority of parliament seats – see figure 4 – 
and despite its modern party structure, it remained politically isolated throughout Imperial times 
(Berghahn 1994, pp. 201).90 Likewise, the SPD was barely integrated in the economic field: no 
socialist delegate occupied a board up until the end of World War I.  
                                                 
89 The party wielded influence in various ways. For instance, the Schutzstaffel played a central role in the Germany 
economy. It was involved in the formation of new domestic and abroad businesses and in the large-scale 
exploitation of forced labour. See Kaienburg (2003) for a comprehensive view. Seebold (1981, pp. 236) gives a 
detailed picture of the tight relationship between business and the National Socialist Party at firm level, as well as 
its implications and consequences using the example of the steel producer Bochumer Verein.  
90 On the basis of mainly ideological reason, it was successfully kept out of any government affairs. While at least 
at the federal level the party was not officially discriminated, the situation at the state level was quite different. 
There, the design of the franchise often resulted in an extremely low share of parliamentary seats despite a majority 
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A look at the evolution of connections in table 5 – illustrated graphically in Figure 1 – gives a 
first impression of which political links appeared most promising. Though the parliament in 
1925 was far more powerful than in Imperial Germany, firms did not intensify their effort to 
establish links in terms of quantity of connections. In contrast, the share of interlinked firms 
nearly doubled in the last period. In 1938, about 20 percent of firms were connected, although 
the formal power of the parliament after the passage of the Enabling Act was virtually nil.91  
Figure 2 gives a similar picture. It displays the connections to the governing party over time. 
The relatively lower amount in 1913 compared to 1925 is simply due to the fact that the 
government coalition was much broader in Weimar times.92 Being connected apparently 
promised some additional benefits under National Socialist rule. However, an alternative 
explanation for this pattern corresponds to the ability of a firm to survive. If a link to politics 
significantly increased the probability to remain listed after 1925, the corresponding share 
would be much higher in the final period. 93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
in votes for the Social Democrats. For more details see, for instance, Lehmann-Hasemeyer et al. (2014) or Jones 
and Retallack (1992, pp. 49). 
91 Political pressure by the National Socialist Party that tried to gain influence on the economy might well be a 
reason for the enlarged share of connected firms. Though plausible, as such, this argument is not documented in 
the literature. From a formal point of view, the choice of board members was still a privilege of the company’s 
shareholders only (Lieder 2006, pp. 358). 
92 As previously mentioned, there was no actual government in place in Imperial Germany. For an overview of 
governing parties, see table 6. 
93 That thesis is tested more explicitly the following section. 
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Figure 2: Share of connected firms by year  
 
Figure 3: Share of government connected firms by year  
 
Own calculations; for data, see text. 
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Table 6: Political parties with a connection to a firm 
Party number of connected firms 
percentage of connected 
firms 
governing 
party 
Conservatives 25 24.0 yes 
Left Liberals 31 29.8  
National Liberals 33 31.7  
Centre Party 12 11.5 yes 
no party affiliation 3 2.9  
 Total 1913 104 100.0  
      
BVP 2 1.5 yes 
DDP 43 33.1 yes 
DNVP 7 5.4   
DVP 55 42.3 yes 
NSDAP 0 0.0  
SPD 12 9.2  
Centre Party 11 8.5 yes 
Total 1925 130 100.0  
    
BVP 0 0.0   
DDP 5 4.5  
DNVP 2 1.8  
DSP 1 0.9  
DVP 21 18.9  
NSDAP 73 65.8 yes 
SPD 0 0.0  
Centre Party 9 8.1   
Total 1938 111 100.0  
Own calculations, based on any type of connection to a party, including former ones; for data, see text.   
 
Political connections were not distributed among all parties in an equal manner. As mentioned 
before, the Social Democrats became the largest parliamentary group in the Reichstag after the 
election in 1912 – see figure 4. Still, no single stock company held a ‘socialist connection’ in 
Imperial Germany. The programmatic structure of the party was in fact not really favourable to 
big business. The SPD consisted in large parts of workers and members from the lower middle 
classes94 (Berghahn 1994, pp. 208). Its basic political demands were practical social reforms 
along with a definite redistribution policy on the one hand and the implementation of Marxism 
on the other. The actual party programmes varied only slightly over time.95 To a lesser extent, 
                                                 
94 Nevertheless, Social Democratic Party was a role model for modern type of party. Tightly organised, the SPD 
was quite different from the other parties at that time, which were rather loose assemblies of notables. Also, it was 
widely integrated in everyday life and the social milieu of its voters – an equally high level of identification was 
only achieved by the Catholic Centre Party (Wehler 1994, pp. 83). 
95 Up until Weimar times, the Erfurt Party Manifesto of 1891 provided an ideological guideline that emphasized 
both practical and theoretical ideas. In the atmosphere of secession of left-wing parts of the Social Democrats, a 
38 
 
but similarly underrepresented, was the Catholic Centre Party. It possessed about 10 percent of 
all connections, while at the same time more than 20 percent of seats in parliament.96 In contrast, 
the two liberal parties were linked to business to a great degree. Table 6 reveals that each of 
these accounted for roughly one third of all connections. A reason for this might be – in addition 
to the conception that a liberal legislation is generally beneficial for economic activity – that 
these two parties actively advanced the interests of large companies (Pohl 1995). 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of parliament seats in Imperial Germany  
 
Source: Ritter 1980, pp. 38. 
 
In 1925 the picture had changed to a certain degree. Especially in the initial years following 
World War I, the Social Democratic Party was very supportive of the state. In fact, it became 
an integral part of the political system in the newly established democracy. As a consequence, 
it obviously looked promising for a firm to establish a link to the SPD as well.97 The imbalance 
                                                 
party convention in Görlitz agreed upon more conservative elements. Finally, in 1925 the main political objective 
was re-established: A society based on Marxist principles. For details of the various party manifestos see Treue 
(1954). 
96 That outcome is the more surprising, as the Centre Party proved to be very supportive of the government and 
was accordingly considered a ‘governing’ party in 1913.  
97 Still, the political atmosphere was far from being peaceful, without however arriving at a level of animosity as 
was existent during Imperial times (Lau 2008, pp. 30). 
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between the share of votes and the share of connections is not as distinct as in Imperial times, 
see figure 5. However, the dominant parties in terms of connectedness were still the right and 
left liberal parties, the DVP and DDP.   
  
Figure 5: Distribution of parliament seats in the Weimar Republic 
 
Source: Falter et al. 1986, p. 41. The figure in 1919 refers to the constituent National Assembly. In 1924 two 
elections were held (in May and December), just as in 1932 (July and November). 
 
Such pattern seems to be persistent over time. Also in present day Germany, politicians of a 
conservative and liberal party are more likely to be affiliated to a company than their left-wing 
counterparts (Niessen and Ruenzi 2010).98 That difference can be driven by ideology, as 
reflected in the respective party programme and the attitude towards economic policy in 
general. Naturally it seems irrational for an investor to link itself to a party which is opposed to 
business. However, the actual policy could largely differ from the public image drawn during 
campaigning. The National Socialist Party, for instance, often used anti-capitalist slogans (Lau 
                                                 
98 The share of Social Democratic delegation with firm affiliation is surprisingly similar to that in Weimar with 
about 12 percent. As well, the best connected party is the liberal FDP.  
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2008, pp. 329; pp. 372).99 At the same time, the NSDAP received substantial financial support 
from the German industry, at least in the late years of the Weimar Republic (Trumpp 1983).100  
Similarly, with regard to political parties, political connections are of varying importance for 
the different sectors of the economy. Table 7 displays the share of interlinked firms within the 
respective branches.  
 
Table 7: Share of connections within sectors   
  1913 1925 1938 
Banking 41.3 15.7 30 
Insurance 14.6 23.3 27 
Mining 17 25.6 40.5 
Heavy industy 7.7 7.3 15.2 
Light industry 5.1 7.5 18.1 
Food processing 2.3 9.1 12.3 
Transportation 10.3 22.4 26 
Chemical industry 8.6 7.5 16.1 
Public utility 34.4 23.8 34.6 
Others 4 9.5 13.5 
All firms 11.5 12.3 21.3 
Own calculations; for data, see text. Table contains the percentage share of overall connected firms in the 
respective within the respective sector. 
 
There are some remarkable changes between the three periods. The overall increase of 
connected firms in 1938 – see figures 2 and 3 – is detectable also across branches. While in 
many cases there is only moderate altering, some sectors vary largely. Banks, for instance, 
highly interlinked in Imperial Germany, report a sharp drop until 1925. In the last period the 
share of connected banks recovered to a level that was, after all, 50 percent above average. That 
fits in well with the recent cross-country study by Matías Braun and Claudio Raddatz (2009). 
They find banks to be particularly prone to political ties. The importance of connections among 
insurances, on the other hand, grew steadily over time – as reflected in the pure share of 
connected firms. Two branches in our sample – public utility and transportation companies – 
are by the nature of their business dependent on local politics and the placing of public contracts. 
The transportation sector in particular is, moreover, subject to regulation as its business activity 
                                                 
99 In particular, the paramilitary Sturmabteilung (SA), which played a decisive role during the seizure of power, 
had largely anti-capitalist and anti-establishment beliefs. However, in a large-scale purge at their highest level of 
command in 1934 the influence was basically eliminated. The National Socialists finally sided with the old elites 
(Rassow 1987, pp. 663). 
100 However, the actual importance of these financial donations is disputed in literature (Turner 1985). 
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often requires governmental concessions or the like. Consequentially, these two sectors were 
highly interlinked.  
After the National Socialists had seized power in 1933, they instantly took vigorous steps to 
strengthen the defence economy and to push the armament of the German military (Thomas 
1966, p.62). The preparation of a large-scale military engagement potentially stressed the 
economy as a whole. However we assume that certain sectors were particularly affected. In our 
sample these were supposedly mining, heavy industry and chemical industry. As for the 
armament, the competences in National Socialist Germany were not distinctly set between 
military and civil bureaucracy, which led to an ongoing dispute (Bagel-Bohlen 1975, pp. 33). 
Whether the placing of contracts in that field was within the ambit of the party is therefore not 
clear, neither is the existence of any effect on firm performance. Indeed, the key armament 
sectors show remarkable figures in 1938. About 40 percent of mining companies were 
connected, which is the highest value of all industries. Though at a lower level, heavy and 
chemical industry were also highly connected. These possessed twice as many board members 
in parliament as in the period before. Apparently firms adapted to the new armament policy by 
securing many connections in the respective field. However, a deliberate appointment of 
National Socialist Party delegates in these key industries seems a plausible explanation for such 
outcome.  
 
In addition to this general classification, we check how political connections were determined 
by firm characteristics in the following. Presumably, different kinds of companies were 
confronted with various incentives to establish a link to the parliament. As a consequence, firm 
characteristics differed largely in that regard. Already in Victorian Britain, older and larger 
firms were more likely to establish links with politics (Braggion and Moore 2013, pp. 156). 
Such result is also attained by Ferguson and Voth (2008). They detect firms connected to the 
National Socialist Party to be by far more capitalised than those without connection. This 
relationship applies not just in historical context, but also for recent times: Boubakri et al. (2008, 
pp. 660) and Faccio (2010, pp. 909) find firm size to be positively correlated with 
connectedness, in addition to other firm characteristics.101 Most of the studies considering a 
single country have the same findings.  
 
 
                                                 
101 Like the size of the supervisory board, leverage and number of employees. These are unfortunately not available 
for our historical dataset.  
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Figure 6: Joint stock capital by connectedness  
 
Own calculation; Joint stock capital in million Reichsmark. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates how much connected firms differed from others when it came to size. 
Though this measure is most salient, further firm characteristics are likely to determine the 
prevalence of a connection. Table 8 reports the respective mean values of various firm variables, 
subdivided into connected and non-connected. A simple t-test of difference in means indicates 
the probable differentials between those two groups regarding firm age, joint stock capital and 
geographic location of the headquarters.  
Connected firms were significantly larger in terms of share capital throughout all periods. In 
1938 the gap is most distinct, with connected firms found to be four times as large as non-
connected ones – consistent with the findings of Ferguson and Voth (2008, p. 111). Though on 
average a connected firms was older in all regimes, the difference is significant only in 1925. 
The location of the headquarters – as expressed in distance to the seat of the parliament – did 
not vary significantly.  
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Table 8: T- test of difference in mean between of connected and non-connected firms 
 
1913 
Non-connected 
firms 
Connected 
firms Difference t-statistic p-value 
Firm age in years 27.55 28.91 -1.36 -0.79 0.43 
Joint stock capital 9085194 26270767 -17185572 -6.52 0 
Distance to Berlin in km 244.68 255.24 -10.56 -0.53 0.59 
 
1925      
Firm age in years 33 37.77 -4.77 -2.71 0.01 
Joint stock capital 7794968 18909089 -11114121 -5.85 0 
Distance to Berlin in km 246.53 235 11.53 0.67 0.5 
 
1938      
Firm age in years 47.17 49.69 -2.53 -1.19 0.23 
Joint stock capital 11374527 42767465 -31392937 -4.28 0 
Distance to Berlin in km 240.31 259.44 -19.12 -0.94 0.35 
Own calculations; for data, see text. 
 
This relation is somewhat unexpected, other studies find the prevalence of a connection to be 
quite dependent on the location of a firm (Boubakri et al. 2008, p. 659). Moreover, a firm’s 
geographical location has been emphasized in recent (historical) finance literature. Carsten 
Burhop and Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer (2014) detect that the distance between the 
headquarters and stock exchange has a large influence of the listing decision of a firm. They 
believe that the reason lies in the asymmetric information between issuer and investor. Quite 
plausibly, such an asymmetry can be assumed when it comes to political information. In that 
respect a remotely located firm might have a disadvantage. As a consequence, it might be 
tempted to place one of its board members in the centre of political power.  
This argument might be particularly relevant for smaller firms with fewer capacities to compile 
information in other ways. At the same time, the resources to appoint a politician might be given 
only to large companies. In order to clarify the relation we check whether there is an interaction 
effect of firm size and distance to Berlin. 
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Table 9: Logit regression of having any type of political connection 
  1913 1925 1938 
              
Firm age 
in years -0.00345 -0.00476 0.0101** 0.0107** 0.00911 0.00839  (0.647) (0.539) (0.0473) (0.0377) (0.108) (0.161) 
Distance 
to Berlin  0.000408 -0.000246 -0.000385 0.000135 0.000476 -0.000989  (0.523) (0.730) (0.493) (0.826) (0.411) (0.167) 
Joint stock 
capital 1.70e-08*** 1.10e-08** 1.57e-08*** 2.38e-08*** 9.11e-09 2.06e-09  (0.00103) (0.0399) (0.00243) (4.25e-06) (0.407) (0.385) 
Distance x 
Capital  3.31E-11   -3.16e-11 *  9.67e-11***   (0.120)  (0.0645)  (0.000446) 
Constant -2.296*** -2.131*** -2.407*** -2.567*** -2.037*** -1.842***  (0) (0) (0) (0) (2.90e-08) (1.85e-07) 
       
N 843 843 1,064 1,064 521 521 
Table shows regression coefficients of a logit regression of being connected at all. Branch dummies included. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at sector level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 9 shows a logit regression of connectedness on various firm characteristics. The results 
are consistent with the differences in means as reported in table 8. Larger firms had a higher 
chance of being connected while firm age played a role in the Weimar Republic only. These 
relations did not change when including the interaction term. While not significant in Imperial 
Germany, in 1925 it was slightly negative, indicating that the advantage of size disappeared for 
distant firms. 1938 shows a reverse relation. A more accurate view reveals a sample split into 
four distance categories, as displayed in table 10. In 1913 larger firms were significantly better 
connected, regardless of their geographic location. During the following period such a relation 
holds only for the two subsamples that are nearest to Berlin. In 1938 that result is reproduced 
in mirror image: Only between the two groups remotely located from Berlin did the amount of 
a firm’s share capital increase the probability of having an MP on its supervisory board. The 
thesis that political ties are established mainly by the major players is only valid for the German 
Empire and probably for a monarchy in general.102  
 
 
 
                                                 
102 In that sense the result is in line with a common conception of Imperial Germany. This emphasizes the role of 
a small elite that dominated both the economic and the political sphere (Wehler 1994, pp. 56).   
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Table 10: Logit regression, segmented into distance categories 
Distance to Berlin in km up to 150 150 - 300 300 - 450 450 - 683 
  1913 
Joint stock capital 1.10e-08** 2.13e-08** 3.88e-08** 1.47e-08** 
 -4.73E-09 -1.03E-08 -1.58E-08 -7.38E-09 Firm age in years -0.017 -0.00816 -0.00258 0.0103 
 -0.0124 -0.0265 -0.0244 -0.0136 Constant -1.684*** -2.298*** -3.008*** -2.141*** 
 -0.484 -0.531 -1.112 -0.642 
N 284 218 172 169 
  1925 
Joint stock capital 1.88e-08*** 4.92e-08*** 1.65E-08 2.93E-09 
 -4.04E-09 -1.23E-08 -1.06E-08 -4.91E-09 Firm age in years 0.00678 0.0167 0.0111 0.0124 
 -0.0078 -0.0114 -0.00884 -0.00985 Constant -2.194*** -3.464*** -2.546*** -2.386*** 
 -0.339 -0.455 -0.324 -0.512 
N 352 305 190 217 
  1938 
Joint stock capital 1.94E-09 1.89E-08 7.79e-08* 2.93e-08** 
-2.65E-09 -1.58E-08 -3.98E-08 -1.35E-08 
Firm age in years 0.00458 0.0136 -0.00028 0.0107 
 -0.00629 -0.012 -0.0148 -0.0139 
Constant -1.573*** -2.566*** -2.367*** -2.070*** 
 -0.433 -0.663 -0.729 -0.724 
N 189 126 86 120 
Table shows regression coefficients of a logit regression of being connected at all. Branch dummies included. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at sector level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the first German democracy, the alliance of large business and high politics moved closer to 
Berlin. The major players in the province could not, however, exercise their influence until the 
National Socialist regime came into power. Apparently, in dictatorships, where decision-
making does not take place transparently, political information is an extremely valuable asset. 
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Performance of politically connected firms   
 
Whether political connections actually pay off is not solely reflected in their absolute or relative 
frequency. A view on firm performance allows for a more precise assessment of possible 
benefits. As described beforehand, most authors use event study methodology in order to 
appreciate the impact of a link to politics. The emergence of such a link is usually cases 
accompanied by a positive reaction of stock market investors. In the following, the impact on 
both market and accounting performance is studied by regressing corresponding measures on 
connectedness.  
We use logarithmised end-of-year share prices as a simple market performance proxy. Note 
that share prices generally are not necessarily reflecting the actual performance of a firm, but 
rather the expectation of investors with regard to future development. However, given that these 
are profit maximising, the prevalence of a connection - if valuable - should have increased 
demand for a share: first, the respective information was open to the public. Contemporary press 
extensively publicised board memberships of members of the Reichstag. For instance, a 
journalist under the pseudonym Morus gave detailed information on the extent of firm 
affiliation of MPs and explicitly mentioned well-known political figures at that (Morus 1925; 
1928). His articles were based on Adressbuch der Direktoren und Aufsichtsräte, a widely used 
handbook that listed all directors and supervisory board members of German stock companies. 
Also, more conservative and liberal newspapers reported on firm and industry affiliation of 
high-ranking politicians. There, various political careers were appreciated – along with the 
respective business positions. The list included some central figures like the leader of the 
National Liberal Party Ernst Bassermann (Rheinisch Westfälische Zeitung, 25 July 1917), the 
former Minister of the treasury Georg Gothein (Deutscher Aussenhandel, 13 August 1927) or 
the above mentioned vice speaker of parliament, Emil Georg von Stauß (Berliner Börsen-
Zeitung, 6 October 1937). Moreover, annual company reports explicitly listed all persons of the 
supervisory board along with a possible parliament membership.103 Even an average informed 
investor must have been aware of the existence of political connections. The Berlin Stock 
Exchange in the early 20th century was already largely efficient, even compared to today’s 
standards.104 Accordingly, a simple ordinary least squares regression displays the impact of a 
                                                 
103 See, for instance, Disconto-Gesellschaft. Geschäftsbericht für das Jahr 1927. Such annual reports were often 
published in daily newspapers. Also, the stock manual used in this study was readily accessible to investors.  
104 Baltzer (2006), Gehrig and Fohlin (2006) or Gelman and Burhop (2008) detect weak information efficiency as 
defined by Fama (1970). Also, referring to the semi-strong form, prices reacted quite sensitively to political or 
economic information, see Burhop (2011a) or Lehmann-Hasemeyer et al. (2014) 
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political connection from an investors view. In addition, we measure accounting performance 
by taking return on assets as an additional dependent variable.105 The effect of various political 
connection measures is estimated on the basis of the following equation:  
 
ܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁௜ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚ ∗ ܿ݋݊݊݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߛ ∗ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜ 
 
The different types of political connections have been delineated above: an addition to overall 
links to politics, three mutually exclusive subcategories are included: These are defined as a 
board member which was a current MP only, a former MP only and a person that was 
continuously delegated respectively. Tables 11 to 16 contain the results. The outcome relating 
to the basic connection types are presented in models (1) and (2). Furthermore, governing 
parties are considered separately in (4). Those MPs with a large network, i.e. a large number of 
maximum board seats held, are included in model (3), in addition to the tenure variable. That 
contains the time a board member spent as a delegate, adjusted by possible breaks in-between. 
Xi represents the firm-specific control variables in our sample. These are the age of the firm, 
joint stock capital and distance from the headquarters to Berlin. Additionally, dummy variables 
are included for each sector.106 Finally in models (5) and (6), these indicator variables are 
interacted with the connection dummy in order to identify the specific effect for each branch, 
both regarding overall connections and those to the governing party.  
 
The number of observations in the regression model is smaller as compared to the whole sample 
of firms, for the most part since insurances are excluded: Their shares could only be traded 
under great restrictions as they only issued registered shares with limited transferability 
(Gelman and Burhop 2008, p. 4).107 Also, the data availability is sometimes limited – historical 
records are rarely without any gap.  
For Imperial Germany, our findings differ from most other studies. A political connection did 
not improve firm performance in any way. Regarding accounting, firms with a connection to a 
                                                 
105 By regressing performance on various firm variables, including connectedness, we follow the same approach 
as the authors mentioned above. Of these, Mitchel and Joseph (2010, p. 467) and Faccio (2010, p. 914) also employ 
return on assets as a profitability measure. Using the end-of-year share price as performance proxy resembles the 
vast event study literature in that field.  
106 These performed quite differently over time. However, there is a broad pattern. The whole manufacturing sector 
plus mining and chemical companies were performing well on the stock exchange. Banks, on the other hand, 
showed a comparably low market value in all regime types. The other sectors behave inconsistently over time. The 
same holds for firm profitability in the form of returns on assets, which is far less affected by branch affiliation.   
107 Any transfer of such shares – vinkulierte Namensaktien – required the approval of the company. 
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heavyweight (number of board seats) even underperformed, which is, however, in line with the 
literature. Generally, larger firms were more successful in terms of both market valuation and 
profitability. The latter measure also took higher values for firms which were remotely located 
from Berlin. Though overall connections did not have an effect, the single sectors show 
significant variation. The food processing and the chemical industry, and, to a lesser extent, 
mining companies and light industry especially benefitted in terms of both share price and 
profitability, whereas banks and heavy industry underperformed if interlinked. This result 
applies almost equally to government connections. The results are a good fit to our expectation 
of the impact of a connection to the parliament in a monarchy and support Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s 
argument of a relatively powerless Reichstag.  
In 1925 profitability was not affected by either firm characteristics or any type of connection. 
The regression of share prices, however, reveals a large differences. A connection to an MP as 
such was insignificant. 108 Those firms connected to an MP whose party was part of the current 
government were rated much better on the Berlin Stock Exchange. If controlling for this type 
of political link, the sole connection effect even becomes negative. In contrast to Imperial times 
the government was an actual parliamentary one. Investors apparently realised that this widened 
influence could be utilised by a related politician – for the first time in German history. 
Moreover, those MPs with a large network could bring additional value to the firms they were 
linked with. Of all branches, banks were the biggest profiteers. Their share prices were much 
higher in case of a connection, even more so if that involved the governing party.109 After times 
of huge monetary uncertainty, the stock market was apparently neuralgic with respect to 
financial institutes. The overall branch effect is, accordingly, strongly negative. A tie to politics, 
however, promised some safety for the investment in the corresponding share. The demand for 
security particularly regarding financial institutes has also been delineated in the literature, 
alongside the positive effect of a respective political connection (Acemoglu et al. 2013). Finally, 
both larger and older firms were assessed favourably in 1925.  
 
Under National Socialist rule, the general characteristics in terms of share capital, age and 
location of a firm lost their relevance for market performance. In that final period, however, 
political connections did not just became widely established, as previously shown, but also 
proved quite effective. As the Reichstag itself was just a false front of parliamentarism and 
                                                 
108 That refers to overall connectedness as well as to the various subcategories. A board member that was a current 
MP was not regarded more advantageous than a former politician or vice versa. 
109 Also mining and light industry could enjoy some advantages from such a connection. For most other sectors, 
however, there was no distinct effect. 
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without any decisive power, such outcome had to be driven by either improved access to 
political information or a probable direct exercise of power.  
Taking a closer look, the insignificant effect of a government connection does not fit the mould. 
At first sight it even looks counter-intuitive. A link to the National Socialist Party, now ruling 
with absolute power, did not have an impact on the market valuation of a firm. Controlling for 
that, the effect of the simple connection actually increases.110 There is a reasonable 
interpretation however, considering the previous period. There, long-serving and influential 
business leaders were believed to give a firm an advantage. Most of these persons dropped out 
of the parliament after the seizure of power. From then on the Reichstag basically comprised 
veteran National Socialist Party members (Hubert 1992, pp. 361). The old economic elites 
rarely were NS party members but mainly former MPs (of other parties). Accordingly, this 
category of connection brought along the most benefits. Firms connected to only current on the 
other hand did not perform well.111 Instead of NS veterans, investors have realised the 
advantage of an established economic network, indicating their preference for stability in times 
of (political) change. Likewise, the impact on prices is quite pronounced when the economic 
heavyweights are considered. As a consequence thereof, the probable benefit of a connection 
can be mostly attributed to favourable access to a network and the consequential information. 
A direct influence on politics on the other hand does not correspond to our outcome. The result 
is broadly consistent with Ferguson and Voth (2008). In an analogy to their finding that only 
an early ‘bet’ on Hitler paid off, we do not reveal a distinct effect for sole connections to the 
NSDAP. The economic Mitläufer were not particularly well-off in National Socialist Germany.  
Banks, considered separately, did perform relatively well if connected. The respective 
interaction term shows the least negative coefficient.112 Though consistent with the share price 
regression, an expropriation effect of Jewish assets still seems implausible. Due to the 
favourable acquisitions in the wake of Aryanisation, involved banks are expected to display 
great degree of profitability. Such a relation is not reflected in the outcome in table 16: all 
connection measures remain insignificant with regard to the return on assets in 1938. Firms 
potentially affected by the German armament attempts were highly connected in the last period, 
see table 7. However, they could not utilise a political connection if in place. The interaction 
terms of mining, heavy and chemical industry do not differ substantially from other branches.  
                                                 
110 Note that the only legal party at that time was the NSDAP. Therefore, long-lasting and ‘weighty’ connections, 
which also include other parties, have a higher probability to be found in the overall connection group. 
111 Over time, the composition of the parliament was barley altered was barely altered (Hubert 1992, pp. 361). 
Accordingly, the share of firms connected to only current MPs amounted to only 1.24 percent. 
112 The net effect of a bank connection is – as for most other sectors – positive, given the large positive impact of 
the connection dummy itself.  
50 
 
Firms which were directly dependent on public contracts – like transportation and public utility 
companies – performed relatively poorly in terms of both prices and the return on assets, no 
matter whether related to any politician or to the government. Under the two prior regimes there 
is no distinct positive impact, either. Preferred access to public contracts due to a connection is 
not detectable in our data – despite fierce public discussion about such affairs (Klein 2014, pp. 
109, pp. 298). Such a direct form of political corruption at a high level was apparently not 
widespread in Germany in the first half of the 20th century.  
 
In neither regime can we detect a pronounced effect on actual firm profitability. Political 
connections did not have a real impact on performance in terms of returns on assets, which is 
well in line with previous work. Instead, these links to the parliament worked as a signal for 
stock market investors and end-of-year share prices were affected. However, that effect 
depended on various factors. Unlike most of the literature, we fail to find an overall positive 
impact of a political connection. The hypothesis of effectiveness of a connection cannot be 
corroborated fully, but is valid in certain regimes only. A link to politics mattered in the 
democratic Weimar Republic as well as under National Socialist rule. In a monarchy like 
Imperial Germany, it was of no value. 
Whether a political connection actually paid off depended heavily on the political environment 
in the previous literature. Our particular sampling allows for reformulating this point: looking 
at the very same country, the value of a political connection does depend on the specific regime 
type.  
Firm characteristics are another important factor. Likewise, in accordance with our hypothesis, 
different types of connections were of varying impact. This depended heavily on the position 
of the respective MP. Political and economic heavyweights mattered mostly for the value of a 
political connection.  
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Table 11: OLS regression of share prices 1913   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES logp logp logp logp logp logp 
              
Joint stock capital 3.85e-09*** 3.86e-09*** 3.95e-09*** 3.81e-09** 3.78e-09*** 3.70e-09** 
 (0.00978) (0.00876) (0.00895) (0.0113) (0.00963) (0.0111) Firm age 0.000748 0.000742 0.000688 0.000755 0.000779 0.000803 
 (0.675) (0.669) (0.697) (0.671) (0.669) (0.660) Distance to Berlin 0.000209 0.000208 0.000209 0.000208 0.000193 0.000191 
 (0.240) (0.244) (0.237) (0.250) (0.269) (0.281) Connected 
altogether -0.00128   -0.0228 -0.359*** -0.418*** 
 (0.987)   (0.764) (1.16e-08) (4.61e-05) Connected only to 
current MP  0.00553     
  (0.980)     Connected only to 
former MP  0.00892     
  (0.912)     Connected to 
continuousMP  -0.0312     
  (0.775)     No of board seats   -0.00391    
   (0.399)    Tenure   0.0151    
   (0.906)    Connected to 
governing party    0.0474  0.0838 (0.629) (0.249) 
Interaction Banking 0.226*** 0.251*** 
(9.02e-06) (9.71e-05) 
Interaction Mining     0.568*** 0.587*** 
     (7.56e-10) (3.29e-08) Interaction heavy 
industy     0.286*** 0.316*** 
     (6.49e-10) (1.81e-06) Interaction light 
industry     0.409*** 0.440*** 
     (1.21e-08) (8.19e-08) Interaction food 
processing     1.170*** 1.230*** 
     (1.79e-10) (7.37e-08) Interaction 
transportation     0.353*** 0.364*** 
     (3.42e-06) (4.29e-06) Interaction 
chemical industry     1.018*** 1.023*** 
     (3.77e-10) (7.40e-10) Interaction public 
utility     0.173*** 0.195*** 
     (1.53e-05) (0.000246) Constant 4.595*** 4.595*** 4.597*** 4.595*** 4.617*** 4.617*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
       Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.089 0.090 
N 825 825 825 825 825 825 
 Table contains OLS regression results of the logarithmised share price on various connection und firm characteristic measures. For details see 
text. Firm age in years, distance in kilometres, and stock capital in Reichsmark. The sector indicator variable ‘others’ is omitted. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at sector level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12: OLS regression of profitability 1913  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES RoA RoA RoA RoA RoA RoA 
              
Joint stock capital 1.72e-10** 1.77e-10** 2.02e-10** 1.67e-10* 1.72e-10* 1.66e-10* 
 (0.0389) (0.0355) (0.0304) (0.0604) (0.0572) (0.0790) Firm age -0.000342 -0.000346 -0.000356 -0.000342 -0.000363 -0.000361 
 (0.277) (0.258) (0.253) (0.276) (0.243) (0.243) Distance to Berlin 4.10e-05** 4.03e-05** 4.12e-05** 4.08e-05** 3.81e-05** 3.78e-05** 
 (0.0420) (0.0455) (0.0396) (0.0438) (0.0476) (0.0478) Connected 
altogether -0.00732   -0.00987 -0.0585*** -0.0657*** 
 (0.404)   (0.428) (3.78e-08) (0.000357) Connected only to 
current MP  -0.00208     
  (0.883)     Connected only to 
former MP  -0.00231     
  (0.819)     Connected to 
continuousMP  -0.0230     
  (0.290)     No of board seats   -0.00140*    
   (0.0849)    Tenure   0.000897    
   (0.932)    Connected to 
governing party    0.00542  0.00869 (0.719) (0.541) 
Interaction Banking 0.0342*** 0.0378*** 
(8.79e-07) (0.000242) 
Interaction Mining     0.0612*** 0.0639*** 
     (8.90e-09) (9.34e-07) Interaction heavy 
industy     0.0498*** 0.0540*** 
     (4.98e-10) (3.13e-05) Interaction light 
industry     0.0413*** 0.0457*** 
     (1.29e-09) (0.000173) Interaction food 
processing     0.110*** 0.117*** 
     (2.85e-09) (7.36e-06) Interaction 
transportation     0.0826*** 0.0848*** 
     (2.57e-07) (3.37e-07) Interaction chemical 
industry     0.156*** 0.158*** 
     (0) (9.78e-11) Interaction public 
utility     0.0352*** 0.0382*** 
     (1.64e-07) (8.36e-05) Constant 0.0502*** 0.0501*** 0.0506*** 0.0501*** 0.0536*** 0.0537*** 
 (0.000507) (0.000494) (0.000436) (0.000504) (0.000336) (0.000321) 
       Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes R-squared 0.084 0.085 0.086 0.084 0.099 0.099 
N 797 797 797 797 797 797 
Table contains OLS regression results of the logarithmised share price on various connection und firm characteristic measures. For details see 
text. Firm age in years, distance in kilometres, and stock capital in Reichsmark. The sector indicator variable ‘others’ is omitted. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at sector level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: OLS regression of share prices 1925 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES logp logp logp logp logp logp 
              
Joint stock capital 9.01e-09*** 9.01e-09*** 8.14e-09*** 8.47e-09*** 8.65e-09*** 8.02e-09*** 
 (0.00789) (0.00958) (0.00524) (0.00727) (0.00720) (0.00656) Firm age 0.0133*** 0.0134*** 0.0135*** 0.0134*** 0.0138*** 0.0139*** 
 (0.00173) (0.00217) (0.00153) (0.00195) (0.00182) (0.00193) Distance to Berlin 0.000265 0.000265 0.000250 0.000246 0.000231 0.000218 
 (0.375) (0.372) (0.381) (0.401) (0.443) (0.464) Connected 
altogether 0.181   -0.770* -0.735*** -1.619*** 
 (0.255)   (0.0518) (1.78e-08) (0.00399) Connected only to 
current MP  0.0932     
  (0.866)     Connected only to 
former MP  0.0755     
  (0.694)     Connected to 
continuousMP  0.376     
  (0.256)     No of board seats   0.0377*    
   (0.0888)    Tenure   0.0520    
   (0.849)    Connected to 
governing party    1.079**  1.105* (0.0326) (0.0585) 
Interaction Banking 1.730*** 1.840*** 
(2.09e-09) (1.28e-08) 
Interaction Mining     1.124*** 0.906*** 
     (2.96e-09) (1.62e-05) Interaction heavy 
industy     0.876*** 0.868*** 
     (3.99e-09) (2.82e-09) Interaction light 
industry     1.193*** 1.048*** 
     (0) (3.41e-07) Interaction food 
processing     0.736*** 0.515*** 
     (0) (0.000932) Interaction 
transportation     0.950*** 0.864*** 
     (1.39e-07) (4.02e-07) Interaction chemical 
industry     0.408*** 0.467*** 
     (1.25e-06) (2.55e-06) Interaction public 
utility     0.917*** 0.800*** 
     (2.24e-06) (8.81e-06) Constant 1.423*** 1.422*** 1.427*** 1.434*** 1.481*** 1.485*** 
 (1.27e-06) (1.47e-06) (1.68e-06) (1.40e-06) (1.20e-06) (1.41e-06) 
       Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.185 0.186 0.189 0.191 0.193 0.199 
N 887 887 887 887 887 887 
Table contains OLS regression results of the logarithmised share price on various connection und firm characteristic measures. For details see 
text. Firm age in years, distance in kilometres, and stock capital in Reichsmark. The sector indicator variable ‘others’ is omitted. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at sector level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14: OLS regression of profitability 1925 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES RoA RoA RoA RoA RoA RoA 
              
Joint stock capital -6.11e-09 -6.06e-09 -6.48e-09 -6.22e-09 -6.75e-09 -6.98e-09 
 (0.401) (0.402) (0.396) (0.400) (0.395) (0.393) Firm age 0.0372 0.0374 0.0375 0.0373 0.0370 0.0371 
 (0.328) (0.327) (0.327) (0.329) (0.332) (0.333) Distance to Berlin -0.000662 -0.000663 -0.000708 -0.000670 -0.000724 -0.000740 
 (0.264) (0.268) (0.263) (0.271) (0.266) (0.273) Connected 
altogether -0.356   -0.488 -0.0271*** -0.252 
 (0.304)   (0.466) (0.00480) (0.537) Connected only to 
current MP  -0.614     
  (0.348)     Connected only to 
former MP  -0.244     
  (0.386)     Connected to 
continuousMP  -0.410     
  (0.323)     No of board seats   0.0283    
   (0.334)    Tenure   -0.578    
   (0.259)    Connected to 
governing party    0.157  0.325 (0.749) (0.576) 
Interaction Banking -0.422 -0.398 
(0.335) (0.329) 
Interaction Mining     -0.00890 -0.108 
     (0.814) (0.591) Interaction heavy 
industy     0.125 0.123 
     (0.282) (0.280) Interaction light 
industry     -2.315*** -2.387*** 
     (1.07e-06) (5.48e-08) Interaction food 
processing     -0.529 -0.635 
     (0.339) (0.367) Interaction 
transportation     0.438 0.368 
     (0.289) (0.275) Interaction chemical 
industry     -0.162 -0.264 
     (0.350) (0.439) Interaction public 
utility     0.0421 -0.0325 
     (0.527) (0.812) Constant -0.908 -0.912 -0.910 -0.906 -0.918 -0.917 
 (0.357) (0.355) (0.356) (0.356) (0.361) (0.361) 
       Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 
N 684 684 684 684 684 684 
Table contains OLS regression results of the logarithmised share price on various connection und firm characteristic measures. For details see 
text. Firm age in years, distance in kilometres, and stock capital in Reichsmark. The sector indicator variable ‘others’ is omitted. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at sector level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: OLS regression of share prices 1938 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES logp logp logp logp logp logp 
              
Joint stock capital 2.98e-10 3.03e-10 2.68e-10 2.99e-10 3.17e-10 3.18e-10 
 (0.127) (0.120) (0.243) (0.126) (0.118) (0.119) Firm age 0.00105 0.00102 0.000931 0.00105 0.00105 0.00106 
 (0.416) (0.439) (0.457) (0.413) (0.445) (0.445) Distance to Berlin 7.10e-05 7.03e-05 6.62e-05 6.75e-05 6.65e-05 6.38e-05 
 (0.518) (0.537) (0.542) (0.553) (0.574) (0.602) Connected 
altogether 0.0970***   0.137** 0.212*** 0.228*** 
 (0.00152)   (0.0142) (3.43e-06) (5.67e-06) Connected only to 
current MP  0.130     
  (0.204)     Connected only to 
former MP  0.120***     
  (0.00717)     Connected to 
continuousMP  0.0783**     
  (0.0456)     No of board seats   0.0199**    
   (0.0376)    Tenure   0.00862    
   (0.820)    Connected to 
governing party    -0.0598  -0.0381 (0.392) (0.643) 
Interaction Banking -0.0533* -0.0415 
(0.0625) (0.389) 
Interaction Mining     -0.116** -0.101 
     (0.0256) (0.173) Interaction heavy 
industy     -0.150*** -0.131* 
     (0.000290) (0.0625) Interaction light 
industry     -0.0967*** -0.0973*** 
     (9.60e-05) (5.85e-05) Interaction food 
processing     -0.136*** -0.128*** 
     (9.55e-05) (0.00422) Interaction 
transportation     -0.109*** -0.0967** 
     (0.000451) (0.0494) Interaction chemical 
industry     -0.148*** -0.148*** 
     (0.00103) (0.000907) Interaction public 
utility     -0.287*** -0.266*** 
     (1.01e-07) (0.000383) Constant 4.593*** 4.591*** 4.604*** 4.591*** 4.577*** 4.577*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
       Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.141 0.142 0.143 0.142 0.146 0.146 
N 473 473 473 473 473 473 
Table contains OLS regression results of the logarithmised share price on various connection und firm characteristic measures. For details see 
text. Firm age in years, distance in kilometres, and stock capital in Reichsmark. The sector indicator variable ‘others’ is omitted. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at sector level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16: OLS regression of profitability 1938 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES RoA RoA RoA RoA RoA RoA 
             Joint stock capital -2.13e-12 -1.34e-12 -4.65e-12 -1.98e-12 -1.02e-11 -9.98e-12 
 (0.863) (0.916) (0.689) (0.878) (0.426) (0.436) Firm age -8.12e-05 -8.27e-05 -9.02e-05 -7.93e-05 -5.97e-05 -5.68e-05 
 (0.739) (0.735) (0.710) (0.742) (0.817) (0.824) Distance to Berlin -4.92e-06 -5.15e-06 -5.76e-06 -5.48e-06 -6.38e-06 -6.84e-06 
 (0.828) (0.820) (0.802) (0.809) (0.779) (0.765) Connected 
altogether 0.00433   0.0115* 0.00269 0.00553* 
 (0.457)   (0.0682) (0.468) (0.0656) Connected only to 
current MP  0.00619     
  (0.301)     Connected only to 
former MP  0.00893     
  (0.180)     Connected to 
continuousMP  0.00124     
  (0.839)     No of board seats   0.00180*    
   (0.0704)    Tenure   -0.00472    
   (0.523)    Connected to 
governing party    -0.0106  -0.00674 (0.103) (0.168) 
Interaction Banking -0.00341 -0.00132 
(0.503) (0.828) 
Interaction Mining     0.0270** 0.0297** 
     (0.0232) (0.0234) Interaction heavy 
industy     -0.00490 -0.00155 
     (0.363) (0.823) Interaction light 
industry     0.0173*** 0.0172*** 
     (6.94e-05) (5.47e-05) Interaction food 
processing     0.00713* 0.00852* 
     (0.0947) (0.0793) Interaction 
transportation     -0.0263*** -0.0240*** 
     (1.95e-05) (0.000231) Interaction chemical 
industry     0.00429 0.00417 
     (0.574) (0.579) Interaction public 
utility     -0.0117*** -0.00785* 
     (0.000436) (0.0716) Constant 0.0464*** 0.0461*** 0.0473*** 0.0460*** 0.0460*** 0.0460*** 
 (0.000158) (0.000187) (0.000129) (0.000174) (0.000280) (0.000258) 
       Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.015 
N 480 480 480 480 480 480 
Table contains OLS regression results of the logarithmised share price on various connection und firm characteristic measures. For details see 
text. Firm age in years, distance in kilometres, and stock capital in Reichsmark. The sector indicator variable ‘others’ is omitted. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at sector level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
57 
 
One could argue that the results of the above analysis are driven by the fact that politicians 
selected themselves in the largest and most successful firms. Table 7 reveals significant 
differences between connect and non-connected firms in all three periods. In order to address a 
possible selection bias, further tests are applied. 
First, we consider only those 265 firms which were continuously listed at Berlin over the entire 
period of sampling.113 By doing so we obtain a balanced panel dataset which allows for a fixed-
effects estimation. The general model resembles the ordinary least squares regression equation. 
However, time-invariant variables drop out.114 Along with these, unobserved firm-specific 
factors are controlled for. The impact of the various regime types is tested by interacting a 
respective indicator variable with connectedness. The outcome with regard to logarithmised 
share prices is presented in table 17. Just as before, we consider simple connections and those 
to the government. Including interaction terms of connectedness and sector affiliation in models 
(2) and (4) barely alters the coefficients. Also, the respective sectors were largely unaffected.115  
An overall impact of a political connection is non-existent considering continuously listed firms 
only. The different regime types show some variation however. The Imperial period exhibits 
the highest levels of share prices. In 1925 by contrast, these were exceptionally low. There, 
interlinked firms did not perform differently. Under National Socialist rule a significant effect 
manifested. That however is diametrically opposed to the OLS results. All types of political 
connections had a negative effect on firm performance. ´ 
Considering the continuously listed firms only reveals no explicit benefit with regard to share 
prices. Returns on assets show no significant results at all. These are reported in the appendix. 
Altogether we fail to reproduce the previous results. Admittedly, the selection of firms into the 
panel dataset is strongly biased. Listing decisions over time were not fully random, but in fact 
depended on performance itself. Further, there is strong evidence that a political connection had 
large influence on the probability of a firm to remain listed and accordingly enter the panel.116 
This is examined separately in a survival analysis of firms in the following section. 
  
 
 
                                                 
113 These are 265 firms in total. The share of those connected to any MP and to the government respectively are 
13.7 and 6.7, which compare approximately to the single periods. 
114 These are distance to Berlin, sector affiliation and firm age, which is just another measure for the time period. 
Stock capital on the other hand varies over time and therefore is included.  
115 Only the chemical industry was affected significantly. There, a government connection had an even negative 
effect.  
116 Among other authors, Filatotchev and Toms (2003), Faccio et al. (2006) or Grossman and Woll (2014) provide 
direct or indirect evidence. 
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Table 17: Fixed effect panel data regression of share prices 
            overall connections 
      connections to 
        the governing party 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Joint stock capital 2.73e-09 2.42e-09 2.48e-09 3.58e-09* 
 (0.126) (0.227) (0.181) (0.0907) 
Connection 0.179 0.0852 0.908 0.433 
 (0.294) (0.797) (0.151) (0.565) 
1925 -2.142*** -2.138*** -2.122*** -2.122*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
1938 -0.164*** -0.163*** -0.182*** -0.185*** 
 (0.000373) (0.000458) (3.70e-06) (3.58e-06) 
Interaction x 1925 0.189 0.248 -0.555 -0.363 
 (0.434) (0.265) (0.422) (0.486) 
Interaction x 1938 -0.415** -0.435** -1.154* -1.133** 
 (0.0408) (0.0221) (0.0753) (0.0403) 
Constant 4.981*** 4.986*** 4.989*** 4.974*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
     
Branch interaction   yes  yes 
Observations 767 767 767 767 
R-squared 0.723 0.728 0.723 0.730 
Number of firms 265 265 265 265 
Table contains fixed-effects (within) regression results of the logarithmised share price on various connection und 
firm characteristic measures. The group variable is firm. For details see text. Firms’ age in years, stock capital in 
Reichsmark. Robust standard errors, clustered at sector level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In addition, we check the robustness of our results by applying a propensity score matching. 
Introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), it helps to identify the causal effect of a certain 
treatment on individuals. While common in medical research, this technique is now also well-
established in social sciences mainly in the evaluation of policies such as labour market 
programmes (Heckman et al. 1999; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). Faccio et al. (2006) use 
matching for the valuation of political connections regarding a potential bailout, using a slightly 
different approach however. 
The general principle is relatively simple and straightforward: instead of comparing the 
performance of connected firms with all unconnected ones, only those with very similar 
characteristics are taken as a reference. If one assumes that the overall performance is reflected 
in these characteristics, the profit- or prestige-seeking politician should have chosen the 
reference firm with equal probability and no selection bias would occur. 
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More precisely, every firm that was given the ‘treatment’ of a political connection is matched 
with one or more firms that exhibit very similar characteristics but did not receive that 
treatment. Subsequently, the two groups are compared regarding the outcome variables in order 
to assess the effect of a political connection. The central aspect, the matching itself, consists of 
two parts. First, the probability of being in the treatment, that is, the connected group is 
estimated using a logit-model based on the basic firm characteristics. The results of that 
estimation are shown in the appendix. From this, a propensity score for every single firm is 
derived, reflecting the probability of receiving a treatment of having a certain political 
connection. Second, every connected firm is matched with those three non-connected firms 
whose propensity score is closest. Using more than one match reduces the risk of an accidental 
result. As our sample is relatively small, so is the set of covariates. We therefore also match the 
connected firms with their three closest competitors.117 This so-called nearest neighbour 
matching creates a control outcome variable which can be interpreted as the firm’s 
counterfactual performance. A standard t-test for the difference between the two means can 
then be interpreted as the sole treatment effect. 
Tables 18 and 19 present the final outcome regarding logarithmised share price and the return 
on assets, respectively. For of all three regime types, connected firms are checked against their 
counterparts – matched on the basis of propensity scores. In addition, firm characteristics of 
treated and matched firms are compared in order to check that the latter are a good fit.118 The 
results basically resemble those obtained by OLS. Firm probability in terms of the return on 
assets is completely unrelated to political connections – considering both regular MPs and 
members of the governing party.  
With regard to share prices, a connection in Imperial Germany remains ineffective, even when 
the connected MP is a member of the governing party, i.e. Centre Party or Conservatives. In 
the Weimar Republic a mere connection to just any politician did not improve market 
performance. However, the share price of a firm linked to the government was significantly 
higher. To that effect, the democratic nature of the Weimar constitution is also reflected, quite 
precisely, in the propensity score matching specification. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 Using two and four – or even more than four – matched firms yields similar results.  
118 An appropriate control group requires the firm characteristics to be as similar as possible. 
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Table 18: Propensity score matching results regarding logarithmised share price 
  
Firms 
treated with 
connection  
Matched 
firms t-stat/z-stat 
Firms 
treated with 
government 
connection  
Matched 
firms  t-stat/z-stat 
      1913     
Joint stock 
capital  27 28 -0.19 35 34 0.11 
Firm age 26 26.7 -0.28 26.2 25.1 0.31 
Distance 
Berlin 254.5 274 -0.68 265.6 133 0.75 
log price 4.85 4.86 -0.18 4.91 4.84 1.06 
      1925     
Joint stock 
capital 23 20 0.65 25 25 0.04 
Firm age 36.3 38 -0.69 35.7 36.5 -0.06 
Distance 
Berlin 315.6 310.8 0.18 224.17 208.2 -0.57 
log price 2.61 2.39 1.64 2.79 2.51  1.69* 
      1938     
Joint stock 
capital 34 27 0.95 42 32 0.9 
Firm age 48.4 49.1 -0.23 48.4 51.5 -0.88 
Distance 
Berlin 259.8 256.6 0.11 245.5 398.5 -1.35 
log price 4.87 4.81 1.81*** 4.86 4.79 1.38 
The table compares firms whose board members are MP or MP of the governing party with non-connected one by 
means of standard t and z-tests respectively; Joint stock capital in million Reichsmark; significance level indicated 
by p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The picture in 1938 reads analogous to our previous results as well. A connection to the ruling 
NSDAP did not bring any improvement in share price, whereas a simple connection did. The 
propensity score matching is consistent with the OLS regressions in all periods. It broadly 
confirms our finding that it is not a link to politics as such that mattered. Only access to an 
important political figure can add value to a firm. 
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Table 19: Propensity score matching results regarding return on assets 
  
Firms 
treated with 
connection  
Matched 
firms t-stat/z-stat 
Firms 
treated with 
government 
connection  
Matched 
firms  t-stat/z-stat 
      1913     
Joint stock 
capital 28 29 -0.29 35 34 0.08 
Firm age 25.8 25.5 0.11 26.2 26.1 0.02 
Distance 
Berlin 253.4 238.8 0.5 265.6 224.7 0.94 
RoA 0.044 0.05 -0.76 0.049 0.038 0.86 
1925     1935     
Joint stock 
capital 20 19 0.28 23 21 0.35 
Firm age 34.3 33 0.48 33.6 31.8 0.68 
Distance 
Berlin 220.4 212 0.29 236.2 238.9 -0.09 
RoA 0.0283 0.034 -1.2 0.029 0.03 -0.01 
1938     1938     
Joint stock 
capital 34 27 0.95 40 31 0.95 
Firm age 48.7 49 -0.1 48.9 51.5 -0.73 
Distance 
Berlin 260.4 270.9 -0.38 255.4 293.7 -1.17 
RoA 0.029 0.025 0.72 0.025 0.036 -1.03 
The table compares firms whose board members are MP or MP of the governing party with non-connected one by 
means of standard t and z-tests respectively; Joint stock capital in million Reichsmark; significance level indicated 
by p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Propensity score matching does not provide exact matches for each observation. Given the 
mostly continuous covariates in our data this seems virtually impossible. In such case a 
parametric model is still preferable to a simple test of differences in means with regard to any 
causal inference.119 For that reason we implement coarsened exact matching (CEM), as 
described by Iacus et al. (2011), as an additional robustness check. This method restricts the 
data in a way that common support is empirically given. The matching algorithm simply 
coarsens each variable in the data thereby creating a set of variable-specific strata around the 
exact values. The bandwidth of these can be set manually, if desired.120 In the next step, all 
strata which do not contain both a treated and a control group observation are dropped. The 
remaining variables are the basis for further evaluation of the actual impact of treatment. In 
principle this procedure simply reduces imbalances between the treated and the control group 
ex-ante. Afterwards, common parametric models can be applied, for instance an OLS regression 
either using a reduced or weighted sample. Figure 7 illustrates how the imbalance disappeared. 
The left side show the means values of the whole sample, the right side refers to the reduced 
sample only. Most distinct was the difference in joint stock capital, whereas firm age and 
location of the headquarters was quite balanced before matching. 
Moreover, the CEM algorithm assigns weights to each observation reflecting different strata 
sizes. These are used in a weighted OLS regression, displayed in table 20. Just as the original 
OLS regression, it includes a set of variables to control for the remaining imbalance within a 
stratum.121 Models 1 and 3 use the CEM weights, while models 2 and 4 are based on so-called 
k-to-k matching. In that specification only those strata containing an equal number of treated 
and control units are considered. As a result of this, the number of observations is greatly 
reduced in these models.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 For a more detailed overview of the advantages of coarsened exact matching, see King et al. (2011). 
120 Natural breaks in (mainly discrete) variables give a point to a manual calibration of strata. For instance, using 
schooling data, in most cases years of education are equivalent to a specific level of education. In such case it is 
reasonable to set the breakpoints manually in order to avoid implausible matches. 
121 Note that the inclusion of all covariates in the regression does barley change the outcome, indicating that the 
matching has worked well. For reasons of clarity we only include the full model here. 
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Figure 7: change in sample means of covariates as a result of CEM in 1938 
 
Figures refer to firms with a connection to the government in 1938 (grey) and without a connection (black) before 
CEM matching on the left side and after on the right side. 
 
Overall, the outcome resembles largely the standard OLS results: there is no effect of a plain 
connection in neither Imperial times nor in the Weimar Republic. In model (3), direct links to 
the government were valuable in 1925. Also, the older firms tend to be significantly higher 
connected. Under National Socialist rule, only overall political connections were beneficial. 
Just as in the previous analyses, returns on assets are barely affected, find the corresponding 
table in the appendix. Altogether, the close resemblance to the standard OLS results indicates 
that this was already well-specified. 
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Table 20: Regression result after Coarsened Exact Matching – share prices 
 overall connections connections to the governing party 
  1913 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connection -0.0281 0.157 0.113 0.216 
 (0.729) (0.304) (0.310) (0.270) 
Joint Stock Capital 7.25e-09* 5.08e-09* 8.12e-09 -1.55e-10 
 (0.0779) (0.0827) (0.154) (0.976) 
Firm age 0.00391 0.000420 0.00530* 0.00891 
 (0.167) (0.898) (0.0667) (0.184) 
Distance Berlin 0.000424 0.000124 0.00108** 0.000892 
 (0.216) (0.776) (0.0392) (0.172) 
Constant 4.223*** 4.123*** 4.100*** 3.678*** 
 (0) (0) (1.15e-10) (9.19e-08) 
Observations 462 132 270 60 
R-squared 0.168 0.170 0.277 0.353 
  1925 
Connection 0.224 0.168 0.408* 0.290 
 (0.207) (0.241) (0.0969) (0.341) 
Joint Stock Capital 1.14e-08 1.66e-08 9.93e-09 1.09e-08 
 (0.430) (0.106) (0.481) (0.285) 
Firm age 0.0169** 0.0114*** 0.00948* -0.00383 
 (0.0311) (0.00296) (0.0642) (0.397) 
Distance Berlin 0.000992 0.000917 0.00121* 1.24e-05 
(0.111) (0.295) (0.0627) (0.988) 
Constant 1.039*** 0.538*** 1.310*** 1.476*** 
 (0.000109) (0.00639) (2.14e-06) (0.000850) 
Observations 685 166 673 144 
R-squared 0.228 0.333 0.238 0.294 
  1938 
Connection 0.121** 0.102 0.0507 0.0158 
 (0.0312) (0.194) (0.133) (0.600) 
Joint Stock Capital 2.41e-09 1.77e-09 1.71e-09 2.74e-09 
 (0.149) (0.290) (0.230) (0.179) Firm age -1.08e-05 0.00185 -0.00252 -0.00436* 
 (0.996) (0.498) (0.150) (0.0609) 
Distance Berlin 1.14e-05 -0.000175 8.46e-05 6.20e-05 
 (0.958) (0.331) (0.723) (0.823) Constant 4.498*** 4.669*** 4.698*** 4.888*** 
 (0) (5.82e-10) (0) (0) 
Observations 327 142 255 93 
R-squared 0.237 0.241 0.298 0.406 
Table contains OLS regression results of the logarithmised share price on various connection und firm characteristic 
measures after Coarsened Exact Matching. For details see text. Firm age in years, distance in kilometres, and stock capital 
in Reichsmark. Sector indicator variables included, ‘others’ is omitted. Robust standard errors, clustered at sector level, in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Survival analysis 
 
In the following, an assessment of another, more implicit type of market performance is 
conducted: The chance of a firm to survive over time, i.e. to remain listed on the Berlin Stock 
Exchange. In particular we examine how far this is affected by the prevalence of a political 
connection.  
The probability to survive in the market is estimated using survival analysis methodology.122 
Technically, this approach assesses the likelihood of a certain event – denoted as failure – to 
take place.123 The assessment is based on the actual observed time until the occurrence of the 
event – in the stochastic model represented by the nonnegative random variable T.124  Unlike 
the implicated by the term ‘failure’, the event itself does not necessarily need to be negative 
and can be defined in any way. The analysis itself is quite intuitive and is based on the 
estimation of a survivor and a hazard function, respectively. The former is defined simply as 
the reverse cumulative distribution function of the time until failure F(t).  
 
ܵሺݐሻ ൌ 1 െ ܨሺݐሻ ൌ Prሺܶ ൐ ݐሻ 
  
The hazard function h(t) or conditional failure rate, reflects the risk of the event to occur in a 
given period.125 It is defined as the probability that failure will happen in the specified time 
interval – given that the object of investigation has survived until the start of that interval – 
divided by the length of that: 
 
݄ሺݐሻ ൌ lim∆௧→଴
Pr	ሺݐ ൅ ∆ݐ ൐ ܶ ൐ ݐ|ܶ ൐ ݐሻ
∆ݐ ൌ
݂ሺݐሻ
ܵሺݐሻ 
 
Note that f(t) is simply the derivation of F(t) regarding time t. The total amount of risk to fail is 
reflected in the cumulative hazard function H(t). That, in turn, is inversely related to the 
probability of survival.  
                                                 
122 For a detailed overview see Cleves et al. (2010). 
123 These denotations stem from the traditional application of survival analysis in medical or engineering science. 
There, a main concern is the examination of mortality or mechanical lifetime. 
124 The main reason for not simply applying an OLS regression of time until the event on the variables of interest 
is the non-normality of the error term. That is non-symmetric in a way, which is hardly matched by any OLS 
specification (Cleves et al. 2010). 
125 The hazard rate ranges from zero – no risk to fail at all – to infinity, implying certainty of failure. 
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The hazard function ݄ሺݐሻ is estimated using a set of covariates, given the respective dataset. In 
order to do so, the basic structure of the function must be defined. Here we employ some of the 
most common parametric models. Specifically, we assume h(t) follows an exponential, a 
Gompertz and a Weibull distribution, respectively. Parameters are fitted by maximising the 
corresponding likelihood function.126 Finally, the impact of the variable of interest, i.e. the 
existence of a political connection, on the probability of a firm to survive is revealed in a 
regression framework.127 For the plotting of the functions we employ the semi-parametric 
Kaplan-Meier estimator, which can be found in Cleves et al. (2010, pp. 93).  
In addition to relevant information on the object of investigation – in our case firms – the 
estimation of survivor functions requires very little additional data. In fact, we needed to collect 
information on whether firms survived at all, i.e. remained listed in the market and further, in 
case of failure, the time until that point. Beginning in 1925, we checked which firms in our 
sample left the market within the following 10 years. Some firms were liquidated, others just 
ceased to be listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange. Another major cause for a share being cut off 
from being listed were mergers and acquisitions. These are treated separately and constitute 
another form of ‘failure’.128 The interpretation in this case is different, however, and so is the 
outcome.  
 
The considered period is particularly interesting to analyse since it includes both a relatively 
stable period and a full-scale economic crisis that began at the latest in 1929.129 Germany’s 
monetary and financial stability was severely shaken when early information on the Young Plan 
was made public in 1929. Under that new reparation agreement German transfer protection was 
cancelled. This clause in the hitherto running Dawes reparation scheme effectively turned 
corresponding claims into junior debts and thereby considerably lowered the fiscal burden for 
                                                 
126 For an exact description of the respective parameterization, see Cleves et al (2010, pp. 232). Find the general 
form of the likelihood function in Cleves et al (2010, pp. 245).  
127 The method can be applied equally to firm failure. Note that the definition of this event is arbitrary. 
128 Given the historical source – Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften – it is not possible to further 
differentiate between mergers and acquisition. Though it is certainly of great interest, an exploration of every 
individual firm is far beyond the scope of this study. 
129 1929 is generally regarded as the beginning of the worldwide Great Depression. However, the economic 
situation in Germany was already deteriorating in 1927 (Clavin 2000, p. 88; Ritschl 2002). After the so-called 
Black Friday at the Berlin Stock Exchange in the wake of an intervention of the German central bank, investment 
– just as stock prices – remained at a strikingly low level (Voth 2003). 
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the federal government. The concessions given in return did not outweigh the disadvantage – 
Germany was effectively cut off from international capital markets. The economic and political 
disturbances shook the German society in the subsequent years, ultimately leading to the rise 
of the National Socialists (Ritschl 2013, pp. 4). Moreover most of the industrialised countries 
were affected by the Great Depression and international trade was disrupted.130 How to survive 
in times of economic crises was certainly not a trivial issue, but it required all the stops to be 
pulled out. Ab hypothesised previously, we expect connected firms to have better access to 
capital. Also, they are more likely to receive a bailout. Accordingly, we expect the chances of 
survival to be highest for interlinked firms during such troubled times.131 
The other two sample periods 1913 and 1938 were both followed by a World War a short time 
afterwards and therefore not suitable as a starting point for survival analysis. During world 
World War I, trading at the German stock exchanges was heavily restricted (Saling 1921, p. 
315). Similarly, all shares were subject to strict price controls in 1941 at the latest 
(Bittlingmayer 1998). The German economy was largely reorganised and affected by extensive 
state planning activity in order to meet the war time requirements.132 As the analysis comprises 
all stock companies that were listed in Berlin in 1925, it does not cover firms that entered the 
market after that time. Even though political connections appear to have implications for these 
newly-listed firms in particular (Fan et al. 2007), we expect the effect to be negligible given the 
large size of our sample.133 Moreover, setting a fix starting point prevents the data to be left-
censored.134 An overview of firm survival is given in table 21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
130 An overview of the ‘Great Depression’, alongside its exact beginning in the various countries is given by 
Thomas Hall and David Ferguson (1998), Harald James (2002) or Patricia Clavin (2000). 
131 Generally, extreme events or periods provide excellent grounds for testing a hypothesis. See Ferguson and Voth 
(2008) or Acemoglu et al. (2013) for some outstanding examples.  
132 For an extensive view on the total alignment of the German economy to wartime and the armament, see for 
instance Herbst (1982) or Overy (1994). What drives firm survival during wartime constitutes a relevant research 
question indeed. However, this study concerns the general value of a political connections, i.e. during peacetime 
133 Fan et al. (2007) examine the post-IPO performance of connected firms in China. There, connected firms 
performed particularly poor. 
134 Since we define the unit of observation as ‘all firms listed in 1927’. By definition our data is right-censored of 
type 1. Such data structure occurs when there are still surviving objects at the end of the interval. In our case not 
all firms left the market until 1935.    
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Table 21: Life table of surviving firms 
 connected firms non-connected firms 
period rate of surviving firms 
cumulative 
failure rate 
rate of surviving 
firms 
cumulative 
failure rate 
1925–26 0.9991 0.0009 0.9989 0.0011 
1926–27 0.9981 0.0019 0.9938 0.0062 
1927–28 0.9947 0.0053 0.9866 0.0134 
1928–39 0.9934 0.0066 0.9807 0.0193 
1939–30 0.9934 0.0066 0.9727 0.0273 
1930–31 0.9915 0.0085 0.961 0.039 
1931–32 0.9890 0.0110 0.9524 0.0476 
1932–33 0.9855 0.0145 0.9426 0.0574 
1933–34 0.9682 0.0318 0.9244 0.0756 
1934–35 0.9511 0.0489 0.8879 0.1121 
Own calculations; Data see text. 
 
There is a salient difference between connected and non-connected firms with respect to the 
rates of survival and failure respectively. We performed a series of tests of differences in the 
survivor functions, all of which rejected the null-hypothesis of equality of the two groups.135 
Connected firms remained listed on the market at a significantly higher degree. The difference 
is also clearly visible in figure 8, which displays the Kaplan-Meier estimate for the survivor 
function.136  
The survival model regression models, controlling for further variables, produce similar results. 
Estimates are presented in table 22. The prevalence of a connection significantly lowers the 
chance of dropping out of the market in all three models applied. Firm characteristics are of 
large importance as well: Older firms tend to persist – tradition pays off in the market. Likewise, 
a high capital stocks seems to increase the resistance against failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
135 To be precise we performed a log-rank test, a Cox test, a Wilcoxon test, a Tarone-Ware test and a Peto-Peto-
Prentice test on the equality of survivor functions. For an explicit description on these tests, see Cleves et al. (2010, 
pp. 122). 
136 The Kaplan-Meier estimator is particularly efficient in the case of right-censored data and a relatively small 
share of failures, both of which applies to our data (Miller 1983).  
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Figure 8: Survival estimates connected vs. unconnected firms 
 
Own calculations; the (smoothed) survival rates are derived from the Kaplan-Meier estimator.  
 
 
Table 22: Parametric survival model regression, failure-time form 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Model exponential gompertz weibull 
Connection -0.734*** -0.755*** -0.756*** 
 (0.000300) (3.27e-10) (0.000244) 
Joint stock capital -6.60e-08** -6.82e-08*** -6.82e-08** 
 (0.0315) (0) (0.0306) 
Distance to Berlin in km 0.000360 0.000380** 0.000380 
 (0.279) (0.0111) (0.264) 
Firm age in years -0.00888** -0.00921*** -0.00920** 
 (0.0400) (2.55e-08) (0.0409) 
Constant -3.504*** -4.608*** -5.677*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
    
Number of firms 1000 1000 1000 
chi2 22.81 420.8 23.86 
P 0.000138 0 8.51e-05 
The three models represent, an exponential, a Gompertz and a Weibull regression, respectively. Robust pval in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The visualisation of the hazard rate in figure 9 reveals an interesting trend. First, it offers a good 
reflection of the impact of the economic crisis beginning at the latest in 1929. Hazard rates of 
all firms increased notably over time. However, the increase is much sharper for non-connected 
ones. Also, connected firms responded much later to the Great Depression. A break in the 
hazard curve is not detectable before 1930. Connections obviously bought a firm time during 
the crisis. That corresponds well with the literature, which emphasizes the higher chance of a 
bailout and a better supply of capital due to a connection. However, these benefits were not 
unlimited. The German state was to a large extent financially constrained by its reparation 
commitments (Wehler 2003, pp. 240). Furthermore, the German economy was generally in 
extremely poor condition already since 1927 (Clavin 2000, p. 88; Ritschl 2002; Voth 2003).137 
That becomes visible in the slopes of the hazard curves, which start to gradually align after 
1930.138 The decline at the end of the time horizon indicates a relaxation of the economic 
downturn as early as 1933.139 That is also in line with the literature, which locates the start of 
the recovery in Germany – in contrast to most other countries – in that very same year (Clavin 
2000, pp. 171; Fisher and Hornstein 2002, pp. 103). Survival analysis reveals the great benefits 
of a political connection. This worked as an implicit insurance against firm failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
137 In fact, the German budget was highly restricted during the whole Weimar Republic. For details of the extensive 
public debt in that period, see Bachmann (1996).  
138 The advantage for connected firms amounted to approximately two years. It seems plausible that the effect 
might be even larger in countries with healthy public finances. 
139 Bear in mind that at the end of the sample period the section bias is largest, as the analysis is based solely on 
firms that were listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange in 1925.  
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Figure 9: Smoothed hazard estimates of connected vs. non-connected firms 
 
The (smoothed) survival rates are derived from the Kaplan-Meier estimator.  
 
In interwar Germany, mergers and acquisitions were greatly facilitated by political connections. 
Some of the most important German mining and steel producing companies merged into the 
Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG in 1926, which constituted one of the largest steel producers in 
Europe. A formation of this magnitude required in-depth preparation on both the firm and the 
political level (Reckendrees 2000, pp. 222). The fact that two of the five initiating directors 
were members of the parliament supposedly facilitated the endeavour. Along with other high-
ranking managers these persons were key figures in the realisation of the merger.140 Anita Klein 
(2014, pp. 426) gives a further example from the considered period. Again, the Reemtsma 
Company was involved. The realisation of a planned takeover was greatly facilitated by the 
firm’s political ties. In 1929 the by then large-scale tobacco company acquired the smaller 
cigarette producer Batschari, which had cumulated a huge tax debt. Due to the decision of 
Reemtsma-affiliated persons in the ministry of finance that debt was cancelled after the 
acquisition. Reemtsma made a sizable profit.  
                                                 
140 The connected board members were Fritz Thyssen of Thyssen&Co and Albert Vögler of Deutsch-
Luxemburgische Bergwerks- und Hütten AG (Reckendrees 2000, p. 149; own dataset). 
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Beng-Soon Chong et al. (2006, pp. 3229) provide empirical evidence. By examining Malaysian 
banks, they find that politically connected institutes are more likely to be taken over by others. 
Jiatao Li and Cuili Qian (2013) get to similar results analysing Chinese firms: Political 
connections significantly increase the chance of a takeover taking place.141 Paul Brockman et 
al. (2013) underline the general importance of political connections for merger and acquisition 
activity.142 Though the event of interest is denoted as failure, following survival analysis 
diction, mergers and acquisitions do not necessarily involve an economic loss.143 The shares of 
involved companies are usually withdrawn from the market or swapped for shares of the 
acquiring company. After all, usually both sides expect to benefit. As implied by the literature, 
political connections have been utilised frequently to bring forward such deals. Altogether, we 
expect the merger activity of connected firms to be significantly higher.144 The newly formed 
company is obviously larger in size. Highly capitalised firms in turn have generally a much 
better chance to survive on the market (Audretsch et al. 2000; Disney et al. 2003; Geroski et al. 
2010), which leads to an indirect benefit of a connection145 – The hypothesis reads quite 
comparable to the above case, though in reverse direction: High failure rates of connected firms 
would support our notion of a connection functioning as insurance against firm failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
141 Their sample is much broader than the one of Chong et al. (2006), as they employ all publicly listed Chinese 
firms between 1998 and 2007. 
142 However, the institutional setting plays a crucial role. Merging activity itself as well as firm performance after 
such a deal are highly dependent on the level of corruption or the legal environment in a country (Brockman et al. 
2013). 
143 Particularly shareholders of the target firms benefitted. See Lübbers (2008) for a profound study of takeovers 
in coal mining in Imperial Germany.  
144 Which implies a significantly higher rate of failure for connected firms in this setting.  
145 There are various underlying reasons for the increased survival rates, which comprise increased economies of 
scale, better access to funds, a higher diversity of business activities or better managerial capabilities (Geroski et 
al. 2010, pp. 511). The literature on post-merger efficiency is ambiguous, however. Some authors find a positive 
effect (Healy et al. 1992; Powell and Stark 2005), others find a merger to be negative (Knapp et al. 2005; Sharma 
2016). Others, like Ghosh (2001) or Abbas et al. (2014) detect no effect at all. Brockman et al. (2013) find large 
differences across different institutional settings. 
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Table 23: Life table of merging firms 
 connected firms non-connected firms 
period rate of surviving firms 
cumulative failure 
rate 
rate of surviving 
firms 
cumulative failure 
rate 
1925–26 1 0 0.9998 0.0002 
1926–27 1 0 0.9996 0.0004 
1927–28 0.9978 0.0022 0.9983 0.0017 
1928–39 0.9966 0.0034 0.9969 0.0031 
1939–30 0.9935 0.0065 0.9949 0.0051 
1930–31 0.9861 0.0139 0.9926 0.0074 
1931–32 0.9813 0.0187 0.9904 0.0096 
1932–33 0.9677 0.0323 0.9867 0.0133 
1933–34 0.9395 0.0605 0.9717 0.0283 
1934–35 0.9227 0.0773 0.9537 0.0463 
 Own calculations; Data see text. 
 
Indeed, figure 10 shows a reverse relation than in the case of actual firm failure, i.e. dropping 
out of the market. Though in the first two periods there are no connected firms involved in a 
merger, their share increases much faster than for non-connected firms. At the end of the 
assessment period, it is nearly twice as high (see table 23).  
The results are validated when controlling for further firm characteristics. Table 24 displays the 
parametric survival model regressions. All the coefficients are reverse to those in table 21. In 
the merger setting a political connection increased the chance of failure. Connected firms tend 
to merge at a significantly higher amount, regardless of the model applied. The same holds also 
for older firms, for which it is difficult to give a reasonable interpretation. Joint stock capital 
has a significant effect only in the Gompertz (2) model. There, large firms have a higher chance 
of merging. The same applies for distance to Berlin. Remote firms also tend to be involved to 
a higher degree. 
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Figure 10: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates connected vs. unconnected firms; Merger 
 
The (smoothed) survival rates are derived from the Kaplan-Meier estimator.  
 
 
Table 24: Parametric survival model regression, failure-time form; Merger 
  (1) (2) (3) 
model exponential gompertz weibull 
connected 0.560** 0.582*** 0.579** 
 (0.0160) (9.11e-10) (0.0153) 
Joint stock capital 6.32e-09 6.26e-09*** 6.27e-09 
 (0.124) (1.62e-10) (0.127) 
Distance to Berlin in km 0.000811 0.000838*** 0.000833 
 (0.170) (5.78e-05) (0.162) 
Firm age in years 0.00940** 0.00944*** 0.00943** 
 (0.0343) (1.61e-07) (0.0379) 
Constant -5.710*** -8.093*** -10.40*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
    
N 1064 1064 1064 
chi2 23.33 131.6 22.98 
p 0.000109 0 0.000128 
The three models represent, an exponential, a Gompertz and a Weibull regression, respectively. Robust pval in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 11 shows the smoothed hazard rates. Considering firms without political linkage it grew 
steadily over time – at a relatively low speed. In contrast, the hazard rate for connected firms 
sharply increased after 1929. Just as the hazard ratios of the actual firm failure shown above, it 
reflects the start of the Great Depression quite well. Also, both curves are stagnating after 1933. 
Firm consolidation dramatically increased during the crisis – apparently fostered greatly by a 
political connection, which constitutes an additional benefit: by creating larger companies in 
the first place, a link to politics increases the chance of survival in the following time. 
 
Figure 11: Smoothed hazard estimates all connected vs. unconnected firms, merger 
 
The (smoothed) survival rates are derived from the Kaplan-Meier estimator.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this study we comprehensively survey the political connections between firms and parliament 
in pre- and interwar Germany. The respective periods of time comprise three different regimes. 
The first, Imperial Germany, was a parliamentary monarchy. Next, we considered the Weimar 
Republic, representing the first actual all-German democracy. The rule of the National Socialist 
in our final sample period exemplifies a prototypical dictatorship. In a further step, we aim to 
evaluate the prevalence of a connection in the various regimes with respect to firm value and 
firm performance, including the likelihood of failure.  
 
Overall, interlinked firms i.e. firms which had at least one of its board members as a delegate 
in the Reichstag, were relatively widespread. Even in Imperial Germany, where the influence 
of the parliament was quite limited, nearly 12 percent of all Berlin-listed stock companies 
established a connection. That share remained relatively constant until 1925. In the last period, 
1938, it nearly doubled – every fifth stock companies possessed a political connection. 
Admittedly, the number of firms listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange varied largely over time, 
as did the average firm characteristics. A view on the various sectors of the economy shows 
some interesting insight. For instance, those branches particularly affected by the armament 
during National Socialist rule exhibited a remarkable increase in connections. Also, those 
sectors subject to public awarding of contracts and regulation were highly interlinked. 
Connections were not spread equally among the various political parties. Their distribution was 
generally heavily biased towards liberal parties. Unsurprisingly, the last period was dominated 
by the National Socialist Party. Other relevant political forces such as the Centre Party and even 
more so the Social Democrats were clearly underrepresented.  
The probability of a having a connection further depended on various firm features, most 
notably size, in terms of joint stock capital. That result resembles the literature (Boubakri et al. 
2008; Ferguson and Voth 2008). Moreover, given the size of our sample, this paper gives a 
comprehensive view of the composition of the Berlin Stock Exchange in the first half of the 
20th century.  
 
Though the majority of politicians possessed a board seat of only one firm, a few represented a 
number of companies – up to 17 in Imperial times. These political and economic heavyweights 
proved quite rewarding: share prices of the affiliated companies were significantly higher in 
1925 and 1938. Altogether, the value of a political connection in interwar Germany was not 
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homogeneous. In fact, it was highly dependent on both type of connection and the political 
system. Except for extreme settings, we do not discover a general benefit. Connections affected 
firm valuation in terms of share prices only under dictatorship, which is broadly consistent with 
the findings of Ferguson and Voth (2008). Just as in their work, it is the early link that pays off. 
Being just a Mitläufer did not bring about additional value, since a simple NSDAP linkage was 
worthless – the long-term connections were the ones that mattered.  
In the Weimar Republic only those firms affiliated to a governing party performed better in 
terms of share prices. After Germany had become a true parliamentary democracy for the first 
time in its history, investors utilised the advantage to forge links with the government. Also, 
that result corresponds to those of the literature (Fisman 2001; Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang 2009; Chen et al. 2013).146 In Imperial Germany, political connections were 
basically of no value. This finding supports the conception of a weak Reichstag during that era, 
as prompted by Wehler (1994).  
The various sectors of the economy could not exploit a connection to an equal extent. Banks, 
for instance, were affected to a great degree. The effect was particularly pronounced in 1925, 
emphasizing the investors’ need for security after times of monetary uncertainty. However, we 
fail to find a distinct Aryanisation effect for banks under National Socialist rule. An armament 
effect is not detectable in our data. A connected firm in the respective sectors did not outperform 
the others. Neither can we find a preferential treatment in the placing of public contracts due to 
political links. Given these findings, it seems highly improbable that firms could benefit directly 
from a connection. Rather, access to political information or to an established political and 
economic network are qualified as channels of transmission.  
Actual firm profitability in terms of the return on assets is barely affected by the prevalence of 
a political connection.147  
 
In addition, we follow an alternative approach, yet unutilised in that context. A survival analysis 
provides further insight into possible advantages of politically connected firms. These had a 
much better chance of remaining listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange over time. Such results 
support the argument of facilitated access to credit and an increased chance of being bailed out 
                                                 
146 Still, the impact of a connection in a democracy, featured by a powerful parliament, requires a more precise 
assessment. Part II of this thesis gives a detailed picture of the performance of connected firms, particularly in 
times of crises.  
147 That is broadly in line with the literature, which finds connected firms to even underperform (Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Boubakri 2008; Bliss and Gul 2012). 
78 
 
due to close political ties.148 Likewise, the probability of being involved in a merger or an 
acquisition is significantly higher if a firm is affiliated to the parliament. Also, that outcome fits 
quite well with the anecdotal and empirical evidence on that issue. Presumably, the newly-
founded companies are more likely to persist, which further amplifies the survival effect of a 
political connection.  
Altogether, survival analysis reveals an additional benefit arising from such connection. A link 
to politics can effectively function as an implicit insurance against firm failure – particularly in 
times of crisis.  
                                                 
148 As described among others by Khwaja and Mian (2005), Li et al. (2008), Faccio et al. (2006) or Blau et al. 
(2013). The effect we find seems to be limited to a certain timespan and is driven – aside from connectedness – by 
further firm characteristics, in particular joint stock capital. Whether this is due to poor state finances in the Weimar 
Republic requires additional investigation – for instance, by examining countries which were better-positioned in 
terms of fiscal condition. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Firms characteristics 1913 
1913 mean SD Min Max 
Firm age in years 27.70 15.89 4 101 
Joint stock capital 1.106e+07 2.502e+07 570,000 3.000e+08 
End-of-year price 147.3 85.94 3.400 612 
Distance to Berlin in km 245.9 183.6 0 681.9 
Return on assets 0.0566 0.0730 -0.572 0.850 
Own calculations; for data, see text. 
 
Table A2: Firms characteristics 1925 
1925 mean SD Min Max 
Firm age in years 33.58 18.94 1 160 
Joint stock capital 9.163e+06 2.068e+07 25,000 3.000e+08 
End-of-year price 21.50 30.94 0.100 390 
Distance to Berlin in km 245.1 183.5 0 682.2 
Return on assets 0.492 12.33 -0.267 331.6 
Own calculations; for data, see text. 
 
Table A3: Firms characteristics 1938 
1938 mean SD Min Max 
Firm age in years 47.71 19.84 3 126 
Joint stock capital 1.806e+07 6.970e+07 216,000 1.106e+09 
End-of-year price 128.2 41.05 3 400 
Distance to Berlin in km 244.4 190.4 0 681.9 
Return on assets 0.0289 0.0983 -0.691 1.236 
Own calculations; for data, see text. 
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Table A4: Share of political connections by sector 1913 
 
Share of firms 
connected 
altogether 
Share of firms 
connected only 
to current MP 
Share of firms 
connected only 
to former MP 
Share of firms 
connected to 
continuousMP 
Banking 41.3 6.3 21 14.3 
Insurance 14.6 0.0 10 4.2 
Mining 17.0 1.0 12 4.0 
Heavy industy 7.7 0.6 5 2.4 
Light industry 5.1 0.0 4 0.8 
Food processing 2.3 0.0 1 1.2 
Transportation 10.3 0.0 9 1.5 
Chemical industry 8.6 0.0 6 2.9 
Public utility 34.4 3.1 31 0.0 
Others 4.0 0.0 3 0.8 
All firms 11.5 0.8 8 2.8 
Own calculations; for data, see text.    
Table A5: Share of political connections by sector 1925 
 
Share of firms 
connected 
altogether 
Share of firms 
connected only 
to current MP 
Share of firms 
connected only 
to former MP 
Share of firms 
connected to 
continuousMP 
Banking 15.7 0.0 6 9.8 
Insurance 23.3 0.0 16 7.0 
Mining 25.6 0.0 16 9.3 
Heavy industy 7.3 0.8 5 1.2 
Light industry 7.5 1.0 4 2.5 
Food processing 9.1 2.6 3 3.9 
Transportation 22.4 7.5 9 6.0 
Chemical industry 7.5 1.9 2 3.8 
Public utility 23.8 3.2 11 9.5 
Others 9.5 1.1 3 5.6 
All firms 12.3 1.5 6 4.6 
Own calculations; for data, see text.    
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Table A6: Share of political connections by sector 1938 
  
Share of firms 
connected 
altogether 
Share of firms 
connected only 
to current MP 
Share of firms 
connected only 
to former MP 
Share of firms 
connected to 
continuousMP 
Banking 30.0 0.0 8 22.0 
Insurance 27.0 2.7 16 8.1 
Mining 40.5 2.7 8 29.7 
Heavy industy 15.2 3.8 3 8.9 
Light industry 18.1 0.0 11 7.4 
Food processing 12.3 0.0 5 7.7 
Transportation 26.0 0.0 10 16.0 
Chemical industry 16.1 0.0 10 6.5 
Public utility 34.6 0.0 4 30.8 
Others 13.5 3.8 8 1.9 
All firms 21.3 1.3 8 12.1 
Own calculations; For data, see text.    
Table A7: Fixed effect panel data regression of returns on assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Joint stock capital -0 -0 -0 -0 
(0.928) (0.826) (0.886) (0.864) 
Connection 0.00760 -0.0135 -0.0117 0.0118 
 (0.555) (0.535) (0.771) (0.740) 1925 -0.0317*** -0.0318*** -0.0357*** -0.0357*** 
 (1.77e-06) (1.50e-06) (3.49e-10) (4.61e-10) 1938 -0.0339*** -0.0340*** -0.0357*** -0.0358*** 
 (0.000865) (0.000852) (8.54e-05) (9.02e-05) Interaction x 1925 -0.0229 -0.0127 0.0226 0.0155 
 (0.463) (0.614) (0.585) (0.676) Interaction x 1938 -0.0151 -0.00488 0.00746 -0.00991 
 (0.424) (0.755) (0.861) (0.789) Constant 0.0728*** 0.0731*** 0.0740*** 0.0742*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
     
Branch interaction   yes  yes 
Observations 707 707 707 707 
R-squared 0.067 0.079 0.066 0.069 
Number of nr 265 265 265 265 
Table contains fixed-effects (within) regression results of the logarithmised share price on various connection und 
firm characteristic measures. The group variable is firm. For details see text. Firms’ age in years, stock capital in 
Reichsmark. Robust standard errors, clustered at sector level, in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A8: PSM - logit regression of section into treatment 1913  
 Logarithmised share price return on assets 
Treatment 
Member of the 
supervisory 
board was or is 
currently MP  
Member of the 
supervisory 
board was or is 
currently MP 
for a governing 
Party  
Member of the 
supervisory 
board was or is 
currently MP  
Member of the 
supervisory 
board was or is 
currently MP 
for a governing 
Party  
      
Joint stock capital 7.79e-09** 1.14e-08*** 8.11e-09** 1.11e-08*** 
 (3.61e-09) (3.94e-09) (3.65e-09) (3.94e-09) 
Firm age -0.0207** -0.0202* -0.0218** -0.0188 
 (0.00865) (0.0119) (0.00892) (0.0120) 
Distance Berlin 9.34e-05 0.000729 -2.73e-05 0.000666 
 (0.000641) (0.000878) (0.000650) (0.000878) 
Banking 2.594*** 1.461** 2.717*** 1.405** 
 (0.503) (0.626) (0.528) (0.625) 
Mining 1.425*** 0.814 1.532*** 0.807 
 (0.485) (0.601) (0.513) (0.600) 
Heavy Industry 0.403 -0.370 0.526 -0.407 
 (0.481) (0.647) (0.505) (0.647) 
Light Industry -0.0343 -0.861 0.107 -0.891 
(0.575) (0.851) (0.596) (0.851) 
Food Processing -0.763 - -0.613 - 
 (0.817)  (0.832)  
Transportation 0.711 0.397 0.885 0.400 
 (0.560) (0.693) (0.582) (0.694) Chemical 
industry 0.520 0.369 0.684 0.366 
 (0.722) (0.865) (0.739) (0.865) 
Public Utility 2.212*** 1.360** 2.223*** 1.343** 
 (0.536) (0.659) (0.566) (0.660) 
Constant -2.521*** -3.033*** -2.587*** -2.995*** 
 (0.440) (0.543) (0.469) (0.546) 
     
Observations 825 739 797 714 
The table shows the regression coefficients of a logit regression of being connected, which is the treatment in 
propensity score matching. The sector indicator variable ‘others’ is omitted. Robust p values in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A9: PSM – logit regression of section into treatment 1925  
 Logarithmised share price return on assets 
Treatment 
Member of the 
supervisory 
board was or is 
currently MP  
Member of the 
supervisory board 
was or is currently 
MP for a governing 
Party  
Member of the 
supervisory 
board was or is 
currently MP  
Member of the 
supervisory board 
was or is currently 
MP for a governing 
Party  
      
Joint stock 
capital 1.25e-08*** 7.10e-09 1.20e-08*** 7.92e-09 
 (4.08e-09) (4.77e-09) -4.53E-09 (5.67e-09) Firm age 0.00976 0.00818 -0.00117 -0.000447 
 (0.00682) (0.0103) -0.00705 (0.0102) Distance 
Berlin -0.00112* -0.00127 -0.000405 -0.000846 
 (0.000629) (0.000930) -0.000662 (0.000958) Banking -0.884* -0.131 -0.463 -0.146 
 (0.512) (0.782) -0.52 (0.810) Mining -1.322*** -1.169 -1.345*** -2.314** 
 (0.392) (0.721) -0.474 (1.146) Heavy 
Industry -1.117*** -0.333 -1.141** -0.458 
 (0.398) (0.641) -0.451 (0.686) Light Industry -1.053** 0.113 -1.144 -0.441 
(0.518) (0.724) -0.811 (1.159) 
Food 
Processing -0.443 0.278 0.0147 0.680 
 (0.471) (0.722) -0.459 (0.672) Transportation -1.434** -0.00266 -1.922** -0.357 
 (0.601) (0.769) -0.813 (0.900) Chemical 
industry 0.0432 0.924 0.153 0.799 
 (0.437) (0.646) -0.454 (0.660) Public Utility -1.362*** -0.747 -1.037** -0.480 
 (0.445) (0.727) -0.449 (0.693) Constant -1.380*** -2.859*** -1.172*** -2.477*** 
 (0.422) (0.683) -0.451 (0.695) 
     Observations 887 887 684 684 
The table shows the regression coefficients of a logit regression of being connected, which is the treatment in 
propensity score matching. The sector indicator variable ‘others’ is omitted. Robust p values in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A10: PSM – logit regression of section into treatment 1938 
 Logarithmised share price return on assets 
Treatment 
Member of the 
supervisory 
board was or is 
currently MP  
Member of the 
supervisory board 
was or is currently 
MP for a governing 
Party  
Member of the 
supervisory 
board was or is 
currently MP  
Member of the 
supervisory board 
was or is currently 
MP for a governing 
Party  
      
Joint stock 
capital 2.49e-08*** 2.26e-08*** 2.59e-08*** 2.36e-08*** 
 (5.77e-09) (5.47e-09) (5.80e-09) (5.52e-09) Firm age 0.00434 0.00505 0.00576 0.00677 
 (0.00716) (0.00835) (0.00705) (0.00820) Distance 
Berlin 0.000691 0.000261 0.000704 0.000315 
 (0.000657) (0.000784) (0.000651) (0.000776) Banking 0.534 1.016 0.506 0.972 
 (0.554) (0.733) (0.553) (0.733) Mining 0.528 1.078 0.433 0.981 
 (0.594) (0.758) (0.589) (0.755) Heavy 
Industry 0.0453 0.823 0.0207 0.792 
 (0.523) (0.693) (0.522) (0.692) Light Industry 0.109 0.0123 0.0740 -0.0272 
(0.500) (0.727) (0.500) (0.727) 
Food 
Processing -0.222 0.237 -0.229 0.223 
 (0.566) (0.765) (0.566) (0.765) Transportation 0.562 0.829 0.577 0.891 
 (0.544) (0.739) (0.538) (0.728) Chemical 
industry -0.148 0.0264 -0.126 0.0434 
 (0.682) (0.949) (0.684) (0.950) Public Utility 0.430 1.241 0.410 1.212 
 (0.632) (0.778) (0.634) (0.780) Constant -2.304*** -3.178*** -2.378*** -3.272*** 
 (0.515) (0.699) (0.513) (0.697) 
     Observations 470 470 477 477 
The table shows the regression coefficients of a logit regression of being connected, which is the treatment in 
propensity score matching. The sector indicator variable ‘others’ is omitted. Robust p values in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A11: Regression results after Coarsened Exact Matching – return on assets 
 overall connections connections to the governing party 
  1913 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connection -0.0121 -0.0188* 0.00139 0.00733 
 (0.201) (0.0530) (0.909) (0.670) 
Joint Stock Capital 9.49e-11 3.91e-10** 4.08e-10 -7.51e-10 
 (0.555) (0.0133) (0.493) (0.274) 
Firm age -1.79e-05 -9.47e-05 0.000433 0.000290 
 (0.957) (0.844) (0.392) (0.448) 
Distance Berlin 5.00e-05** 7.73e-05 0.000167* 4.99e-05 
 (0.0466) (0.123) (0.0514) (0.290) 
Constant 0.0154** 0.0268** -0.00596 0.00290 
 (0.0340) (0.0101) (0.653) (0.783) 
Observations 449 128 265 59 
R-squared 0.175 0.233 0.258 0.442 
  1925 
Connection -0.00552 -0.00933 -0.00309 0.00540 
 (0.293) (0.246) (0.534) (0.361) Joint Stock Capital 6.22e-11 0 0 1.75e-10 
 (0.534) (0.678) (0.796) (0.124) Firm age -6.67e-08 -0.000250 8.16e-06 -0.000108 
 (1.000) (0.235) (0.969) (0.434) Distance Berlin -7.42e-06 -4.17e-07 -1.08e-06 -1.75e-05 
(0.534) (0.977) (0.945) (0.383) 
Constant 0.0410*** 0.0398*** 0.0398*** 0.0275*** 
 (7.18e-05) (3.51e-05) (0.000874) (0.000932) Observations 526 143 516 117 
R-squared 0.025 0.074 0.018 0.101 
  1938 
Connection 0.0103** 0.0127** 0.00486 0.00718 
 (0.0454) (0.0179) (0.136) (0.141) Joint Stock Capital 1.28e-10 -0 -1.43e-10 0 
 (0.332) (0.900) (0.439) (0.917) 
Firm age 0.000104 0.000180 0.000220 0.000243 
 (0.736) (0.273) (0.276) (0.339) Distance Berlin -2.36e-05 2.47e-06 -1.85e-05 1.51e-05 
 (0.348) (0.886) (0.289) (0.541) 
Constant 0.0202 0.0147 0.00259 -0.0162 
 (0.144) (0.118) (0.729) (0.344) Observations 330 146 260 96 
R-squared 0.027 0.183 0.022 0.176 
Table contains OLS regression results of returns on assets on various connection und firm characteristic measures after 
Coarsened Exact Matching. For details see text. Firm age in years, distance in kilometres, and stock capital in Reichsmark. 
Sector indicator variables included, ‘others’ is omitted. Robust standard errors, clustered at sector level, in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter II 
- 
‘With a little help of my friend’ 
Political Connections as risk insurance for investment in times of instability – evidence 
from interwar Germany149 
 
 
 
 
In the interwar years, quite a large number of firms had active or former politicians on their 
supervisory boards. We show that especially large and established firms had political 
connections in this form. We further provide anecdotal and empirical evidence that political 
connections to a governing party functioned in a way like a risk insurance for investment, since 
the market value of connected firms was not just higher than the value of unconnected firms, 
connected firms also seemed to recovered quicker and with lower volatility after the 
hyperinflation in 1923.  
 
Keywords: Political Connections; Interwar Germany; Stock Market Performance 
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Introduction 
 
In July 2015 the German parliament passed a law that introduced a waiting period of 18 months 
before a resigned politician could accept a job offer from a private firm or lobby group. This 
law was the result of the recently re-opened debate on the potential conflict of interest of 
politicians, which started with Peer Steinbrück, Angela Merkel’s main competitor for the 
chancellorship in the election in 2013. In the same year, Steinbrück was still a board member 
of Thyssen Krupp – a large industrial concern. In a board meeting, the members discussed 
various possibilities to reduce energy prices. During this discussion, he promised political 
support. In the following weeks, it was heavily discussed whether a politician was authorized 
to openly support the interest of a particular firm, especially since he was paid from the firm 
for being a member of the board (see, for instance, Die Zeit, 10 January 2013). Firms’ 
connections in the form of supervisory board memberships of politicians have been recognised 
and debated among citizens, journalists, economists and political scientists for many years and 
several academic papers have documented that links between politics and business are, and 
were, quite widespread and seem to add considerable value to firms (see Faccio 2006). 
 
However, although there is broad literature on more recent periods, research dealing with the 
quantifiable impact of political connections in Germany does not relate to periods prior to 1950, 
with the exception of Ferguson and Voth (2008)150. These authors quantify the impact of an 
extreme political connection — the one to the National Socialist Party (NSDAP). They compare 
stock market performance of firms listed on the Berlin stock exchange that already had 
substantial links to the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) before Hitler came 
to power in 1933 with firms that had no connection. They show that firms that were connected 
to the NSDAP through party affiliation or financial donations by directors, managers or 
supervisory board members, performed disproportionately well in 1933 – after Hitler took over. 
Examining 1932 and 1933, they picked a time in German history when the first democracy was 
wheezing its last breath and the coming leadership of Adolf Hitler was more than just a threat. 
As Faccio (2006) has shown, political connections matter most in systems of restricted 
democracy, high levels of corruption, barriers to foreign investment and weak institutions, and 
                                                 
150 Further research in this area has studied the existence and impact of bankers on supervisory boards as well as 
on connections between different firms via supervisory board members (see, for instance, Fohlin 2007; Windolf 
2006; Windolf and Beyer 1997; Krenn and Marx 2012), but not on the value added by having politicians on the 
boards. 
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Ferguson and Voth’s (2008) results fit in very well here.151 The potential conflict of interest and 
possible advantages of a political connection was not a new phenomenon of the early 1930s. 
Contemporaries in Germany were aware of these networks well before the rise of the National 
Socialists. A journalist with the pseudonym Morus wrote in a left wing weekly newspaper in 
1925: ‘Schau einer an, die sitzen gar nicht am Königsplatz, um das ganze deutsche Volk zu 
betreuen, die wollen nur das Brauereigewerbe oder die Klempnerinnung oder den 
Großgrundbesitz oder die Metallarbeiter versorgen?‘152 (Morus 1925, 29). Furthermore, he 
mentions that member journals of economic associations proudly reported the number of 
politicians that were members of its organisation or board members of a firm organised in this 
very organisation (Morus 1928).  
 
In this paper, we provide a first systematic quantitative overview of the political connections of 
firms that were listed on the Berlin stock exchange in the first German democracy. Our 
benchmark year is 1925. Overall, about 12 percent of the firms had a politician in the 
supervisory board. We further show that larger and older firms had a higher likelihood to 
establish political connections. The most active politicians on supervisory boards were often 
well-known industrialists, like Hugo Stinnes, who tried to benefit directly by gaining political 
power and influence. They are also known as important networkers. Aside from the work of 
Ferguson and Voth (2008) this is the first quantitative research on the existence and the impact 
of political networks via supervisory boards in Germany before 1950 and should be seen as a 
starting point for further research on the degree and impact of political connections in Europe 
in the long run.  
 
In general, we assume that political connections paid off since they ensured that the interest of 
the firms were represented politically – similar to the recent case of Steinbrück and Thyssen. 
This support can have many different faces, which we discuss in detail in the section following 
the introduction.  Altogether, previous research on other countries and periods as well as 
anecdotal evidence suggests that investors believed that political connections improved firms 
performance via information advantages, support of business activities in general and 
protection against prosecution. In that sense, they served as an insurance and reduced 
                                                 
151 For earlier periods, one study provides evidence for Britain that political connections already paid off in the 
19th Century (Braggion and Moore 2013). 
152 “Look at that, they are not sitting in this particular square (square of kings) to take care of the needs of all 
German people. They just care about Breweries, the guilds of plumbers, great land owners or metal workers?” 
The “Königsplatz“ (today’s Platz der Republik) is the square were the parliament was located.   
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investment risk and should matter most in periods of instability and insecurity. To test this 
hypothesis for the economic crisis that came along with re-stabilizing the German currency 
after hyperinflation, we select a sample of firms and analyse their longer run performance in 
the period 1922, 1923 and 1924. While the breakdown of the economy in 1923 and early 1924 
lead to the downfall and bankruptcy of many firms, some people benefitted in these years. 
Especially investors, who were in possession of large amounts of foreign capital, were able to 
buy a number of other firms in a very short period. After the inflation, they needed large 
amounts of capital to run these enterprises. However, after the hyperinflation, capital became 
scarce and firms with the need for large credits were dependent on political support (Klein 2014, 
221).  
 
Overall, our results fit well our expectations. We find that a former or current politician of a 
governing party increased the overall value of firms. We further show that connected firms 
seem to recover quicker after the hyperinflation in 1923, since the market value was above the 
value of unconnected firms and the volatility of the shares was lower than the volatility of 
unconnected firms.   
 
The paper is organised as follows. In the first section, we discuss the literature on political 
connections and provide anecdotal evidence for the interwar years. We show that both, previous 
research and anecdotal evidence suggest that political connections function like a risk insurance 
on investment. In the next section, we provide descriptive statistics about the political 
connections, the connected politicians and parties and main differences between connected and 
unconnected firms for the benchmark years 1925 and 1928. Next, we apply a simple OLS 
setting in order to see whether political connections paid off and if there were differences 
between the types of connections. In the fourth section, we study the impact of political 
connections in times of crisis. The last section concludes. 
 
Political connections as risk insurance 
 
Generally, we assume that political connections paid off since they ensured that the interest of 
the firms were represented politically. As mentioned above, this support can have many 
different faces. Political connections might have helped, for instance, to get preferential access 
to credit as Cull and Xu (2005) have shown for present-day China and Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
for present-day Pakistan. Faccio et al. (2006) have further provided evidence in a cross-country-
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study including 35 countries in the period 1997-2002 that connected firms received better 
treatment by the government in times of crisis, with a higher likelihood to get bailed out. 
Backman (1999) for example, provides evidence of preferential treatment by government-
controlled banks. Evidence of tax discounts is documented by De Soto (1989). Regulatory 
benefits enjoyed by politically connected firms are discussed by Stigler (1971) and De Soto 
(1989). Most studies on political connections focus on emerging markets and developing 
countries and provide similar results.  
 
There are numerous historical examples that indeed show that some of the above links mattered 
in Interwar Germany and that contemporary observers were well aware of these potential 
advantages.153 A well know example for preferential access to credit is the famous Barmat affair 
(see for instance Klein 2014, pp. 239). The two brothers Barmat, who were the owners and 
CEOs of the Barmat concern made large profits during the hyperinflation 1923, when they 
continued to expand their business and bought other firms. The largest firm in their firm group 
was Amexima, a firm that mainly imported food to Germany. However, during the 
hyperinflation they expanded and bought other firms (König 1924). After 1923, when the 
hyperinflation was banned, it suddenly became much harder to get access to credits and the 
liquid capital was not sufficient to meet the needs of the newly acquired firms and estates.  
In 1924, it became public that the two brothers Barmat solved this problem by bribing officials 
and politicians with private credits or board memberships. Despite some private banks, the 
central bank (Reichsbank) and the post, which also granted loans, were involved. The 
postmaster general, Anton Höfle (Center party), for instance received a private credit from 
Barmat. This credit was arranged with the help of fellow Member of Parliament for the same 
party group, Hermann Lange-Hagemann. Lange-Hagemann was board member of several firms 
that were part of the Barmat-concern. In exchange, Höfle granted a large credit to the Barmat 
concern. Although Höfle had already repaid his private credit before he signed the credit for 
Barmat, he lost immunity and was arrested in 1924. He died in prison three month later. 
Hermann Lange-Hagemann left the Center party, but stayed in parliament. Overall, many other 
politicians from different parties were involved in the affair. The most famous actor was the 
former chancellor Gustav Bauer from the Social Democrats.  
In the aftermath of this scandal, there was a heated debate in the Prussian parliament put forward 
by the communist party. They accused the government of preferring to bail out firms, whose 
                                                 
153 Klein (2014) has recently collected famous cases of corruption in Interwar Germany.  
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leaders had well established relationships to politicians154. In this debate the bailout of the Hugo 
Stinnes AG, which severely struggled after the death of its eponym, was discussed (Klein, 2014, 
223). In the same year, Reemtsma, the producers of cigarettes also seemed to benefit from his 
political connections. The state increased taxation on warehousing of raw tobacco, which was 
only applicable if tobacco was stored within a company. Reemtsma already had learned from 
the changes while the law was debated. When the law came into effect, the company had already 
secretly outsourced its material stock, unlike many competitors. Moreover, rumour has it that 
established political connections to the government prevented the firm from being accused of 
tax fraud (Klein 2014, pp. 421). A few years later, Reetsma again benefitted from his good 
relationships with the ministry of finance (Jacobs 2008, pp. 46, Klein 2014, pp. 426). In 1929 
the tobacco company aimed at taking over the smaller cigarette producer Batschari, which had 
accumulated a huge tax debt. Due to a decision of the ministry of finance, the debt was cancelled 
without stating its reason. 
 
Altogether, drawn from theoretical consideration, previous research on other countries and 
periods as well as anecdotal evidence, we expect that investors believed that political 
connections improved firms performance via information advantages, support of business 
activities in general and protection against prosecution. In that sense, they served as an 
insurance and reduced investment risk and should matter most in periods of instability and 
insecurity. To test this hypothesis for the economic crisis that came along with re-stabilizing 
the German currency after hyperinflation, we select a sample of firms and analyse their longer 
run performance in the period 1922, 1923 and 1924. While the breakdown of the economy in 
1923 and early 1924 lead to the downfall and bankruptcy of many firms, some people – like the 
Barmat brothers – benefitted in these years. Especially investors, who were in possession of 
large amounts of foreign capital, were able to buy a number of other firms in a very short period 
(see also Ufermann 1924). After the inflation, they needed capital to run these enterprises and 
were dependent on political support (Klein 2014, p. 221). The Barmat affair is a good example 
for the value of political connection in these years. Another example comes from a debate in 
the parliament 1924 about how much debt and liabilities had to be revalued in order to 
compensate creditors for the devaluation of the currency. In the committee that was founded to 
debate these issue, four members were identified who had personal interest for a rather 
moderate revaluation of debts and liabilities. They themselves or their family members had 
                                                 
154 See also: Verhandlungen des Preussischen Landtags, 2. WP. Bd. 5, 95 Sitzung, 11. November 1925, 6267, 
6326. 
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bought land during the hyperinflation but still had  remaining liabilities from these deals, which 
they tried to keep low (Morus 1925).  
 
Descriptive statistics and overview of the political connections 
 
By the end of 1925, 1,064 firms were listed on the Berlin stock exchange, with a nominal share 
value of 9,759.9 and a market value of approximately 7,000 million Reichsmark (RM). This 
equals a market capitalisation of 11 to 15 percent of the GDP155, which is about half the amount 
of the estimate provided by Rajan and Zingalis (2003)156. The largest sector in terms of number 
of listed firms was heavy industry. The banking sector, with its main trading centre in Berlin 
was also of great importance, though the recent period of hyperinflation had severely decreased 
its overall market share.157 In terms of joint stock capital the market seemed quite balanced 
regarding its composition mirroring the structure of the German economy with its core sectors 
chemicals and machine building. Firm data for the benchmark year 1925 was taken from 
Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, a stock market manual. This record includes 
firm-specific variables such as name of the firm, director and supervisory board members, size 
of an issue (total value of all shares), the year of incorporation, place of headquarters and 
sector.158 For these firms we further collected firm information and political connections in the 
year 1928 to show the development of political connections from the same source. The end-of-
year prices for 1925 and 1928 were taken from the December issues of Berliner Börsenzeitung.  
We define political connections as a connection via the supervisory board memberships of 
politicians. Ferguson and Voth (2008) as well as Faccio (2006) also included financial 
donations to parties. These payments, however, are very difficult to identify and summarise for 
our observation period. It is relatively easy for the Nazi party, since many historians and 
political scientists have spent decades of research time on this party, but it is nearly impossible 
to identify these kinds of informal links for all parties in interwar Germany. We may therefore 
underestimate the actual political relationship and are not able to directly compare our results 
                                                 
155 Nominal GDP was taken from Burhop and Wolff (2005). 
156 Rajan and Zingales (2003) cover all stock exchanges in Germany and not just the central one in Berlin. 
However, Burhop and Lehmann-Hasemeyer (2016) have recently shown for 1913 that even if all stock exchanges 
are covered, the overall market capitalisation is slightly lower. A similar revision of the Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
data has been made for the US and the UK (see Musacchio and Turner 2013, p. 528) 
157 The large universal banks in particular suffered tremendous losses, which led to a  reduction in equity capital 
and made them dependent on the Reichsbank (Central Bank) as a last-resort lender and left the entire banking 
sector vulnerable (Tilly 2001, p. 15; Schnabel 2009). 
158 We are grateful to Carsten Burhop for providing us with an unpublished dataset of all firms listed on the Berlin 
stock exchange in 1925, including name of the firm, size of the issue year of incorporation, place of headquarters 
and sector. This severely reduced the amount of data that we had to collect. 
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to Ferguson and Voth (2008). However, by studying the stock market performance, we mainly 
study the expectations of investors. It therefore makes sense to focus on formal and public 
political connections that can easily be observed by an average informed investor. Board 
memberships and board of directors were made public in Adressbuch der Direktoren und 
Aufsichtsräte and – based on the handbook – discussed in media (Morus 1925, p. 1928). 
Supervisory boards were elected by the general assemblies. Since 1884 all persons, regardless 
of whether they held shares or not, could be elected (Burhop 2006, p. 14). The members were 
elected for a term of five years and the supervisory board had to consist of at least three 
members, but the larger the firm the larger the boards. Deutsche Bank, for instance, had 58 
board members in 1925. In this period supervisory boards were not just regulatory bodies. 
Members of the board were often involved in strategically important firm decisions (Windolf 
2006, 191). Political connections were identified by comparing the names of supervisory board 
members with MPs since 1919 when the National Assembly, the founding meeting of the first 
German democracy, took place. This has been done using the database published in the digital 
library of the Bavarian state library (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek).159 These result were then 
compared and crosschecked with the Adressbuch der Direktoren und Aufsichtsräte 1925. It is 
necessary to rely on more than one source to make sure to reduce mistakes that arise for instance 
due to misspelling of names or missings in the manuals.160  
 
We differentiate between different types of political connections in order to learn more about 
their quality. We therefore distinguish between board members, who are currently in the 
parliament, but for the first time (connected only to current MP); board members that were MP 
in earlier years (connected only to former MP) and board members who are in parliament and 
look back on at least one term of office before (connected to former and current MP). 
Furthermore we count the same type of connections but just if the party of the MP was in the 
current government. We assume that a direct connection to the government, which is even 
closer if the MP is still in parliament, should have a higher value than a connection to a former 
politician. We also checked whether the politician held the office of a minister at some stage. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the political connections for the benchmark years 1925 and 
                                                 
159 By considering only supervisory board members who had been MPs since the National assembly in 1919, we 
miss political connections of supervisory board members that were MPs in the Empire, but not in Weimar. 
However, since we capture all politicians who started their political career in the Empire but were still politically 
active in the Weimar Republic, the bias should be limited. Especially since the political “value” in terms of the 
political influence of a person who was an MP in the Empire but not in the Weimar Republic was most likely too 
limited to matter in 1925—nearly six years after the official end of the Empire and almost a decade after the 
beginning of World War I. 
160 This is quite a common problem as Radandt (1966) points out. 
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1928. Overall, it was quite common to have a political connection. About 12 percent of the 
firms had a political connection in the form of a current or a former Member of Parliament 
(MP) in 1925. The share slightly decreased to 9 percent in 1928. Most of these political 
connections were direct connections to the government and about 2 percent were connections 
to a former Minister. Morus (1925) claims that previous ministers were particular attractive for 
firms, but as long as Ministers were still in office, they tried avoid any official connection to 
industry to keep the impression of a clean and uncorrupted Republic. Eleven firms had a CEO, 
who was previously a politician. In our benchmark year, Morus (1925) reports that 65 of the 
463 Members of Parliament held together 269 board memberships. In 1928, the same journalist 
again reports that about 16 percent of the Members of Parliament and about eleven percent of 
the Members of the Prussian state parliament were ‘close’ to industry. Altogether, 72 Members 
of Parliament held together 276 board memberships. He further claims that although the overall 
number of politicians in supervisory boards seems rather low, a single man from a certain sector 
or firm in the right parliamentary group would be sufficient to influence politics in their favour 
(Morus 1928).  
 
Panel b of Table 1 reveals that most connections were to moderate parties in the middle of the 
political left-right continuum. The most extreme connections were to the right-wing German 
National Peoples party. We do not find connections to more extreme parties. Most connections 
were to the German Democratic Party (DDP)161, a liberal party that clearly supported economic 
interests and the German Peoples Party (DVP), both of which were most of the time part of the 
government and the rather conservative Center Party (Zentrum). Surprisingly we just find few 
Social Democrats and Independent Social Democrats (USPD) on supervisory boards and all of 
them in public or non-profit organisation. Morus (1925) claims that this might be caused by the 
‘Barmat- Affair’162, after which the involved Social Democrat Gustav Bauer resigned from all 
board memberships.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
161 The DVP were liberal with an emphasis on civil and parliamentary rights (Treue 1954, pp. 70). The party 
represented the interests of the upper classes and commerce. The aims of the opposing Social Democrats were 
defined in their Erfurt Programme of 1891, which contained several practical demands in favor of the working 
class, such as the improvement of labour conditions, the eight-hour working day, free health care and not least that 
religion should be a private matter (Treue 1954, p. 72).  
162 See also Klein (2014, 229-228). 
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Table 1: Overview political connections of supervisory board members 
 1925  1928 
Panel A: Types of political connections 
 Number of firms in Percent Number of firms in Percent 
Connected altogether 131 12.3 88 9.1 
Connected only to current 
MP 16 1.5 4 0.4 
Connected only to former 
MP 66 6.2 38 3.9 
Connected to former and 
current MP 49 4.6 46 4.8 
Connected altogether to 
governing party 111 10.4 76 7.9 
Connected only to current 
MP of the governing 
party 
15 1.4 4 0.4 
Connected only to former 
MP of the governing 
party 
57 5.4 31 3.2 
Connected to former and 
current MP of the 
governing party 
39 3.7 41 4.2 
Connected to a former or 
current Minister 21 2.0 14 1.5 
Panel B: Connections to Parties 
 Number of firms in Percent Number of firms in Percent 
Bavarian Peoples Party 
(BVP) 3 0.3 4 0.4 
German Democratic Party 
(DDP) 48 4.5 34 3.5 
German Nationals 
Peoples Party (DNVP) 10 0.9 5 0.5 
German Peoples Party 
(DVP) 55 5.2 29 3.0 
National Socialist Party 
(NSDAP) 0 0.0 1 0.1 
Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) 12 1.1 7 0.7 
Centre Party 11 1.0 15 1.6 
Total number of firms 1064 100 968 100 
Source: see text 
 
Taking a closer look at the politicians on supervisory boards reveals that some of them were 
well-known networkers. Table 2 provides an overview over the politicians, which held more 
than ten board memberships in 1925. The industrialist Victor Weidtmann, for instance, was a 
member of 19 different boards. Most of these firms were from heavy industry, but Weidtmann 
was also on the board of Deutsche Bank, the most influential universal bank at the time (see for 
instance Lehmann 2014). We assume that good networkers played a central role, especially 
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since they often represented large parts of particular sectors and not just a single firm. For 
instance, Albert Vögler, who held 12 board memberships, co-initiated the foundation of the 
trust of large steel mills ‘Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG’ in the mid-1920s. The trust cooperated with 
the government and took advantage by influencing taxation and getting other privileges (see 
Reckendrees 2000, pp. 222). Furthermore, the overall number of board memberships of these 
politicians was much higher if we also include non-listed companies or firms that were no joint 
stock companies. Hans von Raumer for instance, overall held 14 board memberships, Hermann 
Fischer 46 and ten Hompel more than 15 altogether (Adressbuch der Direktoren und 
Aufsichtsräte 1925/1926, Morus 1925).  
 
Table 2: Politicians with more than 10 board memberships in 1925 
Name Number of 
board 
memberships 
Party 
affiliation 
legislative 
periods 
Occupation 
Victor Weidtman 19 DVP 1 Lawyer, Entrepreneur 
Hermann Fischer 15 DDP 3 Lawyer  
Albert Vögler 12 DVP 2 Engineer, Entrepreneur 
Carl Friedrich von Siemens 11 DDP 2 Engineer, Lawyer, Entrepreneur 
Hans von Raumer 8 DVP 3 Lawyer, Entrepreneur 
Alfred Hugenberg 5 DVP 4 Entrepreneur 
Hugo Stinnes 4 DVP 1 Entrepreneur 
Rudolf ten Hompel 4 Center 3 Entrepreneur 
Source: see text 
 
Furthermore, some sectors were much more connected than others (Table 3). In mining, for 
instance, every fourth firm had a politician on its supervisory board. Branches with a direct 
business link to public or state matters, such as transportation and public utility, also rank 
among the sectors with the largest amount of connected firms. For the year 1932, Ferguson and 
Voth (2008, p. 124) also find the highest degree of political connections to the Nazis these 
sectors. However, while in 1925 less than 8 percent of steel firms (part of heavy industry) were 
connected, the NSDAP affiliation of these firms was nearly 60 percent in 1932. The National 
Socialists had a strong interest in controlling that part of the economy, since it would become 
decisive in times of war. Thus, arguably the National Socialists MPs selected themselves into 
the supervisory boards of steel producing firms around 1932 with a clear interest in controlling 
production. However, steel industrialist on the other hand also had a strong interest to cooperate 
with the National Socialist of whom they expect to raise demand for armament. 
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Table 3: Share of different types of political connections by sector 1925 
Panel A: Connection type 
  Share of firms connected altogether 
Share of firms connected 
to governing party 
Share of firms connected to 
former or current Minister 
Banking 15.7 9.8 3.9 
Insurance 23.3 14.0 0.0 
Mining  25.6 25.6 4.7 
Heavy industy 7.4 6.1 0.4 
Light industry 7.5 7.0 0.5 
Food processing 9.1 7.8 0.0 
Transportation 22.4 19.4 7.5 
Chemical industry 7.6 5.7 0.0 
Public utility 23.8 22.2 7.9 
Others 9.5 7.3 1.7 
All firms 12.3 10.4 2.0 
Panel B: Parties 
Share by sector DVP Zentrum DNVP DDP BVP SPD/  USPD no connection 
Banking 0 0 20 10.4 33.3 8.3 4.6 
Insurance 9.1 9.1 20 0 0 16.7 3.5 
Mining 25.5 18.2 30 18.8 0 0 6.9 
Heavy industry 21.8 0 0 8.3 0 25 24.3 
Light industry 7.3 18.2 0 14.6 33.3 8.3 19.8 
Food processing 7.3 0 10 4.2 0 0 7.5 
Transportation 7.3 9.1 0 18.8 0 16.7 5.6 
Chemical industry 1.8 9.1 0 2.1 0 0 5.3 
Public utility 12.7 9.1 0 12.5 0 8.3 5.1 
Source: see text 
 
Table 4 compares the characteristics of connected and unconnected firms for all types of party 
connections for 1925. One can clearly see that there were significant differences. Firms with 
political connections seem to have been larger and older than the average unconnected firm. 
Apart from firm age, connections to the Social Democrats show reverse characteristics. The 
average capitalisation of firms with a Social Democrat on the supervisory board was below 
average and far below the average of other politically connected firms. 
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Table 4: Overview of differences between connected and unconnected firms 1925  DVP Zentrum DNVP DDP BVP SPD/ 
USPD 
no 
connection 
Joint Stock Capital 18.1 14.6 31.2 34.5 49.2 3.3 7.9 
t-statistic  3.9*** 1.2 3.9*** 8.8***  4.0*** -0.9  
Firm age in years 34.1 34.3 42.4 37.7 48.7 52.1 33.0 
t-statistic 0.4 0.2 1.6 1.7* 1.5 3.5***  
Distance to Berlin in km 264 328 235 202 302 177 246 
t-statistic 0.7 1.5 -0.2 -1.6 0.5 -1.3  
N 55 11 10 48 3 12 934 
Source: See text. Share capital in million Reichsmark. 
 
Cross-section – the value of political connections 
 
In order to quantify the impact of political connections, we first run a simple cross section 
analysis. The dependent variable is the log of the market value in percent of the nominal share 
value in December 1925. The market value of firms mainly reflects investors’ expectations. 
These are influenced by firm fundamentals and microstructure of stock exchanges. Since all 
firms were listed on the Berlin stock exchange, the influence of microstructure can be ignored. 
Thus the stock price level should reflect the expected performance, i.e. earnings of a firm. The 
demand for shares is also influenced by expectations about risk. Firms with high expected 
earnings should have high stock prices, while firms with low expected earnings should have 
low stock prices (see Fama and French 1992, 1995). High risk should reduce the effective 
demand for shares and therefore depress share prices. As stated before, we assume that political 
connections influence the stock price positively: firms that have well established political 
connections are able to generate higher profits because of better information. Furthermore, since 
we assume that political connections can be interpreted as an insurance for investment, they 
should also make the investment more attractive, which raises the demand. This should be even 
more pronounced in times of crisis, when the overall risk for all stock market investments 
suddenly increases. Altogether, we estimate the following equation with ordinary least squares. 
Standard errors are clustered by sector. 
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where Marketvalue is the log of the end-of-the year share price in percent of the nominal share 
value. The variable ‘political connections’ covers different measures for connections such as 
for instance dummy variables indicating whether a firm had a current or a former politician on 
the board, whether a firm had an MP or a former MP of the governing party on the board, or 
whether the MP was Minister. We also include a variable that measures the years of experience 
he had as politician. Xi is a vector that covers other firm-specific variables such as joint stock 
capital, sector, age of the firm and distance from headquarters to Berlin. The latter serves as a 
proxy for asymmetric information. Burhop and Lehmann-Hasemeyer (2016) have recently 
provided evidence that distance is positively correlated with information asymmetries. 
Furthermore, Lampe and Ploeckl (2014), for instance, have shown – based on Bavarian 
telephone exchanges in 1900 – that a theoretically ‘weightless’ communication like phone calls 
was subject to substantial distance cost similar to physically transported mail. Thus, it is 
possible that firms farther away from Berlin will use political connection to reduce information 
costs. If we cannot observe a price in the December issues of Berliner Börsenzeitung then we 
exclude the firms.163 We further exclude the 43 insurance companies, since trading in them was 
heavily restricted. They only issued ‘vinkulierte Namensaktien’, that is, registered shares with 
restricted transferability (Gelman and Burhop 2008, p. 4). Therefore, our data demands reduce 
the number of observations from 1,064 to 887. 
 
Tables 5 provides the results. Overall, the model is a good fit explaining about 20 percent of 
the overall variation of the market value. As expected, firm fundamentals clearly influence the 
market value. The larger and older a firm, the higher is its market value. Political connections 
also influence the market value in the expected way. However, it is interesting to note that not 
every political connection mattered. Just a connection to a party in the government mattered. 
This is possibly driven by the rather negative performance of the public firms, which were non-
profit organisation, in which the Social Democrats were board members.164
                                                 
163 In general, we take the price from 31 December, but if this price cannot be observed, we take the last price 
reported in the Berliner Börsenzeitung. The earliest price that we take for 1925 is the 1 December, to keep a 
potential bias small. 
164 However, the causality is very unclear. On the one hand, this observation fits the literature about investors and 
Social Democrats. Hibbs (1977), for instance, claims that left-wing governments in general pursued policies 
harmful to capital owners. Research for more recent periods provides evidence that stocks drop after a left electoral 
victory and increase after a right victory, which further supports this hypothesis (see Bechtel 2009; Herron 2000; 
Leblang and Mukherjee 2004; Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2007). Furthermore, Social Democrats were the 
party of the workers, demanding shorter working hours, better working condition and better pay (see Winkler 
1982). Thus, it seems plausible that iestors feared potential negative effects n a frm’s performance if a Social 
Democrat was on the supervisory board. Supervisory board members from the Social democrats might have been 
suspected to also rather harm capital owners to the benefit of the employees and workers. On the other hand, there 
is evidence of positive political support trough Social Democrats in this period as seen in the Barmat affair. 
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Table 5: Regression results OLS 1925 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable log (market value in percent of nominal share value) December 1925 
All political connections board members (BM) 0.181          (0.147)         All political connections (BM and CEO)  0.192          (0.134)        BM is currently MP for the first time   0.0932          (0.533)       BM was MP   0.0755          (0.185)       BM was and still is MP   0.376          (0.307)       All political connections to a governing party (BM)    0.319*      
    (0.162)      All political connections to a governing party (BM and CEO)     0.326*     
     (0.146)     Number of years BM was MP      0.0610**    
      (0.0256)    BM was or is MP and board president       -0.133   
(0.346) 
BM was Minister 0.308 
        (0.558)  
CEO is or was politician         0.0486 
         (0.279) Distance headquarters-Berlin 0.000265 0.000264 0.000265 0.000270 0.000263 0.000284 0.000248 0.000262 0.000247 
 (0.000282) (0.000281) (0.000280) (0.000276) (0.000274) (0.000275) (0.000286) (0.000264) (0.000287) Capitalisation 9.01e-09*** 8.99e-09*** 9.01e-09*** 8.62e-09*** 8.59e-09*** 8.65e-09*** 9.48e-09*** 9.39e-09*** 9.38e-09*** 
 (2.56e-09) (2.55e-09) (2.66e-09) (2.40e-09) (2.40e-09) (2.48e-09) (2.81e-09) (2.65e-09) (2.78e-09) Age of the firm 0.0133*** 0.0133*** 0.0134*** 0.0133*** 0.0132*** 0.0134*** 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 
 (0.00289) (0.00291) (0.00302) (0.00291) (0.00294) (0.00289) (0.00282) (0.00287) (0.00284) 
Constant -0.0408 -0.0395 -0.0540 -0.0389 -0.0332 -0.0623 -0.0220 -0.0391 -0.0228 
 (0.154) (0.156) (0.164) (0.157) (0.159) (0.159) (0.154) (0.157) (0.156) Sector dummies y y y y y y y y y 
R-squared 0.185 0.186 0.186 0.188 0.188 0.187 0.184 0.185 0.184 
N 887 887 887 887 887 887 887 887 887 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by sector *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Furthermore, the experience of a particular politician also seems to matter. If we include a 
variable that measures the years of time in office, it has a positive and highly significant impact 
on the firm’s performance. On the other side, it did not matter if the politician was a former 
minister or was not just a member of the supervisory board but board president or part of the 
management board (CEO).165 We further run a regression where we include the four MPs with 
the largest number of board memberships and dummies for different party affiliations. It is 
interesting to note that a certain political party does not drive the results in Table 5. Instead, it 
rather seems to be related to certain persons. We find, for instance that firms which had Albert 
Vögler on the supervisory board, performed significantly better.166 This interesting result, 
however cannot further be explored quantitatively since most other MPs had much fewer board 
memberships. Therefore, the dummies variables capturing the presence for other MPs would 
cover too few firms and cannot be interpreted meaningfully.  
 
Performance in times of crisis 
  
The results of the previous section support our hypothesis that firms benefit from political 
connections. This also fits well the anecdotal evidence we discussed in the introduction. 
However, it is still possible that well performing firms simply had a higher likelihood to 
establish political connections. In order to learn more about causality, we analyse the 
performance of connected versus unconnected firms in a period of three years, including an 
exogenous economic crisis, the hyperinflation in 1923. Since we assume that political 
connections served as an insurance for investment, we expect them to matter most in times of 
crisis when the overall risk for all firms on the stock exchange increased. We therefore apply a 
Diff-in-Diff like setting, in which the treatment is the stabilisation crisis in 1924, which 
followed the hyperinflation in 1923. The hyperinflation in 1923 caused a large exogenous shock 
to the economy, which severely increased risk. However, we have learned previously that the 
hyperinflation also created particular opportunities for connected firms. Barmat would be a 
typical example. We therefore expect connected firms to perform significantly better than 
unconnected firms in the years after the inflation, confirming the hypothesis that political 
connections function like an insurance. Since we have shown in table 4 that the largest and 
                                                 
165 We also tried to differentiate between differently sized firms, by including an interaction effect with all 
connections and connection to the government and the capitalisation of the firm. This variable is not significant in 
1925. We also ran regression separately on certain sectors. Just in mining connections seemed significantly more 
important than in other sectors. 
166 The results are available on request. 
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oldest firms had the highest likelihood to have a political connection, we do a qualitative 
matching by choosing only the largest and establish firms. We reduce the sample to the 30 
largest firms in 1922, which we took from Ronge (2002, p. 323). 9 out of the 30 firms had a 
political connection - all to a governing party. Table 6 shows that the main differences between 
connected and unconnected firms that were evident in Table 4 disappear. There is no significant 
difference between connected and unconnected firms in terms of joint stock capital, firm age, 
distance of headquarters to Berlin, book value and/or profits in 1922. Only market value is 
higher for connected firms, which perfectly fits our results from the previous section. 
 
Table 6: Overview connected versus unconnected firms, 30 largest firms in 1922  
Connected unconnected t-statistics 
Market value in per cent of share value (log) 9.85 9.28 1.70* 
Joint stock capital  in Mill Marks 216 245 0.42 
Firm age in years 40.6 43 0.34 
Distance to Berlin in km 313 266 -0.54 
Book value in Mill Marks 27,800 27,800 -1.43 
Profits 1922 in Mill Marks 1,340 970 0.54 
N 9 21  
Source Source: Ronge (2002, 324), Salinger Börsenhandbuch 1922 
 
 We then manually collected weekly share prices for the years 1922, 1923 and 1924. Table 7 
provides an overview of the firms and some share prices in 1924 and figure 1 the performance 
over the whole period. The nine firms that had politicians in the supervisory board are well 
known for their political connections and how they made use of it. Deutsche Bank for instance, 
the largest German Credit institute at the time was involved in many business activities covering 
many different areas of the economy. Accordingly, they were much more confronted with most 
of the major challenges of that time than other firms: inflation, cut-off from international trade 
during and in the aftermath of the war (Gall 1995, pp. 176). There were many ways and 
situations in which the Deutsche Bank probably used its well-developed political network. In 
March 1920, for instance, the main lobby group for Industry (Reichsverband der deutschen 
Industrie) and the ministry of economics discussed the foundation of ‘Kreditgemeinschaft für 
die Deutsche Industrie’. This institution was supposed to facilitate capital procurement of the 
German industry, which reduced the scope of action for banks. The ministry of finance finally 
rejected this threat for independent banks’ business (Gall 1995, p. 186). At the time, Joseph 
Wirth from the Centre Party was the minister of finance and one of his fellow party members 
was member of the supervisory board of the Deutsche Bank at the same time.  
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Table 7: firm characteristics of the 30 largest firms in 1922 
      Average Market-to-book ratio 1924 
Name of the Firm 
Joint stock 
capital in 
Million Mark 
Firm 
age Headquarters Connected Affiliated Party 
1st 
quarter 
2nd 
quarter 
3rd 
quarter 
4th 
quarter 
Deutsche Bank 400 52 Berlin yes Centre Party, DDP 15.5 8.3 9.7 11.4 
Diskonto Gesellschaft 400 66 Berlin yes Centre Party, DDP 18.6 8.8 11 14.3 
Dresdner Bank 350 50 Berlin   9.8 5.1 6.3 7.7 HAPAG 285 75 Hamburg   40.5 21.9 25 25.8 Norddeutscher Lloyd 250 66 Bremen   9.1 4.9 5.9 4.1 AEG 850 39 Berlin   13.2 7.9 8.6 9.4 Vereinigte Stahlwerke van der Zypen 43 41 Cologne yes DDP 123.2 97.2 89.9 125.7 
BASF 430 57 Ludwigshafen   23.7 14.4 16.4 23.3 Bayer 430 41 Cologne   22.5 12 14 20.4 Degussa  100 49 Frankfurt   - - - - Deutsch-Lux. Bergwerks- und Hütten-AG 260 21 Bochum yes DDP, DVP 57.2 40.2 48.1 67.6 
DEA  100 23 Berlin   63.4 36 38.1 41.9 Mannesmann 100 32 Düsseldorf   35.8 20.9 16.8 25.5 Felten & Guilleaume Carlswerk AG 150 23 Cologne 34.8 19.6 16.5 28.8 
Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksverein 318 49 Gelsenkirchen yes DDP 63.6 44.2 50.2 70.1 
Orenstein & Koppel 136 24 Berlin   21.2 11.6 10.8 17.7 Harpener Bergbau 110 66 Dortmund   82.5 53.4 61.6 97.6 Farbwerke Hoechst AG  430 43 Höchst   33.5 10.7 13.2 20.4 Daimler 200 32 Berlin   5 2.9 2 3.1 Ilse Bergbau AG 150 34 Senftenberg   33.5 15.7 14.7 20.6 Köln-Neuessener Bergwerksverein 94 73 Essen yes DDP 55.3 32.9 36.4 58.6 
Linke-Hofmann-Lauchhammer AG 123 23 Berlin   33 14.3 11.8 10.8 Commerzbank 350 52 Hamburg   8 4.2 3.9 5.8 Mannesmann 101 15 Aachen yes DVP 46.5 27.2 33.4 49.6 
Oberschlesische Kokswerke  70 32 Berlin   63 39.9 40.1 43.8 Phoenix AG für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb 275 70 Düsseldorf   41.7 24.1 32.5 46.1 Rheinischen Aktiengesellschaft für 
Braunkohlebergbau und Brikettfabrikation 104 20 Cologne   43.9 26.7 28.2 33.9 Rheinische Stahlwerke AG 160 52 Duisburg   42.6 23.6 27.7 40.9 Siemens & Halske 260 25 Berlin yes DDP 48.7 37.5 43.1 57.2 
Vereinigte Glanzstoff-Fabriken 70 23 Elberfeld yes DVP 65.2 46.6 44.2 60.1 
Average 237         39.8 24.6 26.2 35.9 
 Source: Ronge (2002, 324). Berliner Börsenzeitung, different issues 1924, Handbuch der Reichstagsabgeordneten     
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Another well know political networker in this sample was Siemens. In times of uncertainty and 
poor business after World War I, secure revenues were highly desired. The Berlin-based 
engineering company could rely on contracts with the federal post to establish and develop the 
telephone network. During the whole 1920s the company enjoyed preferential treatment by the 
post ministry (Feldenkirchen 1995, pp. 262). At the time Siemens had a board member who 
was part of the government. 
 
Figure 1: Log of market value in percent of nominal share value (weekly) 1922-1924 of 
connected and unconnected firms 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that while in 1922, one can hardly see a trend, the inflation gains speed in early 
1923 up to its peak in November 1923. In December 1923 the inflation was banned and firm 
values dropped. Over the year 1924 the firms then started to recover (Taylor 2013). There is no 
eye-catching difference between the two types of firms. However, over the whole time the 
connected firms had a slightly higher market value. If we have a closer look at 1924 (Figure 2), 
after the hyperinflation was banned, it seems that connected firm did not just have a higher 
market value over the whole period, they also seem to recover quicker towards the end of the 
year. We test this by estimating a basic panel fixed effects model: in which the dependent 
variable is the log of the share price in percent of the nominal share value as before. The results 
are reported in Table 8. In Regression 1, 2 and 3 we use the weekly values per firm.
0
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Table 8: Performance and recovery 1922-1923 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable log(market value in per cent of nominal share value) 
average log(market value in per cent of 
nominal share value) per year 
SD (average log(market value in per 
cent of nominal share value) per year) 
           
All connections 0.377    0.377   0.0617  
 (0.270)    (0.277)   -0.0601  
All connections*1923 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.202 0.202 
 (0.697) (0.697) (0.709) (0.718) (0.713) -0.764 -0.76 
All connections*1924 0.348*** 0.351** 0.359** 0.359*** 0.346** -0.129* -0.149* 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.142) (0.126) (0.126) -0.0711 -0.0781 
1923 8.581*** 8.581*** 19.78*** 8.581*** 8.581*** 5.885*** 5.885*** 
 (0.476) (0.476) (1.971) (0.490) (0.487) -0.393 -0.391 
1924 -4.372*** -4.375*** -3.493*** -4.344*** -4.331*** -0.535*** -0.516*** 
 (0.0905) (0.0920) (0.130) (0.0891) (0.0884) -0.0453 -0.056 
Constant 7.251*** 7.377*** 6.841*** 7.251*** 7.359*** 0.858*** 0.872*** 
(0.140) (0.135) (0.168) (0.144) (0.134) -0.0365 -0.111 
Firm fixed effects n y y n y n y 
Week fixed effects n n y       
Observations 4,609 4,609 4,609 89 89 89 89 
R-squared  0.622 0.917   0.972  0.923 
Number of firms 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at sector level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 In order to reduce the potential autocorrelation of the error term, we also provide estimates in 
which we use the average market value per year for 1922, 1923 and 1924 per firm (4 and 5). 
To learn something about risk, we estimate the same panel with the standard deviation of the 
market value for the years 1922-1924 (6 and 7).  
 
Figure 2: Log of market value in percent of nominal share value (weekly) 1924 of connected 
and unconnected firms 
 
 
Overall the results for the market value and average market value are similar. There is no 
difference in performance during the hyperinflation. However, if we look at the coefficient of 
the interaction term ‘All connections* year 1924’, it is positive and significant in all 
specifications. In 1924, firms with political connections seemed to have performed significantly 
better than non-connected ones. Furthermore, they performed better with lower volatility, i.e. 
less risk as shown in regression 6 and 7. 
In Table 9 we take a closer look at the year 1924, by dropping all observations on previous 
years. In the first two regressions, we estimate a similar fixed effect model as in table 8, with a 
time interaction term for quarters of the year. Again, connected firms seemed to perform better 
over the whole year. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the regression, assuming 
that we have a dynamic panel, does not alter the results.  
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Table 9: Performance and recovery 1924 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable log(Market to share value) 
            
Lag dependent variable   0.984*** 0.738*** 0.735*** 
   (0.00855) (0.0638) (0.0145) 
All connections 0.597**  0.0141   
 (0.267)  (0.0103)   
All connections* April-June 1924 0.153** 0.153** 0.0145* 0.0492** 0.0718* 
 (0.0597) (0.0596) (0.00755) (0.0193) (0.0401) 
All connections* July-September 1924 0.200*** 0.200*** -0.0113 0.0439** 0.0471 
 (0.0621) (0.0621) (0.00761) (0.0196) (0.0410) All connections* October-December 
1924 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.00605 0.0758*** 0.0951** 
 (0.0858) (0.0858) (0.00900) (0.0271) (0.0410) 
April-June 1924 -0.595*** -0.595*** -0.0189** -0.160*** -0.142*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.00783) (0.0377) (0.0180) 
July-September 1924 -0.528*** -0.528*** 0.0439*** -0.0968** -0.0756*** 
 (0.0425) (0.0425) (0.00635) (0.0367) (0.0185) 
October-December 1924 -0.301*** -0.301*** 0.0516*** -0.0336 -0.0184 
 (0.0676) (0.0676) (0.00634) (0.0251) (0.0175) 
Constant 3.238*** 3.441*** 0.0223 0.878*** 0.869*** 
 (0.169) (0.0231) (0.0288) (0.220) (0.0498) 
Firm fixed effects n y n y n 
Observations 1,459 1,459 1,424 1,424 1,424 
R-squared  0.526  0.785  
Number of firms 29 29 29 29 29 
Note Model (5) is an Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at sector level  *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Altogether, when we pick the 30 largest firms in 1922 and study the performance of the 
connected versus unconnected ones it seems that the former recovered better after the crisis. 
This may not be driven entirely by their political connections. Yet, it is very likely that the 
stabilisation success can be attributed to their political connections, since the main firm 
characteristics were largely equal between both groups. However, although statistically 
significant- admittedly the real advantage was relatively low. If an investor bought 1000 Marks 
in shares of politically connected firms (equally weighted) in January 1922, he lost 968 Marks 
by December 1924. If he had bought shares for the same amount of unconnected firms, his loss 
would have been 987 Marks. Thus, he lost 0.1 percentage point less. The difference is more 
pronounced if we just consider the stabilisation crisis of 1924. If an investor bought shares for 
1000 Marks of a connected firm in January 1924, he lost about 348 Marks by December. If he 
had bought shares of the unconnected firms the loss would have been about 680 Marks.  
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Conclusion 
 
Altogether, we show that political connections were quite widespread in interwar Germany. 
Overall, about 12 percent of the firms had a politician in the supervisory board. We further 
show that larger and older firms had a higher likelihood to establish political connections. The 
most active politicians on supervisory boards were often industrialists, who probably tried to 
benefit by gaining political power and influence. They are also known as important networkers. 
We also provide evidence that political connections to the government added value to firms and 
that this relationship seems causal. The impact, however is much less than the impact Ferguson 
and Voth (2008) have shown for 1932/1933.  This may be caused by the fact that we 
underestimate the degree of political connections, since we just include supervisory and 
management board memberships. However, it also fits the observation that political 
connections should matter less in more democratic systems (Faccio 2006).   
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that a politician, who was currently an MP or a former 
minister or the head of the board was not necessarily required to add value to a firm. It was 
equally as useful to have a political connection in the form of any MP. The only thing that 
seemed to matter was whether he was a member of the governing party or that he had many 
years of experience, which probably translated into good networks.  
Apart from all these interesting results, there are still a number of unanswered yet important 
questions and, as stated in the introduction, this paper should be seen as a starting point. 
Questions like how did political connections develop over time and sectors? In which periods 
of German History did they matter the most? Was it always the same sectors and firms that 
were interested in political connections or did this change over time? All these questions must 
be left to future research.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Firm characteristics by sector 
  Average 
joint stock 
capital in 
Mill RM in 
1925 
Average 
joint stock 
capital in 
Mill RM 
In 1928 
Av. firm 
age 
In 1925 
Av. 
distance 
headquarte
rs to Berlin 
in km 
Total 
number of 
firms 
Percentage 
share of all 
firms 
Banking 16.3 17.0 47.0 186 51 4.8 
Insurance 4.8 5.7 64.9 221 43 4.0 
Mining 26.8 28.3 39.7 287 86 8.1 
Heavy industry 5.4 5.7 28.2 254 245 23.0 
Light industry 4.9 5.2 30.4 278 200 18.8 
Food processing 4.0 5.3 37.1 305 77 7.2 
Transportation 13.1 18.2 37.9 217 67 6.3 
Chemical industry 17.5 22.0 32.0 244 53 5.0 
Public utility 20.8 25.9 27.6 214 63 5.9 
Others 3.8 5.8 29.6 195 179 16.8 
All firms 9.2 10.7 33.6 245 1064 100 
Source: See text. 
Table A2: Overview of differences between connected and unconnected firms 1928 
  DVP Zentrum DNVP NSDAP DDP BVP SPD no connection 
Joint Stock Capital 40.4 25.7 55.6 1.6 55.3 28.6 5.6 8.3 
t-statistic 6.57*** 2.76***  4.17***  10.0***  1.68* -0.29  
Firm age in years 37.0 30.3 53.4 33.3 34.2 46.0 45.8 33.3 
t-statistic 1.03 -0.61 2.36**  0.30 1.33  1.75*  
Distance to Berlin in km 266.2 360.3 257.6 199.3 215.5 352.4 205.9 243.7 
t-statistic 0.65 2.45** 0.17   -0.88 1.19 -0.54   
N 29 15 5 1 34 4 7 976 
Source: See text. Share capital in million Reichsmark, age in years. Distance from Berlin in km.  
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Table A3: Overview variables 
 1925 1928 
Dummy variables Number of firms in Percent Number of firms in Percent 
Connected altogether 131 12.3 88 8.3 
Connected only to current 
MP 16 1.5 4 0.4 
Connected only to former 
MP 66 6.2 38 3.6 
Connected to former and 
current MP 49 4.6 46 4.3 
Connected altogether to 
governing party 111 10.4 51 4.8 
Connected only to current 
MP of the governing 
party 
15 1.4 3 0.3 
Connected only to former 
MP of the governing 
party 
57 5.4 24 2.3 
Connected to former and 
current MP of the 
governing party 
39 3.7 24 2.3 
BVP 3 0.3 4 0.4 
DDP 48 4.5 34 3.2 
DNVP 10 0.9 5 0.5 
DVP 55 5.2 29 2.7 
NSDAP 0 0.0 1 0.1 
Centre Party 11 1.0 15 1.4 
SPD 12 1.1 7 0.7 
 1925 1928 
Other variables Mean (SD) Min (Max) Mean (SD) Min (Max) 
Max. number of board 
memberships 0.77 (2.9) 0 (15) 0.58 (2.6) 0 (17) 
Value of political 
connection 0.092 (0.26) 0 (1) 0.062 (0.22) 0 (1) 
Age of the firm 33.6 (18.9) 1 (160) 33.6 (18.9) 1 (160) 
Joint stock capital in mill. 
RM  9.16 (20.7) 
0.0225 
(300) 10.7 (28.3) 0.006 (546) 
Distance headquarters–
Berlin 245.1 (183.5) 0 (682.2) 245.1 (183.5) 0 ( 682.2) 
Price end-of-the-year 21.5 (30.9) 0.1 (390) 124.4 (103.4) 0.1 (1178) 
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Chapter III 
- 
‘Вставайте, люди русские!’ 
The revolution of 1905 and the political stock market* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper assesses the attitude of investors towards democratic change by performing an event 
study using Russian government bonds. The Revolution of 1905 offers an ideal occasion: In 
addition to the revolutionary events, it was accompanied by two opposing constitutional 
changes within a short period of time. The result contributes to the debate as to whether Imperial 
Russia could possibly have followed other Western European states, i.e. gradually adopting a 
democratic rule, or whether a revolution was inevitable – as the writing of Soviet history 
suggests. As it turns out, investors did not perceive the ongoing as a threat. Rather they 
considered long-run democratic change to be a realistic. Furthermore, the Russo-Japanese War 
is taken into consideration. The result is basically in line with the literature finding a negative 
impact of wars on capital markets. The assessment is based on two types of bonds, listed at both 
the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin Stock Exchange. The outcome reveals that investors in the 
East and West were largely consistent in their reactions to political and war-related events. 
 
Keywords: Russian economic history; political stock market; Democratic change; impact war 
on stock markets
                                                 
* The author is grateful to the German Academic Exchange Service, which generously funded the research stay in 
Saint Petersburg. The National Library of Russia provided for the necessary sources and a workstation – Russian 
hospitality really overcomes any existing language barriers. Furthermore, I would like to thank Sergey Gelman 
from the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and Katya Khaustova for providing great support and 
encouraging me to do research in Russia. 
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‘The events of 1905 were a prologue to the two revolutions of 1917, that of February and that 
of October. In the prologue all the elements of the drama were included, but not carried 
through.’ 
 
Leo Trotsky, The history of the Russian Revolution (1932)  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In modern Russian history a lot of attention has been payed to the Bolshevik seizure of power 
in 1917, not least because Soviet Communism took a pivotal role in shaping the world’s history 
and politics in the 20th century. The radical nature of the Russian Revolution shook the 
European bourgeois and aristocratic elite in the very foundations. However, it did not come out 
of the blue. Already at the beginning of the 20th century, years before the far-reaching events of 
February and October 1917, Russia’s political and economic situation was far from stable. The 
looming defeat in a costly military engagement in the Far East and deteriorating conditions of 
living had led to severe social unrest. The Revolution of 1905 was not only in many aspects a 
blueprint for the later events but also resulted in the adaption of large constitutional rights in 
the hitherto autocratically-ruled state. 
This sudden political turmoil was a watershed for the country’s future development. The 
resulting participation of a large share of the population, accompanied by substantial civil 
rights, embodied a clear turn towards democracy. However, the granted reforms were revoked 
shortly afterwards and the old autocratic order was restored: Any expectation of fundamental 
political change turned out to be short-lived. Whether Russia could have gone the way of other 
western European states – gradually adopting constitutional democratic rights – or whether its 
inability to do so inevitably eventuated in the Bolshevik Revolution has been disputed among 
historians ever since (Ascher 2004, xi).168  
This paper examines how the various political events during the revolution of 1905 were 
perceived on the stock markets of Saint Petersburg and Berlin. An event study using two types 
                                                 
168 Soviet historians and socialist theorists like Leo Trotsky saw the reason for the revolution in the system itself 
(Frankel 2007, p. 57). An insurrection against it was therefore inevitable. The Tsar’s notion of the political 
development of his country was quite the opposite; He was optimistic in maintaining the authoritarian policies 
which had been existent for centuries (Harcave 1964, p. 18). For a more recent historical view see, for instance, 
Walkin (1964), Fröhlich (1981) or Bradley (2002).   
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of Russian government bonds reflects the reaction of contemporary capital owners, which is 
particularly interesting in two aspects: 
First, it helps to reveal the capital owners view on the implementation of democracy. The 
accompanying political and economic freedom is often regarded as beneficial for economic 
growth.169 Also, democratic regimes are usually characterised by greater stability.170 Both 
arguments imply that a turn towards democracy should generally be welcomed at the markets. 
On the other hand, capital owners have good reason to disapprove of such reform: It might 
result in the redistribution of income, an increased provision of public goods and finally an 
increase in taxation. Such an anti-democratic attitude was characteristic for foreignb investors, 
which prefer to invest authoritarian regimes.171 As it turns out the constitutional changes of 
1905 were not appreciated on both considered markets. At the same time, the actors there did 
not realise an imminent threat of a revolution.172 Such result implies that a gradual 
democratisation of Imperial Russia was seen realistic in the long run – as opposed to the view 
of Soviet historians. 
Second, both the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin Stock Exchange are considered. This approach 
highlights possible dissent between investors in the East and West regarding their view on 
democratisation. While the Berlin Stock Exchange is well-investigated, this does not apply to 
the one in Saint Petersburg.173 It was considerably smaller than other European markets at that 
time and had lower trading volume (Borodkin et al. 2006). However, the securities employed 
in this event study developed almost equally at the two stock exchanges. This outcome suggests 
that investors’ behaviour did not differ substantially between Imperial Russia and the German 
Empire. 
Analogically, the economic effect of the military campaign in the Russo-Japanese war is 
established. The struggle for dominance in the Far East with Japan reached its peak right before 
the revolution.174 Though this eventually turned out to be a disastrous and costly adventure, 
Russia aimed at the chance to expand its influence in a strategically important region. In this 
context, recent military involvements in Crimea come to mind, which had a quite severe effect 
                                                 
169 Economic growth literature suggests a variety of underlying reasons. Positive effects can arise from better 
protection of property rights (Gould and Gruben 1996; Claessens and Laeven 2003), from an effective rule of law 
(Barro 2001) or an increased level of human capital in democratic countries (Tavares and Wacziarg 2001; Baum 
and Lake 2003). 
170 See for instance Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Morrison (2011) or Aidt and Franck (2015). 
171 Many studies find foreign direct investment to be fostered by authoritarian rule, especially in peripheral 
countries (Oneal 1994; Li & Resnick 2003; Mathur & Singh 2013). 
172 As suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). 
173 The Berlin Stock Exchange was already highly developed at that time. Corresponding work on this issue is 
provided, for instance, by Wetzel (1996), Gelman and Burhop (2008) or Lehmann (2014). 
174 According to literature, the war even worked as a catalyst for the revolutionary events in 1905 (Löwe 2007 b). 
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on an economic level: the Rouble depreciated massively and net capital outflow regained the 
high level of the economic crisis in 2008. This development was also reflected in the 
development of the stock market as well as government bonds (Kholodilin et al. 2014).175 
Nonetheless, empirical evidence on the interaction of capital markets and military conflicts is 
ambiguous.176 This paper contributes to the discussion by employing another conflict that has 
not been investigated yet in that respect. The outcome is not fully consistent with historical 
literature considering the importance of the various war events. Furthermore, both the Saint 
Petersburg and the Berlin Stock Exchange reacted almost equally indicating there was no home 
bias of Russian investors. 
This paper is organised as follow: first, the literature is review a based on that various 
hypotheses are set up. Then, the historical background is illustrated – along with the various 
events that will be investigated. Next, the data and the methodology are presented. After the 
results have been outlined, a final section concludes. 
 
Consequences of democratisation   
 
The overall effects of a broader participation of the people can various consequences on the 
political level: For instance, wealth is redistributed from richer to poorer parts of the population 
which are now able to utilise their political power (Husted and Kenny 1997; Justman and 
Gradstein 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). Such development is often accompanied by 
growing government expenditures (Aidt and Jensen 2009, p. 379), as well as an increase in the 
provision of public goods (Husted and Kenny 1997; Lott 1999; Aidt et al. 2006). In the end, 
these expenditures can be a burden for both the treasury and firms.177 Authoritarian 
governments might also have been seen advantageous, since they often claim to be a guarantor 
for political stability. A stable environment, along with lower potential financial burdens is in 
the best interest of investors – visible, for instance, in the recent Turkish parliamentary elections 
in November 2015.178  
Despite high costs, the ruling elites extended the voting rights by choice. One major explanation 
for this is the importance of specific political constellations and general political competition 
                                                 
175 The latter constitute the basis of this study. 
176 Often, there was a large impact of events that are considered decisive (Frey and Kucher 2000; Brown and 
Burdekin 2002). Other authors, like Oosterlinck (2003) or Willard et al. (1996) do not find such a distinct 
coherence.  
177 Additional cost may arise from a better protection of workers or related legislation.  
178 After the victory of conservative authoritarian government on 1 November 2015, the Turkish stock market and 
the currency increased significantly in value (FAZ 2 November 2015). 
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(Lizerri and Persico 2004; Turner and Zhan 2012). Another common argument is that the 
participation of a larger share of the population can avoid a revolution, which arises from the 
disenfranchised masses (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Morrison 2011; Aidt and Franck 
2015).179 Accordingly, democratisation possesses a large stabilising element, which can 
outweigh possibly negative implications – the net effect on investors’ attitude remains unclear 
however.  
Sovereign bonds have been considered frequently without detecting a ‘democratic advantage’: 
bonds issued by democratic governments did not perform significantly better (Saiegh 2005; 
Archer et al. 2007; Beaulieu et al. 2012). John Turner and Wenwen Zhan (2012) find investors 
at the London Stock Exchange to react negatively to a widening of the franchise for the House 
of Commons in 1867. In the Kingdom of Saxony, the electoral law was altered twice in close 
succession. There, the negative effects of such change prevailed (Lehmann-Hasemeyer et al. 
2014). Generally, investors seemed to be rather sceptical towards democratic change. 
 
This study contributes to this stand of literature by adding another market in a largely unique 
political environment. The democratic reforms that came into effect in 1906 virtually constitute 
a natural experiment. The general approach is comparable to other historical studies in that 
context. Technically the instant investor reaction is assessed in an event study. A negative 
reaction to an extension of democratic rights supports an anti-democratic attitude of investors. 
The same applies vice versa. Such an anti-democratic view was found in Great Britain and, 
partially, in the Kingdom of Saxony. There, the main arguments refer to the potential costs 
which originate from higher taxation and improved working conditions, which find their 
expression in a lower value of the affected firms.  
Another reason for such behaviour might be an imminent threat of a revolution as claimed by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). However, Turner and Zhan (2012) failed to find such an effect 
for Victorian Britain. The revolution of 1905 provides an ideal setting for testing this 
hypothesis. Generally, a revolutionary regime seems likely to reject financial demands against 
its predecessor, whose political action, including state expenditures, are probably considered 
illegitimate.180 If a revolution is considered a serious threat, government bonds are expected to 
                                                 
179 Democratisation can have many dimensions. Its level does not only depend on the franchise, but also on the 
competences of the parliament itself. The interdependence between these two factors needs to be taken into account 
before making general statements (Pittaluga et al. 2015). 
180 Stephanie Collet (2013) gives an excellent example of sovereign bonds that are declared null in the wake of a 
regime change. She denotes this type of debt ‘odious’, which underlines the immoral character of its usage. In fact, 
most of the government spending in Imperial Russia had been used for more or less suppressive purposes: Military 
expenditures and the repayment of older debt constituted a large share in the state budget (Ischchanian 1913, p. 
210; Reichsbudget 1908). 
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benefit from a democratic reform, since this would release some of the political pressure and 
accordingly lower the probability of a government bond to fail. Likewise, the revoking of 
reforms should have the reverse effect, as the risk of revolution is increased again. The two 
events of social unrest on 22 January and 5 December 1905 seem particularly suited to test the 
threat of revolution hypothesis, as they carried large revolutionary potential. 
Turner and Zhan (2012) check the threat of revolution hypothesis by using shares prices. This 
paper looks at government bonds instead, which appears advantageous: while firms are likely 
to survive a regime change, this hardly applies for government bonds issued by the old ruler 
(Collet 2013). Their prices are exposed to greater risk and consequently expected to react more 
sensitively than share prices. Theory and empirical findings imply a general anti-democratic 
sentiment of investors. A positive reaction of bond prices to the extension of democratic rights 
can therefore be attributed to an increased risk of an overthrow of the regime. The same applies 
conversely to dissolution of the Duma and the restriction of franchise shortly afterwards. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Bond prices react negatively to an extension of democratic rights. A possible 
thread of revolution is mainly reflected in the two events of social unrest. 
 
By quantifying the market reaction this study further allows for making a point on democratic 
prospects for Imperial Russia. By this means it can reveal in how far the government’s decision 
to eventually leave the path of reform was backed by the elite. Whether Imperial Russia was 
already on a path towards a constitutional state or, in other words, whether it could possibly 
have followed other western European states such as Great Britain, has been debated 
extensively by historians – without reaching a consensus however (See, for instance, Walkin 
1964, Fröhlich 1981 or Bradley 2002).181 
As argued above, bond prices reflect the expectation of market participants, i.e. investors. These 
embody the financial and social elite of Russia and even the whole of Europe.182 Decisions of 
one autocratic ruler – or at best of a small circle of advisors – might be irrational in the end. 
Investment on the other hand follows a largely rational schedule and are plausibly giving a quite 
precise image of the conditions of that time.  
The controversy about the Revolution of 1905 is by no means a recent one. Count Witte saw 
the main reason in the Tsar’s single political decisions – particularly in the war with Japan – 
                                                 
181 The recent political development of Russia has been analysed in similar regard (see Hahn 2004 or Hassner 
2008). 
182 The structure of bond holders is depicted below. For a comprehensive view on foreign activity in Russian 
markets see, for instance, McKay (1970) or Ischchanian (1913). 
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rather than in the inadequacy of the system itself. In his view, the unrest resulted from the Tsars 
‘…wavering and not from Russia’s desire for revolution’ (Frankel 2007, p. 57). 
In sharp contrast, Soviet historians like Leo Trotsky detected intrinsic structural problems in 
the regime itself: ‘The monarchy loses its capacity for any kind of creative initiative; it defends 
itself, it strikes back, it retreats, its activities acquire the automatism of reflexes […] His nearest 
ancestors […] passed on to Nicholas a chaotic empire already carrying the matured revolution 
in its womb. If he had any choice left, it was only between different roads to ruin.’ (Trotsky 
1932, p. 98). According to him, the system itself is the cause for the (therefore inevitable) 
revolution. The above hypothesis in a specific Russian context can be reformulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: If investors see a viable democratic prospect for Imperial Russia, bond prices 
are expected to react negatively to an extension of democratic rights. 
 
At first glance such reasoning seems contradictory. However, the argument is the same as with 
regard to previous Hypothesis, as the reaction of investors reflects the risk of a revolution.  A 
negative price movement in the wake of reforms suggests that the negative effects, as described 
earlier, prevailed. Such an outcome would express the investors’ confidence in the stability of 
the political system.183 If on the other hand a threat of a revolution was imminent, any reform 
should have been welcomed.  
 
Additionally, a well-known historical narrative is re-examined. Ever since, the mutiny on the 
battleship Potemkin has been a central motive in the history of revolution – not only in the 
Soviet Union. The ship was anchoring nearby Odessa, when abominable food caused large 
discontent among the sailors. The command reacted with severe sanction and eventually 
provoked a mutiny. Though the revolt failed to spread to other ships or even the city of Odessa, 
it remained hugely popular in the public.184 However, the importance of the historical event 
remains questionable (Bennett 1959). En passant this paper can further clarify the issue: The 
date of Potemkin mutiny corresponds to the sample period, which allows to test its impact on 
capital markets. 
 
 
                                                 
183Needless to say that such an assessment – from a present-day perspective – would have been a fatal 
misjudgement.  
184 Its mainstream fame stems mostly from the 1925 film by Sergey Eisenstein. There is a vast literature on its 
culture impact, for instance Rosentreter (2011).  
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War effect on the stock market  
 
Generally, political events have a quite measurable impact on stock markets. The majority of 
studies focusses on elections (see, for instance, Bechtel 2009; Bernhard and Leblang 2006, 
chapters 3 and 4; Herron 2000; Leblang and Mukherjee 2004, 2005; Snowberg et al. 2006).185 
The impact of wars has been considered less frequently. By nature wars provide ideal occasions 
for an event study. Stock market prices reflect the investors’ apprasial quite precisely, since the 
outcome of single encounters comes as a surprise for the public. Empirical literature in this field 
focusses mainly on two conflicts: World War II and the American Civil War. In both cases 
however, results are ambiguous. Bruno Frey and Marcel Kucher (2000) find distinct effects 
using the sovereign bonds of different countries traded on the Swiss bourse during World War 
II.186 William Brown and Richard Burdekin (2002) employ a similar approach based on prices 
from the London Stock Exchange. They focussed on a particular German bond which was 
issued to finance reparation payments of the Treaty of Versailles. After the National Socialists 
assumed power, they refused the payment of these dues.187 Accordingly, the risk of failure of 
this security was inversely related to the chance of the regime to prevail. Decisive war-related 
events result in significant breaks in price movements. 
Kim Oosterlinck (2003) employed the spread between Vichy state bonds – issued by the French 
regime collaborating with the German occupiers – and French Rentes, which stem from the 
third French republic. Major price changes are assumed to reflect the probability of the Vichy 
regime to survive the war.188 Various events related to the war had a pronounced impact on the 
respective bond. However, investors reacted more sensitively to political rather than to war-
related events. 
The second conflict that has been an object of thorough investigation is the American Civil 
War. Also there, war-related events manifested in financial market prices (McCandless 1996). 
However, investors often disagreed with historians in their assessment of the significance of 
these events. Kristen Willard et al. (1996) fail to match the market-impact of well-known battles 
with historical assessment. Many encounters that are considered important did not cause 
                                                 
185 Related to these studies are such that evaluate altering of the political or constitutional structure as such. For 
example, an altering of the electoral law has large impact on prices, as delineated by Lehmann-Hasemeyer et al. 
(2014) or Turner and Zhan (2012). 
186 An exception is the final capitulation of the Wehrmacht. It is argued that the German defeat – obviously 
unavoidable – had already been priced by market participants. 
187 The argumentation of the National Socialists resembles that brought forward by Stephanie Collet (2013) - just 
in a perverted sense. In their view, debt issued by the democratic state was ‘odious’ in its nature. 
188 In general, the two security types are nearly identical, except for the different issuer. Any spread therefore only 
reflects the regime itself. 
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structural breaks in the exchange rate of the greenback – a currency issued by the Union to 
overcome wartime financial constraints. Based on the same strategy, a further study by Brown 
and Burdekin (2000) comes to similar results. The authors employed the prices of confederate 
cotton bonds traded in London. In sum, the assessment of contemporaries often deviates from 
the historical narrative. 
Generally, Russian bonds are expected to have been impacted by war-related events. First, 
Russia was already burdened by a huge debt prior to the start of the conflict. Also, its strategic 
position in the Far East was quite disadvantageous. A remote engagement such as this involves 
immense costs and a large risk of failure. Holders of Russian government bonds must have been 
on alert.  Further, all major battles in the war turned out to be disastrous for Russia, as described 
above. Such a rare case allows formulating clear-cut expectations with regard to Russian bond 
prices: price reactions to any war-related event is expected to be negative. The only plausible 
exception from that assumption is the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth which was quite 
advantageous for Russia and should, accordingly, have been perceived positively. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Russian government bonds reacted (negatively) to the war events of the Russo-
Japanese war. 
 
The Russo-Japanese War is particularly suited for the investigation: It had large political 
implications, especially in East-Asia. Also, it sketched out modern warfare in great detail 
(Kowner 2007). Though geographically limited to a small area, related news was noticed across 
the globe. In that regard it was quite modern: means of communication were a distinct 
characteristic of all following conflicts. Nevertheless, the war events have to be looked at with 
caution: The sheer size of the Russian Empire made news from a remote battlefield take a long 
time to reach the European part of Russia.189 Furthermore, the Russian press was characterised 
by patriotic rather than objective reporting and freedom of press was not yet in place (Grüner 
2007). It remains questionable whether any defeat of the Russian army was displayed in full. 
German newspapers on the other hand were less suspicious of being pro-Russian. The 
comparison between price reactions at the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin Stock Exchange can 
clarify this issue. 
 
 
                                                 
189 Only one direct telegraph line to Russian mainland existed, alongside the Trans-Siberian Railway. 
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Russian government bonds and the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange 
 
Russian state borrowing has a long-reaching tradition and was crucial for the modernisation of 
the country. The state played a much larger role in the economic activity than elsewhere. It tried 
to satisfy its demand for capital by extensively floating bond issues. As a consequence, 
government bonds were widespread in Russia well before corporate stocks. Likewise, the 
amount of the corresponding securities was largest throughout the whole Imperial period (Papp 
2001, pp. 32).190 As stated above, the price development of bonds is especially interesting to 
analyse in the context of Russo-Japanese War. This conflict was geographically limited and did 
not affect the economy as a whole.  In line with that the Rouble-Mark exchange rate remained 
relatively constant during the whole period – as displayed in Figure 2. Even so, bond prices are 
assumed to react sensitively than corporate stocks.  
 
Figure 1: Rouble-Mark exchange rate 
 
Source: Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta. 
 
Initially revenues from bond issues were used basically for warfare and other military expenses, 
to a small extent also for railroad construction (Ukhov 2003, pp. 4). In the late 19th century the 
main purpose was altered: Now Russia’s industrialisation was fuelled by that mean. The 
attempts to modernise the economy were implemented mostly by the state. Moreover, market 
                                                 
190 In the considered period government bonds accounted for a large share of the Russian capital market (Sidorov 
1975, p. 253). They were regarded as an attractive investment, not least due to the low level of trust in private 
enterprises and the dominant role of the state in business activities (Papp 2001, pp. 17). 
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economy and a financial market in particular were far less developed compared to other 
European states. The demand for capital could barely be satisfied on domestically. As a 
consequence, new bonds were issued abroad on a large scale under Tsar Alexander III. This 
time the Russian government placed these new securities directly on foreign markets, while up 
until this point it had used banks as an intermediator. Further, gold bonds were introduced as 
universal standard. Coupon and principal payments of these were either made in paper Roubles 
or in gold coins, which facilitated international trading (Ukhov 2003, pp. 16). While these 
measures were of little avail in the beginning, Russia gained unrestricted access to international 
financial markets after the turn of the century. Consequently, nearly half of all Russian 
government bonds were held by foreign investors in 1913 (Ukhov 2003, p. 35).191 The German 
Empire was a major creditor. Approximately 15% of German foreign capital was placed in 
Russia (Nötzold 1975, p. 241). For that reason the use of the Berlin Stock Exchange as a 
reference market is particularly suitable.192 
 
The efficiency of the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange has been investigated but little. It was 
founded at the same time as the city itself. However, it did not become significant for the 
Russian economy until the late 19th century, when trading reached a substantial amount 
(Borodkin et al. 2006, pp. 4). The overall economic environment in Russia was not very 
favourable: the industry was homogeneous as it was grounded on only a few sectors. An 
unfavourable legislation impeded the creation of firms and a prosperous economic development 
(Owen 1995, pp. 16). In addition, the establishment of the so-called security department at the 
Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange in 1900 is regarded as a heavy obstacle. It imposed strict 
controls on trading and thereby hampered the development of a free market (Papp 2001, p. 8). 
Still, prices did react to external events, particularly to political ones (Borodkin et al. 2006).193 
After the turn of the century, the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange was in many aspects 
considered well-functioning (Papp 2001, pp. 324). 
Much more emphasis has been put on the Berlin Stock Exchange. It performed well even when 
measured against modern standards. Berlin displayed a high level of information efficiency 
(Gelman and Burhop 2008) and comparably low trading costs (Gehrig and Fohlin 2006). 
Further, costs of initial public offerings were quite low, which indicates its efficiency in 
                                                 
191 For all Russian companies, this share amounted to 33.5% (Ukhov 2003, p. 35). 
192 Several Russian governments bonds as well as railroad companies were traded in Berlin. These can be found 
in Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1914), a stock market manual. Other important sources of 
capital were France and Belgium. 
193 According to Borodkin et al. (2006), these political events mattered a lot more for prices than the fundamental 
values of a security. 
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underwriting new issues (Lehmann 2014). It was well integrated with other European markets, 
as prices of internationally traded securities developed almost equally (Baltzer 2006). Overall 
Berlin seems to be an adequate benchmark market in terms of efficiency. 
 
As it turns out, prices at Berlin and Saint Petersburg behaved equally most of the time. Possible 
differences in investors’ reaction to specific events are assumed to originate from varying 
attitudes. Likewise, political as well as war-related events might have been taken differently on 
the respective markets. This applies to political events as well as war events. The latter category 
is particularly prone to a home bias of Russian government bonds, if investors’ decisions were 
possible driven by patriotic motives. Likewise, an exceedingly anti-democratic attitude of the 
Russian elite would condense in returns considering political events.194 Admittedly these 
interpretations remain speculative to some extent. Differences in outcome might still be induced 
by lack of efficiency or varying access to relevant information.195 
 
Hypothesis 4: Possible differences in bond returns at the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin Stock 
Exchange reflect mainly differences in investors’ attitude. 
 
Economic and political backwardness of Imperial Russia 
 
The economic backwardness of Imperial Russia became evident to its rulers ever since the 
painful defeat in the Crimean War. Russia, though vastly superior in manpower, in the end did 
not stand a chance due to the lack of modern weapons and transport infrastructure. In the 
following decades modernisation efforts were undertaken – with initial success. Serfdom was 
abolished in 1861, the educational system and the military were modernised, economic and 
social reforms were implemented. The result were extremely high growth rates of GDP and 
industrial production during the 1890s.196 Regardless of the temporary economic advance 
Russia remained largely autocratic, unlike many other European states at that time (Schmidt 
2003 pp. 83). Attempts to promote the self-government of rural municipalities were prevented 
                                                 
194 Historical research often claims distinct autocratic attitudes in the Russian society (see Bradley 2002). 
195 Russian newspapers were generally favourable in reporting of war-related events. Information on political 
events such as the Bloody Sunday should have been accessible even more easily for Russian investors, as these 
happened nearby: the Winter Palace, for instance, a main place of action, is well within sight of the Saint Petersburg 
Stock Exchange. 
196 Although not all of the ambitious reform plans could be implemented. Interests of ruling classes varied largely. 
For instance, former land owners demanded high financial compensation. That could not be given by the 
government which faced huge financial constrains by itself. In the end, former serfs had to ransom themselves and 
remained effectively as dependent as before (Hoch 1991). 
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by the interests of the aristocracy and central bureaucracy – including the Tsar himself (Löwe 
2007 a, pp. 41). Likewise, the peasants’ standard of living remained at subsistence level. The 
area of land they were allotted with to them after the abolishment of serfdom was undersized 
(Hoch 2004). Furthermore, even 40 years after the official liberation of serfs, the redemption 
payment to former landlords were an immense burden (Hoch 1994). In addition, most parts of 
the population, including an emerging middle class, were still excluded from political 
participation.  
After the turn of the century the high growth rates of industrial production could not keep pace 
with population growth, as shown in Table 1. In the absence of a prospering economy and an 
improving standard of living, the structural problems of the empire came to light.197 
 
Table 1: 5-year growth rates of selected economic indicators  
Period Population Coal Oil Pig iron Grain 
1880–1885 11.4% 29.8% 411.4% 17.8% - 
1885–1890 8.3% 40.9% 105.6% 75.5% - 
1890–1895 5.2% 51.3% 66.9% 55.9% - 
1895–1900 7.3% 77.5% 67.4% 102.1% 10.0% 
1900–1905 8.3% 15.6% -27.8% -6.8% 1.2% 
Source: Kahan (1989, p. 69) 
     
In the wake of the Russo-Japanese War the economic situation further worsened. The 
deployment and support of troops in the Far East had a direct impact on the welfare of the 
Russian population, which resulted in continuous unrest. At the same time, an unsuccessful 
course of war further reduced the government’s reputation. According to the memories of Count 
Sergey Witte – a formative figure in Imperial Russian politics at the turn of the century198 – the 
war functioned as a catalyst: ‘It came the year 1905. The disturbance in the heads of all social 
classes grew and grew, related to our inglorious defeats in the Far East’ (Witte 1923, p. 197). 
The unrest culminated on 9 January 1905.199 A large group of striking workers – estimated at 
50,000 to 100,000 people – marched to the Winter Palace in order to express their discontent 
                                                 
197 The dependency of autocratic regimes on economic prosperity appears to be a general phenomenon, as the 
recent discussions on the People’s Republic of China illustrate. When growth ceases, the demands for political 
change become more frequent (see, for instance, The Economist 25 October 2014). 
198 Count Witte – serving among other positions as Russian minister of finance – was largely responsible for the 
fostering of railway construction and industrialisation. Later, he became the main negotiator for peace with Japan 
and the author of the October Manifesto – as delineated below.  
199 That date corresponds to 22 January in the Julian calendar which had been still in use in Imperial Russia. All 
the dates mentioned hereafter refer to the Gregorian calendar. 
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and hand over a petition claiming democratic rights. Though initially peaceful, the mass was 
fired at by tsarist troops, resulting in hundreds of casualties. The so-called Bloody Sunday gave 
rise to large uprisings all over the country.200 The situation was not pacified until the release of 
the October Manifesto on 30 October 1905. In this document the Tsar promised far-reaching 
constitutional rights. Most notably it contained the introduction of a broad franchise for a newly 
established parliament – the Duma. The October Manifesto furthermore promised extensive 
civil rights including religious and political freedom as well as freedom of press (Dahlmann 
2005, pp. 125). Within a short period of time Russia’s political system was altered radically. 
The situation still was quite volatile. While the liberal movement saw its demands mainly 
fulfilled, the socialist fraction of the formerly united opposition continued their protest. On 5 
December 1905 a general strike paralysed economic and social life throughout Russia. Though 
the protest was finally brought to an end by force, it had a direct consequence on the political 
level: The government immediately announced the exact shape of the new franchise.201   
The year 1906 was marked by extensive reforms. Parties and other political organisations were 
founded in large numbers. On 23 April the new constitution became effective, followed by the 
solemn opening of the parliament on 10 May (Dahlmann 2005, pp. 128). 
 
Table 2: Overview political events 
Date Event 
22 January 1905 Bloody Sunday 
30 October 1905 October Manifesto 
5 December 1905 General strike 
23 April 1906 Commencement of new constitution  
10 May 1906 Opening of the first Duma 
21 July 1906 Dissolution of the first Duma 
20 February 1907 Opening of the second Duma 
2 June 1907 Dissolution second Duma and new franchise 
All dates refer to the Gregorian calendar. 
 
When the new Duma began its session, it could not match the high expectations with regard to 
the new political era. In many important questions – for instance, the redemption payments for 
peasants, possible nationalisation of private property or the extent of civil rights – parliament 
                                                 
200 Russia’s mainly agrarian-based economy was heavily affected. For a detailed picture see Miller (2013). 
201 The new suffrage widened the electorate to a great degree. Still, as a census suffrage, it strongly discriminated 
against the low income classes.   
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and government opposed heavily. Legislation was virtually deadlocked. By 21 July of the same 
year, the Tsar made use of his constitutional right to dissolve the Duma.202   
The succeeding parliamentary constituted in February 1907. Still, it was not more cooperative 
to the Tsarist government as it was composed of more leftist and radical MPs. The electorate 
did not welcome the sudden closing of the old Duma. Political consent was still out of sight. 
Once again, the Tsar dissolved the parliament. This time however, the newly decreed franchise 
was greatly restricted in order to generate a parliament that votes in accordance with the 
government – a clear violation of the constitution (Schmidt 2003, pp. 102). The period of 
democratisation in Imperial Russia, initiated in 1905, lasted for only two years. 
 
The struggle for influence in the Far East 
 
In the Far East the conflict with Japan had been intensifying since the turn of the century. Part 
of Count Witte’s strategy to foster economic growth and open up new markets was the eastward 
expansion of the Russian Empire. A prominent symbol of that strategy was the Trans-Siberian 
Railway that was completed in 1904. It connected European Russia with Vladivostok at the 
Pacific Ocean and carried huge economic and military potential. This threat to Japanese 
interests and in addition short-term diplomatic miscalculation led to an escalation of the 
conflict. When Japan asked for a restriction of Russian activity in the region, the Russian 
government did little to comply.203 It completely ignored the Japanese claims, not least due to 
the feeling of superiority over a non-European nation (Frankel 2007, pp. 54).204  
Eventually Japan launched a surprise attack on the Russian city of Port Arthur. The Russian 
government was not caught totally unaware. In fact, it hoped for a successful course of war that 
could lead to enthusiasm among the people and, as in former military conflicts, distract from 
domestic problems. However, such hopes turned out to be wrong, along with the presumed 
superiority of the Russian army. The troops’ morale continuously worsened as an easy victory 
failed to materialise. At the same time, the war became increasingly unpopular. The 
mobilisation of new troops became more and more difficult (Löwe 2007b, pp. 147). 
 
                                                 
202 Though this clearly showed the unwillingness of the Tsar to renounce political power, the political factions did 
their bit, too. Most of them were newly founded and consequently the majority of the Duma was not well-organized 
and failed to find a consensus. A government responsible to the parliament could could barely develop unser such 
circumstances (Galai 2005). 
203 Since the Boxer-rebellion the spheres of interests in the region were altered. Russia controlled Manchuria, while 
Japan had de facto annexed Korea in 1895 (Connaughton 1988, p. 3). 
204 For a comprehensive view of the origins of the war, see Nish (1985). 
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Figure 2: Map of the war in the Far East 
 
Source: Connaughton (1988) 
 
In the following, the Russo-Japanese War is outlined. Table 3 lists the most decisive and 
significant events.205 As it turns out, the Imperial Russian army suffered heavy defeats in the 
majority of battles. In sharp contrast to the self-understanding of a traditional European power, 
the Japanese army was de-facto superior in many aspects. Despite the recent completion of the 
Trans-Siberian Railways, sending and maintaining troops far from the mainland was a 
formidable logistical challenge. Also Russia’s military personnel, though large in numbers, 
consisted mainly of peasants. Their motivation to fight a remote war against an unknown enemy 
was rather low. Japan on the other hand had put in great efforts to modernise its military. 
Modelled on Prussian and British standard, the Japanese army comprised highly trained and 
specialised forces, which it effectively deployed right on its doorstep in the Japanese Sea, Korea 
and Manchuria (Connaughton 1988, pp. 12). 
 
                                                 
205 This section identifies the most decisive events of the war. If not marked differently, it is based on the work of 
Richard Connaughton (1988) and Ian Nish (2005), who provide a detailed view of the war campaigns. Bear in 
mind that only new information on the course of the war – decisive battles of strategic importance – are useful for 
an event study, which ascribes a change in prices to the altering expectations of investors.   
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Table 3: Overview of war events of the Russo-Japanese War 
Date Event 
9 February 1904 First Japanese attack 
30 April 1904 Battle at Yalu River 
10 August 1904 Battle of the Yellow Sea 
2 January 1905 Capitulation of port Arthur 
10 March 1905 Mukden Battle 
27 May 1905 Battle of Tsushima 
27 June 1905 Mutiny on Battleship Potemkin 
5 September 1905  Treaty of Portsmouth 
All dates refer to the Gregorian calendar. 
 
On 9 February the Japanese navy launched an attack on Port Arthur, damaging several Russian 
ships. The attack was not preceded by a declaration of war. It came largely to a surprise to the 
public making this event particularly useful to study – notwithstanding its small strategic 
relevance. 
The first major confrontation on land was the Battle of Yalu River. On 30 April 1904 the 
Japanese army conquered all the Russian positions, however at great cost of life. The Japanese 
fortunes of war continued at the Yellow sea, where Japan gained full control after the battle on 
10 August 1904. In the first half of 1905 the most decisive battle of the war was fought. On 2 
January Port Arthur surrendered after a 154-day siege. Russia finally lost its only naval base in 
the region and the remains of the Russian Far East fleet were destroyed. The impact on public 
opinion and the troop’s morale was immense. Also, the Battle of Mukden in March of the same 
year turned out to be disastrous. Eventually, Russia was repulsed form Manchuria – again, the 
losses on the Japanese side were substantial as well. The last critical naval battle happened at 
the Tsushima strait. In a risky endeavour the Russian Baltic fleet had circumnavigated Africa, 
only to meet the same fate as its Far East counterpart. After its final trump card had failed to 
succeed, Russia’s defeat at all stages was undeniable. 
In the end, both sides showed a certain level of war weariness. Despite the successful course of 
war, the ongoing engagement was a financial and political burden for Japan as well. When US 
President Theodore Roosevelt offered to negotiate peace, the belligerents were keen to accept. 
In a long and tough conference, Japan could not take advantage of the fact that it had won nearly 
every battle. The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on 5 September 1905, comprised the cession of 
Manchuria, southern Sakhalin and Kwantung. Apart from these minor territorial losses, the 
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Russian delegation chaired by Count Witte was quite successful: Japan failed to achieve high 
reparation payments as well as further territorial claims. Considering Russia’s performance on 
the battlefield, the peace treaty was to its best advantage.206  
 
Methodology 
 
The impact of the various events on the stock exchange is measured by applying standard event 
study methodology using Russian government bonds.207 Figure 2 visualises the approach. In an 
estimation period [T-1, T1], which is unaffected by the event – the estimation window – the 
parameters later used to determine the expected (normal) returns are calculated. The event under 
consideration occurs at T0 and can affect the stock market during the event window [T1, T2], 
which can lie on either side of T0. This is due to the fact that information might leak before the 
actual event, which is typically relevant for earnings announcement or the like. There is no 
general consensus on the exact length of the estimation period. Usually, it is set between one 
and six months for daily prices.208 As prices in the considered period are overall unstable, a 
relatively short estimation window of 60 days is used in this study. 
Figure 3: Estimation and event window 
 
         (estimation window)              (event window) 
          T-1        T1                  T0                      T2 
Source: MacKinlay (1997). 
 
The foundation of an event study is the estimation of the expected return, which is then 
subtracted from the actual return. The resulting abnormal return reflects the impact of the event 
itself. Here, the so-called constant mean return model is employed. Based on the period-t returns 
of security i, the expected return )( itRE  is: 
                                                 
206 Correspondingly, the Japanese public perceived the outcome of the negotiations as extremely humiliating. In 
the following days, Tokyo was shaken by violent anti-peace riots (Westwood 1986, pp. 160). 
207 For an overview of this method see MacKinlay (1997). 
208 For an overview see, for instance, Bessembinder et al. (2009). 
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itiitRE  )(   With   0itE   and   2titVar                (1) 
Though much simpler than the common market model, this approach usually yields quite 
similar and equally powerful results (Brown and Warner, 1980; 1985). The expected return is 
simply the mean return during the estimation period. Afterwards, abnormal returns in the event 
window are established. Specifically, these are calculated for security i at time t as: ARit = Rit 
−E(Rit), where Rit is a stock’s realized return and where E(Rit) is its expected return in the 
absence of the event, as calculated above. Then the average cumulated abnormal return (ACAR) 
from t=T1 to t=T2  is 
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1
1   (2), 
where N is the number of securities in the sample during each event. To test the significance of 
the ACARs, their variance is estimated by using the cross-sectional variance across the 
cumulative abnormal returns. This cross-sectional approach takes account of an increase in 
event period variance (Campbell et al. 1997, p. 168; Turner and Zhan 2012, p. 620). According 
to this the variance Var(ACAR) is: 

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The test statistic is then calculated as )(ACARVar
ACARt  , which is asymptotically standard 
normal.  
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Data 
 
The event study is based on daily prices of two types of Russian government bonds. These were 
hand-collected from two sources. The daily newspapers Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta,209 
and Berliner Börsenzeitung both include a daily official price sheet of the respective stock 
exchange.210 Prices there were quoted as a percentage of the security’s nominal value. The exact 
event dates were re-checked in the daily newspapers Frankfurter Zeitung and Berliner 
Börsenzeitung.211 
The choice of the specific securities is based on the availability of prices. Though various 
municipal bonds were issued in Russia, these were traded only sporadically and were rather 
considered a long-term investment for institutional investors (Papp 2001, p. 39). Consequently, 
only federal government bonds are suitable for this analysis. Still, also these are characterised 
by a low frequency of trading. Finally, only those types of securities that were traded regularly 
on both markets were included: The 4% State Bond – following the Russian notation also 
referred to as Renta – and the 31/8 Convertible Obligation.212 Both of these securities had not 
more than one week break in price notation. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 show the two different types of bonds employed in this study. In both graphs 
the solid line represents the prices on the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange. The dashed line 
refers to Berlin. Apparently there is an overall downward trend in the development of bond 
prices. However, there is large variation, especially at the time of the revolutionary events. After 
all such behaviour is desirables for an event study – the basic concept is to link variation and 
time of event.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
209 Торгово- промышленная газета, the literal translation is Commerce and Industry Newspaper. Further, 
missing prices were counterchecked in Биржевые Ведомости  (Stock Exchange Gazette).  
210 The Berliner Börsenzeitung  is available at the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin or online: 
 http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/2436020X/ (07.12.2015) 
211 For most events, the news was announced on the day of occurrence. In some cases, it came out a few days 
delayed. Still, a sufficiently large event window can capture the effect. In addition, a detailed review of Russian 
newspapers would be preferable. This unfortunately was not feasible, due to the author’s tight time schedule and 
poor language skills.  
212 Государственная рента and конвертируемая облигация respectively. 
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Figure 4: State bonds 
 
The solid line refers to of prices on the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange, the dashed line to prices on the Berlin 
Stock Exchange. 
 
 
Figure 5: Convertible obligations 
 
The solid line refers to of prices on the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange, the dashed line to prices on the Berlin 
Stock Exchange. 
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Figure 6: Difference in prices of State Bonds 
 
The graph shows the difference in prices of 4% State Bonds between the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange and the 
Berlin Stock Exchange. 
 
 
Figure 7: Difference in prices of Convertible Obligations 
 
The graph shows the difference in prices of 3 1/8% Convertible Obligations between the Saint Petersburg Stock 
Exchange and the Berlin Stock Exchange. 
 
 
 
 
‐6
‐3
0
3
6
07.1903 03.1904 11.1904 08.1905 04.1906 12.1906 08.1907
‐6
‐3
0
3
6
07.1903 03.1904 11.1904 08.1905 04.1906 12.1906 08.1907
147 
 
The spread between the two markets, which is shown in figures 6 and 7 respectively allows to 
make a point on the efficiency of the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange. Berlin is used as a 
benchmark in terms of efficiency. As it turns out, prices moved equally most of the time. In 
1906 the variance of state bond prices appeared to be somewhat greater. However, an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test shows that the spread of both bond series is stationary. Moreover, 
applying the Engle-Granger two-step method reveals that price series of both Renta and 
Obligations are integrated with its counterpart on the other market.213 Table 4 displays 
corresponding descriptive statistics. 
Considering both security types, mean as well as median prices were slightly higher in Saint 
Petersburg. There is some variation in both spread series though. Unlike to the Renta, the spread 
of the Convertible Obligations possesses a negative skew. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for Renta, Obligations and the differences 
  Renta Petersburg 
Renta 
Berlin 
Spread 
Renta 
Obligations 
Petersburg 
Obligations 
Berlin 
Spread 
Obligations 
Mean 83.17 82.81 0.37 80.37 79.71 0.58 
Median 84.13 84.10 0.28 81.75 81.20 0.65 
Std. Dev. 10.03 10.11 0.83 9.87 9.85 0.95 
Minimum 69.0 65.8 -3.5 63.0 64.0 -5.8 
Maximum 99.5 99.8 6.1 96.9 99.5 3.5 
Skewness 0.15 0.15 1.86 0.17 0.14 -0.59 
Kurtosis 1.61 1.59 11.97 1.65 1.66 5.83 
Source: own calculation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
213 In fact, the two tests are to a large extent equivalent. 
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Results 
 
Tables 5 and 6 contain the event study results regarding Saint Petersburg and Berlin 
respectively. The two markets did not always behave consistently. In nearly all cases however, 
the size and the sign of the abnormal return are almost equal, only the corresponding p-values 
differ. Considering the war events only, this difference is negligible as well. Generally 
speaking, the capital market in Berlin and its investors seemed to react slightly more sensitively 
to political events and adjusted their portfolio accordingly. As the price series were well-
integrated overall, the reason for this varying impact may be due to availability of information. 
War-related events had almost equal impact on both markets. Generally, reporting in Russian 
newspapers was more favourable towards the Tsarist government than abroad, especially in 
times of war.214 Free press was not existent, which is of particular importance in times of 
conflict. During the Russo-Japanese war, the whole media landscape reported patriotically and 
emphasized a Russian superiority over Japanese race and culture. Likewise, the war reporting 
was one-sided and naively ignored the strength of the Japanese military (Grüner 2007, pp. 188). 
Such notion is not reflected in the results presented in Table 5. The assessment of war-related 
events was to large extent equal in Berlin and Saint Petersburg. 
Following Hypothesis 4, there was no significant difference in attitude between investors in the 
East and West. There was no home bias of Russian investors. Even in war times, patriotic 
feeling was less important than the pursuit of profit. In this sense, investment during the early 
20th century was already globalised. Also, the protagonists might in large part have been the 
same on both markets, causing such result. There is evidence of the great importance of foreign 
investors at the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange. The exact ownership of shares is difficult to 
determine, however (Papp 2001, pp. 433).215 
                                                 
214 An exact picture on varying reporting in in Russian and international newspapers would allow more precise 
conclusions. However, this required an intensive historical investigation, which is beyond the scope of this paper.  
215 The majority of shares were bearer and not name shares. Furthermore, many Russian investors deposited their 
shares abroad, which makes it even more difficult to identify the exact origin of capital.  
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Table 5: Results of the event study considering war events 
Date Event (-3; +3) (-7; +7) (0; +7) (-7; 0) 
Petersburg  ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value 
9 Feb 04 First Japanese attack -0.0358 0.010 -0.0438 0.007 -0.0183 0.038 -0.0137 0.064 
30 Apr 04 Battle of Yalu River -0.0042 0.364 -0.0165 0.046 -0.0172 0.042 0.0006 0.880 
10 Aug 04 Battle of the Yellow Sea  -0.0011 0.788 -0.0029 0.508 -0.0013 0.748 -0.0013 0.748 
2 Jan 05 Capitulation of Port Arthur -0.0151 0.054 -0.0167 0.044 -0.0025 0.557 -0.0017 0.692 
10 Mar 05 Mukden Battle -0.0025 0.559 -0.0107 0.098 -0.0079 0.162 -0.0034 0.455 
27 May 05 Battle of Tsushima 0.0029 0.509 0.0050 0.306 0.0021 0.622 0.0021 0.616 
27 Jun 05 Mutiny on Potemkin -0.0028 0.528 -0.0091 0.130 -0.0013 0.757 -0.0056 0.261 
5 Sep 05 Treaty of Portsmouth 0.0150 0.054 0.0543 0.004 0.0038 0.402 0.0475 0.006 
Berlin       
9 Feb 04 First Japanese attack -0.0480 0.009 -0.0616 0.006 -0.0099 0.169 -0.0255 0.032 
30 Apr 04 Battle of Yalu River -0.0127 0.114 -0.0326 0.020 -0.0343 0.018 -0.0008 0.887 
10 Aug 04 Battle of the Yellow Sea  -0.0013 0.813 -0.0064 0.304 0.0037 0.517 -0.0112 0.140 
2 Jan 05 Capitulation of Port Arthur -0.0143 0.093 -0.0186 0.058 -0.0136 0.101 -0.0010 0.846 
10 Mar 05 Mukden Battle -0.0070 0.273 -0.0134 0.103 -0.0093 0.186 -0.0025 0.645 
27 May 05 Battle of Tsushima -0.0005 0.926 0.0068 0.286 0.0019 0.727 0.0043 0.459 
27 Jun 05 Mutiny on Potemkin -0.0035 0.530 -0.0229 0.039 -0.0121 0.123 -0.0105 0.153 
5 Sep 05 Treaty of Portsmouth 0.0196 0.052 0.0498 0.009 -0.0111 0.141 0.0597 0.006 
The upper part of the table shows the results at the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange, the lower part refers to Berlin. Bolded ACAR-values are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6: Results of the event study considering political events 
Date Event (-3; +3) (-7; +7) (0; +7) (-7; 0) 
Petersburg  ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value ACAR p-value 
22 Jan 05 Bloody Sunday 0.0021 0.616 -0.0088 0.137 -0.0024 0.584 -0.0069 0.200 
30 Oct 05 October Manifesto -0.0035 0.442 -0.0219 0.027 -0.0121 0.080 -0.0091 0.130 
5 Dec 05 General strike -0.0053 0.283 -0.0688 0.003 -0.0081 0.155 -0.0583 0.004 
23 Apr 06 First constitution  0.0032 0.478 -0.0021 0.627 0.0051 0.295 -0.0112 0.092 
10 May 06 Opening first Duma 0.0078 0.167 0.0018 0.672 0.0063 0.224 -0.0056 0.263 
21 Jul 06 Dissolution first Duma 0.0160 0.048 0.0398 0.008 -0.0010 0.811 0.0404 0.008 
20 Feb 07 Opening Second Duma -0.0045 0.340 -0.0040 0.384 -0.0020 0.639 -0.0020 0.640 
2 Jun 07 Dissolution second Duma -0.0004 0.924 -0.0026 0.550 -0.0001 0.975 -0.0019 0.660 
Berlin     
22 Jan 05 Bloody Sunday -0.0245 0.035 -0.0086 0.207 0.0010 0.847 -0.0095 0.181 
30 Oct 05 October Manifesto -0.0012 0.829 -0.0419 0.012 -0.0129 0.111 -0.0489 0.009 
5 Dec 05 General strike -0.0371 0.016 -0.0740 0.004 -0.0024 0.663 -0.1034 0.002 
23 Apr 06 First constitution  -0.0126 0.115 -0.0059 0.337 0.0113 0.137 -0.0132 0.106 
10 May 06 Opening first Duma -0.0055 0.365 -0.0179 0.062 -0.0092 0.189 -0.0099 0.169 
21 Jul 06 Dissolution first Duma 0.0184 0.059 0.0278 0.027 0.0116 0.131 0.0149 0.086 
20 Feb 07 Opening Second Duma -0.0163 0.074 -0.0160 0.076 -0.0063 0.309 -0.0077 0.243 
2 Jun 07 Dissolution second Duma -0.0033 0.550 -0.0084 0.217 -0.0137 0.100 0.0032 0.568 
The upper part of the table shows the results at the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange, the lower part refers to Berlin. Bolded ACAR-values are significant at the 10% level. 
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Of all event window specifications, the symmetric two-week window produces the most 
significant outcome. Apparently the effect established over a longer time. According to table 6 
some events apparently have been anticipated in advance and were already priced in. While 
quite realistic with regard to political events, such investment behaviour is far less plausible 
considering war-related events. Here the outcome (of a battle) is stochastic for non-involved 
persons such as investors. As shown in table 5, two events did produce significant abnormal 
returns. The outbreak of the war and the signing of the peace treaty, both with a quite political 
character had been looming for a while, which gives a reasonable explanation for the 
outcome.216 
Overall the stock market reacted to war-related event as hypothesised. All negative abnormal 
returns occurred in the wake of large battles, i.e. Russian defeats. The Treaty of Portsmouth 
was welcomed in both Saint Petersburg and Berlin – in line with common historical assessment 
that considers the treaty as very favourable for the Russian Empire. Hypothesis 3 can be largely 
confirmed. The outcome substantiates previous research on the impact of wars on financial 
markets. Not every ‘great’ battle in resulted in a significant stock market reaction. That 
corresponds quite well with the findings of Willard et al. (1996) and Oosterlinck (2003). 
The mutiny on the battleship Potemkin was not perceived at all by investors. It was popularised 
not until later years, most probably due to its large role in Soviet propaganda and the well-
known movie by Sergey Eisenstein. 
As mentioned before and shown in Table 6, the impact of political events was much greater on 
the Berlin Stock Exchange. The two cases of large public unrest – Bloody Sunday and the 
general strike in December 1905 – were accompanied by a strongly negative price reaction. 
However, it were the harmful consequences of the general strike affecting the whole economy 
that obviously weighted heaviest for investors – much more than the initial uprising, which, 
heavily violent, had a large revolutionary character. In the investors’’ view a revolution was 
apparently not imminent, they rather feared a costly standstill of the economy. Altogether, this 
is a first indication of the validity of the first hypothesis.  
When the October Manifesto was released in 1905, the response on the stock markets was only 
marginal. Any kind of political concession was apparently expected by the public, as the 
reaction one week prior to the event indicates. The other political events follow a consistent 
pattern with respect to the above expectations. Except for the new constitution coming into 
                                                 
216 Prior to the conflict, growing tensions between the later belligerents were widely reported in international 
media. The course of the peace negotiations was also discussed in the press in large measure. The Russian 
delegation had notably close relations to journalists and tried to take advantage by manipulating the (mainly 
American) public (Westwood 1986, p. 158). 
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effect all the events related to democratisation induced negative abnormal returns. Vice versa, 
the reaction of investors was quite positive when the newly established parliament was 
dissolved in July 1906. The first attempt to implement a parliamentary system in Russia was 
dropped after short time only. As it turns out, that happened in the best interests of capital 
owners. When the parliament was dissolved for the second time one year later, no significant 
abnormal price behaviour materialised. Just as before, the Duma had failed to successfully 
cooperate with the government. As Count Witte noted: ‘The dissension between the activity of 
the government and the activity of the Duma was obviously and permanently revealed. It was 
clear that it cannot go on like that’ (Witte 1923, p. 519). The public and investors most likely 
did anticipate the outcome, which was the same as before: Once more, the parliament was 
dissolved by the Tsar. 
Considering the overall market reaction, the first two hypotheses can mostly be confirmed. 
Investors at both the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin Stock Exchange did not welcome 
democratic change. However, they did not realise any threat of a revolution that could enhance 
the risk of failure of government bonds – notwithstanding partially violent uprisings. This study 
fails to find a ‘democratic advantage’ of Russian government bonds,consistent with recent 
literature (See Saiegh 2005; Archer et al. 2007 or Beaulieu et al. 2012). According to hypothesis 
2, such reaction in turn reveals capital owners view on Russia’s development in the long run. 
With no revolution at hand, participation of the masses could be implemented. However, in 
small steps. In the end, a gradual introduction of a parliamentary system – as in most western 
European states – must have been considered a quite realistic option for the Russian Empire as 
well. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Political events in late Imperial Russia mattered for investors throughout Europe. That applies 
for those events related to the Revolution of 1905 as well as to the Russo-Japanese War. Based 
on event study technique, this paper reveals that the prices of Russian government bonds at both 
the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin Stock Exchange reacted sensitively and pretty much in an 
equal manner. 
The particular reaction to political events implies a general anti-democratic attitude of investors. 
Likewise, the price development does not reflect a possible threat of revolution – as claimed by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). Synonymously, a gradual democratic development in the long 
run appeared realistic in the eyes of contemporary capital owners. In the end, this assessment 
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was somewhat optimistic – the Revolution of 1905 effectively served as a blueprint for the 
Bolshevik revolution a decade later. 
The involvement in a military conflict of large scale such as the Russo-Japanese War repelled 
investors. This result corresponds well to the findings of other authors regarding war-related 
events: Historical narrative often differs from the assessment of contemporary investors. Not 
all well-known events – like the battle of Tsushima – did have a large impact on capital 
markets.217 
Finally, both considered markets – Saint Petersburg and Berlin – reacted quite similarly, 
especially to war-related events. There was no distinct home bias of Russian investors. Finally, 
bond prices did not reflect any significant difference in investors’ attitude towards 
democratisation in the East and West. In this respect a globalised political stock market 
including ‘backward’ Imperial Russia was existent already in the early 20th century. 
                                                 
217 Not to mention the mutiny on the battleship Potemkin: though a well-known narrative, it turned out to be of no 
importance for investors. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis examines the interaction of political events and financial markets at both the micro 
and the macro level. As the findings suggest, political information had a quite noticeable impact 
on investment decisions in the beginning of the 20th century. Such result broadly confirms the 
validity of the efficient market hypothesis in its semi-strong form as claimed by Fama (1970) 
as early as in this period. 
Particularly the events related to the Revolution of 1905 – examined in the third part of this 
thesis – often resulted in an instant price reaction at both the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin 
Stock Exchange. The latter one has been investigated frequently and is considered to be largely 
efficient (Burhop 2011; Gelman and Burhop 2008). The major Russian capital market on the 
other hand is largely unexplored in that regard. An examination of government bonds in the 
light of revolutionary as well as events related to the Russo-Japanese War aims to add to the 
picture: an almost equal price reaction to the various events on both markets indicate a high 
degree of information efficiency of the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange at the turn of the 
century. Peripheral financial markets such as this one were apparently globalised well before 
World War I. Participants there followed a rational investment strategy rather than national 
sentiment – just as today, capital seems to be neutral. 
Given the efficiency of markets one can further conclude from the invertors’ reaction. The 
results largely resemble the literature: investors in generally feared the high costs of democratic 
change. However, they did not anticipate a full-scale revolution and most probably saw a 
realistic chance for gradual political change in Imperial Russia, as opposed to the Soviet writing 
of history. As the happening a decade later shows, investors are sometimes profoundly mistaken 
in their appraisal. 
A large-scale military conflict like the Russo-Japanese War levelled down Russian government 
bond prices. Considering the reaction to war-related events, the assessment of contemporary 
investors often seemed to differ from the historical narrative: many well-known events like the 
battle of Tsushima or the mutiny on the battleship Potemkin were not perceived important. 
 
The first two chapters of this thesis consider connections between firms and politics in pre- and 
interwar Germany. Our dataset is hugely comprehensive, as we include all Berlin-listed stock 
companies in 1913, 1925 and 1938 respectively. In this way we can give an overview of 
political connections in Germany in the first half of the 20th century and close a gap in historical 
literature. The choice of time periods further allows us to directly compare three different 
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regime types in terms of the effectiveness of a connection: unlike most of the literature, we fail 
to find distinct benefits of having a board member in parliament in general. Political ties proved 
overall advantageous to share price performance only under National Socialist rule, consistent 
with previous literature on this extreme period of German history (Ferguson and Voth 2008).  
In the first German democracy, a more detailed view reveals how additional value did arise 
from specific types of connection: there, as well as in 1938, the connected person played a 
decisive role. Economic and political heavyweights added considerably to firm performance, 
so did members of a currently governing party. The effect was particularly pronounced in 
certain sectors, in line with the scarce literature in historical context (Braggion and Moore 
2013). Note that the impact on firm performance refers to share prices, which reflect mainly the 
expectations of investors. The actual accounting of affiliated companies – in terms of returns 
on assets – was barely affected at all. Moreover, a clear causal effect is difficult to establish. 
Though we address possible selection bias by performing a variety of robustness checks, the 
main dependent variable remains critical: end-of-year share prices reflect only partially the 
impact of having a connection. 
Our findings suggest that direct benefits from a connection were of minor importance. Rather, 
firms could gain from improved access to political information or to an established political and 
economic network. 
 
In a monarchy by contrast, links to the parliament, although widespread, did not add to the value 
of firms at all. Why these still put great effort in establishing a connection – after all, about 12 
percent of all Berlin-listed firms were interlinked with the parliament in 1913 – remains unclear 
and must be left to future research.  
One explanation for the high level of connectedness is indicated by leaving the steady state 
economy and examining firm performance in times of crises. In these, political connections 
proved extremely advantageous: an examination of the 30 largest stock companies in 1922 
shows that the share prices of connected firms recovered much quicker after the hyperinflation 
two years later. 
Moreover, firms with ties to politics had much better chances to survive over time. Based on 
all firms listed in 1925, we check which of these remained on the market in the following ten 
years. As it turns out, the probability to survive was significantly higher for a connected firm. 
The effect was particularly pronounced during the Great Depression. Seen from this angle, an 
additional benefit becomes apparent: firms, as well as investors regarded a connection as a kind 
of insurance against failure and political backup in economically troubled times. Highlighting 
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this effect constitutes a major aspect of this thesis. As comparable advantage for connected 
firms has been suggested also by historical (Faccio et al. 2006), as well as modern literature 
(Grossman and Woll 2014). These have much better chances of receiving a bailout. By 
implication, the public should be aware when the next bailout is on the agenda. 
 
Our result emphasises the importance of having a board member in the parliament particularly 
for those firms, which are highly exposed to political or economic risks. Although not directly 
apparent, a link to politics proved beneficial already well before the recent financial crisis and 
since then firms have been continuously aiming to bring politicians into their management. 
Probably Richard Cheney hinted at his personal career when he commented on a completely 
unrelated issue in 2004: 
 
‘People...ought to be free to enter into any kind of relationship they want to.’ 
 
Richard Cheney, Washington Post, 25 August 2004 
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